

Dr. Cyrus Kay was born in Iran, and is an American macro-sociologist who completed doctorate studies in 1987 at American University in Washington, D.C. He is known for his book *The Cultural Atlas of Tehran*, and thesis *Social Definition of Crime*. In his newest book *Dialecticism* he skillfully addresses epistemology, philosophy, socio-politico-economy, and presents a new perspective of existence, energy, and human social life.

DIALECTICISM

(RELATIONALISM)

Copyright @ 2021 by Cyrus Kay PhD

All rights reserved.

Title: Dialecticism

Subtitle: A New School of Thought in Philosophy and Socio-Politico-Economy

Submitted to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of the American University in Washington, D.C., in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Macro

Sociology, 1986

First Edition: November 2021

Paperback ISBN 979-8-54553-961-1

No part of this book may be reproduced commercially in any shape or form, digitally or otherwise, without the written permission of the author.

The content of this book is an academic inquiry, and the publisher is not accountable for its claims whatsoever. Neither is the publisher responsible for websites (or their content) that are not owned by the publisher.

Printed and bound in the United States of America on acid-free paper.

to my wife Mahnaz Kay

Contents

PREFACE	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
Dialecticism	
PART I: Dialectical Philosophy	
Chapter 1	15
History of Dialectics	
Chapter 2	28
Dialectical Philosophy	
Dialectical Laws	
PART II Dialectical Epistemology	
Chapter 3	45
The Existential Basis of Knowledge	
Chapter 4	49
Dialectical Methodology	
PART III Social Dialecticism	
Chapter 5	75
What Is Social Dialecticism?	

Chapter 6	89
The General Condition Of Life	
Chapter 7	101
Social Modes of Production and Reproduction of Social Life	
Chapter 8	108
Social Classes	
Chapter 9	124
Social Apparatuses – State Apparatuses	
Chapter 10	139
The Capitalist World System	
Chapter 11	
Dialectical View of Imperialism	174
CONCLUSION	199
BIBLIOGRAPHY	226
FIGURE	
Typology of Class	123
TABLE	
Annual Rate of Growth of Capitalist,	189
Dominated Capitalist and Statist Countries, 1960-1977)	

Preface

With The collapse of the Soviet Union, the change of China's communist system to a Como-Capitalism, and the inefficiency of communist countries, such as Cuba and North Korea, have exposed Marxism to collapse. Therefore, dialecticism tries to present a new school by using Marx's extraordinary achievements in the field of philosophy, epistemology, and methodology, which could not be compiled without studying Marx's works.

Efforts to reproduce, enrich, and update Marxism not only have ignored or misinterpreted Marxist Philosophy and epistemology, but often reduced Marx's political economy (macrosociology) to economism, historicism, humanism, and structuralism.

Therefore, not as a Marxist, but as a Marxian, the purpose of writing this book is not to reconstruct, justify or defend the school of Marxism, but, after studying, re-examining, and a comprehensive critique of the concepts and methodology of Marx, his followers, and other sources, to present a new dynamic school of thought called ***Dialecticism***. In other words, what has emerged from this book is a collection of new philosophical, epistemological, methodological, social, economic, and political concepts that are used to discover the truth and nature of the Universe, mental phenomena, and human social life. In this process, some of Marx's theories have been reinterpreted and others have been rejected, replaced, and new dialectical and scientific perspectives have been presented.

Dialecticism consists of three distinct but related sciences: 1) dialectical philosophy; 2) dialectical epistemology; and 3) dialectical sociology –

distinguished from each other by the differences among their objects.

Dialectical philosophy studies the Universe. The main purpose of this part is to show that, contrary to the theory of the school of idealism and the school of materialism, **The creator of the Universe is neither matter nor idea, but the relationships and exchanges among diverse phenomena or beings which constitute the very existence of the Universe. What is distinctive in dialectical philosophy is its discovery of the law of the increment of the Universe, that is, the law of the increment of energy, practice, exchange, tendencies, interrelations, matter, mental phenomena, and life. Everything in the Universe is alive, and life is nothing more than exchanges, relations, practices among different phenomena, beings, or tendencies. So, the Universe moves from simple to complex and from less to more. In short, the Universe is an incremental creator. This rejects the law of conservation of energy and the theory of the Big Bang.**

Dialectical epistemology has as its object mental phenomena. Here, the objective is an understanding of the existential basis of knowledge and then, it goes on to explain the dialectical mode of production of knowledge - the dialectical methodology as a subfield of epistemology.

Dialectical sociology studies human social life and is devoted to a group of theoretical problems at the heart of the most topical concern of social schools and mainly of Marxism.

The goal of dialecticism is to answer the following questions: 1) What is the existential basis of the universe? 2) What is the existential basis of knowledge? 3)

What is dialectical methodology? 4) What is the general condition of life? 5) What is the mode of production and reproduction of life? 6) What are social classes? 7) What are social institutions? 8) What is the state? and 9) What is the world capitalist system - imperialism? The questions are answered using primarily the secondary sources technique. They culminate in an in-depth examination of the capitalist world system. Central to the discussion is the fact that capitalism is governed by profit motive and competition and is unable to exist and develop by itself.

No remedy can be prescribed for the liberation of people from the aggressive interests and monopolistic/corrupting forces of capitalism except dominated classes organize themselves and transform capitalism to a more humanistic mode of life in which people's will, needs, requirements, well beings, interests, and their continuous development are the chief aim of the process of production and reproduction of life.

Here I must express my deep gratitude to my wife, Mahnaz Kay, who assisted, encouraged, criticized, and supported me in the production of this study. I am also grateful to my parents and to my son, Dr. Atrac Aryan Kay, who prepared the first draft of this book, encouraged me, and gave tremendous and valuable help and contributions in its publication.

Cyrus Kay

Summer of 202

*We live for we do not rest,
Much like the waves, calm is our doom.*

Abu Taleb Kalim Hamedani

Introduction

Sociological theories differ from each other not only because of their philosophical roots, epistemological origins, methodology, and theoretical perspectives, but also in their central tendencies.¹ One may divide these theories into three general categories: micro, middle range, and macro-sociological theories.

In micro-sociology, individuals are observed and studied in isolation, away from their social structure and history.² Micro-sociologists believe they will understand society by analyzing or grasping an individual's mind, self, consciousness, interests, and actions. They examine the biology and psychology of individuals. They care neither about social production, class struggles, state, or international relations; nor are they interested in knowing how society is created, maintained, and changed, but rather how an individual's mind, self, consciousness, and interests are produced, retained, and changed. ***Micro-sociology is a sociology without society.***³

Peter Michael Blau and Robert K. Merton, as two representatives of middle-range sociology, acknowledge that they are not concerned with society.⁴ They believe

1 See C. Wright Mills, *Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 19-24.

2 Micro-sociology includes "Behaviorism," "Symbolic Interactionism," and "Phenomenology."

3 Irvin M. Zeitlin, *Rethinking Sociology* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973). Jonathan H. Turner, *The Structure of Sociological Theories* (Illinois: Dorsey Press,

1978); Margaret M. Polma, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (N.Y.: MacMillan

Publishing Company, Inc, 1979), p. 7

4 There is no one accepted version of micro-middle range, or macro-sociology; therefore, here, I refer to those sociologists who may be considered as the main representatives of these theories.

2 Dialecticism

that sociology is not ripe for comprehensive theory and cannot provide theoretical solutions to major national and international problems.⁵ They attempt to bridge the gap between micro- and macro-sociology; however, they not only fail to connect them, but end up separating them further from each other - as two different spheres with their own laws of existence.⁶ In fact, “middle range theories consist of limited sets of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investigation.”⁷

In macro-sociology, a distinction should be made between grand speculative idealist theories and Marxism.

Structural functionalists and conflict structuralists are among representatives of grand theory. Much like middle range sociologists, they attempt to bridge the gap between micro- and macro-sociological theories by constructing grand theory. They try to connect micro- and macro-levels through institutions (Parsons), or I.C.A., that is, “Imperatively Coordinated Associations” (Ralf Dahrendorf). Here, institutions and “I.C.A.,” as moral authorities, not only train and distribute individuals within the system, but they also determine social structure. They are the daily bread without which societies cannot exist. But we have never been told where do the “moral authority” or “normative order” come from. The grand theoreticians set forth “a realm of concepts from which are excluded many

⁵ Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (N.Y.: John Wiley & Son, Inc., 1964), p. 2; Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (N.Y.: A Division of McMillan Publishing Company, 1968), p. 69

⁶ Johnathan H. Turner, *The Structure of Sociological Theories*, pp. 257-277.

⁷ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (N.Y.: A Division of McMillan Publishing Company, 1968), p. 68.

structural features of human society, features long and accurately recognized as fundamental to its understanding. Seemingly, this is deliberate, in the interest of making the concern of sociologists a specialized endeavor distinct from that of economists and political scientists.”⁸ They do not offer any special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death, and replacement of a given social organism. They are non-historical and ill-suited for past events and international relationships. They fail to account for social changes and transitions. The grand theorists are so rigidly confined to high levels of abstraction that they are unable to apply their concepts to the real processes of social life. They make up universal formal models which are more a game of concepts than an effort to work directly on the existing problems.⁹ In other words, they are so unrealistic and their shortcomings so fundamental that one may cast serious doubt on their scientific value.¹⁰

Marx “was the first,” Lenin said, “to put sociology on a scientific basis, by establishing the concept of an economic formation of society, as a sum of the relations of production, and by establishing the fact that the development of such

8 C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 35.

9 *Ibid.*, pp.33-34.

10 Daniel W. Rossides, (1978:492) believes that "Parsons has neither contributed an original view of human nature and society, nor has he conducted any empirical research." He adds (1978:491) that "even more significant are the difficulties Parsons encounters whenever he leaves his abstract scheme of functional adaptation and analyzes a concrete example of modern society, the United States." On this ground, see, also, Zeitlin, *Rethinking Sociology*, p. vii, 15; Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies* (N.Y.: Harper Torch Books, 1973), p.14; Turner, *The Structure of Sociological Theories*, p. 113.

4 Dialecticism

formation is a process of natural history.”¹¹ In fact, what Marx offers is the science of the “laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher one.”¹²

As a science, Marxism cannot stand still. It is not a historical, eternal, fixed, or abstract formula. “As a historical and revolutionary theory, Marxism requires the continual re-examination of its basic categories and assumptions. In the absence of such critical re-evaluation, theoretical principles can become ossified into outworn formulas which no longer correspond to the reality of contemporary society.”¹³ Hitherto, the efforts to reproduce, enrich, and update Marxism have often been partitioned into reductionism, such as, economism, historicism, humanism, anthropologism, and structuralism.

The first major reinterpretation of Marxism was the economic treatment of Marxism. According to this viewpoint, the whole notion of society must be explained by reference to the economic infrastructure alone. That is the contradiction between the relations of production and the forces of production, and the supremacy of the latter over the former.¹⁴ Here, “technology discloses man’s

11 Quoted by Maurice Cornforth, *Historical Materialism* (N. Y.: International Publishers, 1977), p. 89.

12 “The European Messenger,” quoted by Marx, *Capital*, vol. I (N.Y.: I.P., 1979), p. 19.

13 Val Burris, *Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research*, *Insurgent Sociologists*, (Summer 1979), p. 4.

14 J.V. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, (Peking: F.L.P., 1972); Gustave A. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, (N.Y.: F.A.P.P., 1962); William H. Shaw, *Marx’s Theory of History*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), Maurice Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, (N.Y.: I.P., 1977). On this ground, see, also, Louis Althusser, *Essay in Self Criticism*, (London: NLB., 1976), pp. 14, 88; and *For Marx*, p. 213; N. Poulantzas,

mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them.¹⁵ According to this view, mechanical forces, not men, determine history. The laws of economic development exist objectively outside of men, independently of their will and consciousness. **Thus, for this school, the economic infrastructure constitutes the motive force of history, and Marxism is nothing more than the science of the economic structure of society.**

Historicism in Marxism is a response to the Marxist economist school. Lukács and Gramsci, as typical representatives of this school, reject the distinction between epistemology, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism. They fail to recognize the fundamental principles of Marx's philosophy and epistemology and try to reduce them to historical materialism and then to the science of politics.¹⁶ Thus, "everything that is of real importance in sociology is nothing other than political science."¹⁷ **They concentrate mainly on the study of political structures as the most determining factors of the development of social life, and try to explain the whole notion of society by reference to political relations**¹⁸ **Thus, for them, mechanical forces do not**

Political Power & Social Classes, (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 46, 62-65, 91-104; Burris, "Introduction the Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research." *Insurgent Sociologists*, 1, Summer, 1979.

¹⁵ Marx, in Shaw, Marx's Theory of History, p. 53.

¹⁶ George Lukacs', *History and Class Consciousness* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1976); Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (N.Y.: I.P., 1980). ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-181

dominate history, but men's consciousness does.

Moreover, for Marxist historicists, there is a determination, in the last instance, in the category of totality. "Concrete totality is...the category that governs reality ¹⁹ – the supremacy of the whole over the parts. Marxist historicists see society as a convergent product of totality; history as a homogeneous product of the historical process; classes as a mere subject of history; and class struggle as a fight of collective subjects determined historically by class-consciousness (ideas).²⁰ **Thus, Marxist historicism is the consciousness of historical tasks and necessities. Here, politics is the motive force of history, and Marxism is nothing more than the science of history and politics.** ²¹

Erich Fromm, as a typical representative of the Marxist humanist school, believes that "for Marx's philosophy... the central issue is that of the existence of the real individual man, who is what he is and his 'nature' unfolds and reveals itself in history." ²² From this viewpoint, "Marx's 'materialist' or 'economic' interpretation of history has nothing whatsoever to do with an alleged 'materialistic' or 'economic' striving as the most fundamental drive in human. It does mean that humans, real and total humans, real, living 'individuals' – not the ideas produced by these 'individuals' – are the subject matter of history and of the understanding

¹⁹ George Lukacs', *History and Class Consciousness*, page 10; see also pp. xxi, 3, 27-28.

²⁰ P. Anderson, *Consideration of Western Marxism*, (London: Verso, 1979), p. 70.

²¹ Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London: Verso, 1979), chap. 5.

²² Erich Fromm, *Marxist Concept of Man* (N.Y.: Frederick Ungar Publishing, Co., 1980), p. v.

of its laws. Marx's interpretation of history (is) an anthropological interpretation... It is the understanding of history based on the fact that men are the 'authors and actors' of their history."²³ ***Thus, for Marxist humanists, human is the motive force in history, and Marxism is nothing more than "the full realization of individualism."***²⁴

Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, and Bruno Bettelheim,²⁵ as typical representatives of the Marxist structuralist school, deny the fundamental principles of Marx's philosophy and reduce Marx's dialectical materialism to "the theory of the history of scientific production,"²⁶ and later, by Althusser, to a formal logic, that is, as abstract form, separated from any concrete content.²⁷ Here scientific practices, like idealist methodology, take place entirely in thought.²⁸

Marxist structuralists hold Marx's historical materialism as the science of structures and institutions. For this school, as for structural functionalism, institutions, as "a system of norms or rules," and structures, as a "unity of

²³ Ibid., p. 13

²⁴ Ibid., p. 3

²⁵ Althusser, *For Marx* (London: Verso, 1979); Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital* (London: Verso, 1978); Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: Verso, 1978), and *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1979); Bettelheim, *The Transition to Socialist Economy* (Great Britain: The Harvester Press Limited, 1975).

²⁶ Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 11; see also Anderson, *Arguments within English Marxism*, (London: Verso, 1980), pp.5-6.

²⁷ Althusser, *Essay in Self Criticism*, (London: Verso, 1976), pp.37, 158-159.

²⁸ Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 12-18; Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 42-43, 91, 183,

186; and *Essay in Self Criticism*, pp. 190-191, 193-194, see also, Applebaum, "Born again Functionalism", in *Insurgent Sociologists*, (Summer 1979) p. 19.

8 Dialecticism

determinate ideological unity,”²⁹ are the daily bread without which societies cannot exist. Thus, according to Marxist structuralists, social formation, as the hierarchized overlapping intersecting economic, political, and ideological structure, is the real basis of social life and its transformation; it is the site of the uneven development of the different modes of production; the strategic intersection of different forms of states, various contradictions; the locus of class determination and class consciousness; the place of the reproduction of the economic, political, and ideological relations; the nodes of the existence of imperialism; and, in short, it is the motive force of history.³⁰ Thus, the science founded by Marx is nothing more than the science of social formations.

Marxism, for sure, cannot be limited exclusively to the science of social life, but Marx’s dialectical Materialism and epistemology (including methodology), without which Marxism cannot be understood.³¹

Marxism, for sure, is not economism, historicism, humanism, or structuralism: in fact, as we shall see, Marxism on several fundamental points is opposed to any reductionism.

However, these theoretical problems, gaps, and shortcomings suggest the need for a deep re-examination of the basic categories and assumptions of Marxism. The motivating forces behind this re-examination are 1) the dialectical relationship

²⁹Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 67. By structure, Poulantzas (1978:115) means an ideological function which “covers the organizing matrix of institutions.”

³⁰ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 16, 23, 30, 31, 49; *Political Power*, pp. 41, 46, 144; and *State Power Socialism*, pp. 25, 44-45.

³¹ Marx, unlike Weber, does not isolate the human sciences either from philosophy or natural sciences, but believes in dialectical interdependency among sciences.

between theory and practice, that is, the encounter through which theoretical formulations are modified in their course of practical application and in response to the need to account for the development of ongoing processes of social life; and 2) the dialectical dialogues, on the one hand, between Marxism and other schools of thought, and, on the other hand, within Marxism.³² In fact, it is within this context of double dialectical relations between theory and fact, and the dialogue between this study and other schools of Marxism, that we try to develop dialecticism. **Thus, the basic theme and the general strategy of this study is the production of the most concrete knowledge of the nature of human social life, to provide the most scientific and humanistic guides for its development.**

Dialecticism

Dialecticism is a continuation – but on no account a repetition – of Marxism. Although it uses the fundamental principles of Marxism as its primary source and its basic means for production of scientific knowledge, dialecticism is opposed to Marxism with regards to several concepts. **It is called dialecticism for it is the recognition of the relations between/among different phenomena/being, which**

32 Burris, “Introduction,” p. 4. “In the absence of such critical reflection” writes Burris (1977:4) “theoretical principles can become ossified into outworn formulas which no longer correspond to the reality of the contemporary society.” Alfred North Whitehead writes (Quoted by Merton, 1968:1): “a science which hesitates to forget its founder is lost.”

10 Dialecticism

constitute the very essence of all natural, social, and mental phenomena. It is neither idealism nor materialism, but relationism, because neither idea nor matter, but interrelations between/among several beings that are conceived as the ultimate elements of reality, the secret of all beings, the true soul of life that are the basic condition of existence and the key to the survival, self-movement, and changes in all phenomena. It is, in fact, with this philosophical perspective that dialecticism begins.

Dialecticism is made up of three distinct but dialectically interrelated scientific practices: 1) dialectical philosophy or philosophical dialecticism; 2) dialectical epistemology or epistemic dialecticism; and 3) dialectical sociology or social dialecticism, distinguished from each other by differences among their objects.

Part I of this study is centered on dialectical philosophy. Dialectical philosophy encompasses as its object all phenomena. It is the science of the laws of practices among diverse beings which regulate the origin, existence, and changes in all natural, social, and mental phenomena.³³ Along with this part, three principals themes will be studied:

1. To demonstrate that Marxism does entertain a philosophy (a world outlook).³⁴
2. Attempt shall be made to prevent Marx's philosophy from fragmentation and

³³ What is, then, the distinction between philosophy and the other sciences? Kedrov (in Wetter, 1973:250) believes that "whereas the special sciences confine their inquiries to a particular portion of reality...philosophy's inquiries are directed to the laws operative in reality as a whole."

³⁴ Marxism is a general theory seeking to make assertions about the universe, thought, and social life.

descend into idealism, materialism, methodologism, reasonism, humanism, positivism, and historicism.³⁵

3. Attempt will be made to discover the general laws of existence of all phenomena.

What makes this section revolutionary and attractive is the new discovery of the law of the increment of the Universe, i.e. the law of increment of energies, beings, tendencies, matter, mental phenomena, and life. According to this philosophical law, phenomena have evolved not only from simple to complex or from quantitative changes to qualitative ones, but also from less to more. Moreover, by regarding exchange relations between/among different beings as the cornerstone of dialectical philosophy and existences, and by holding matter and idea just as a mode of existence of the interrelations among diverse tendencies, Part I of this book transforms Marx's dialectical materialism to the Philosophical Dialecticism or to the philosophical "Relationalism".

Part II is centered on dialectical epistemology (epistemic dialecticism). Dialectical epistemology has as its object mental phenomena. It is the science of the origin, existence, changes, and transformation of all mental phenomena, or, in short, it is the ontology of thought. The basic themes of this section are:

1. Dialecticism regards epistemology as a science of nature and scope of knowledge. 2. Epistemology is not the same as philosophy.

³⁵ See Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 254-255, 281; Fisk, in Mephram and Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 127; Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 11; Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 67-70, 58, 159; Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, pp. 133, 434-436.

That is why we reject Engels, Althusser, Poulantzas, Politzer, and many other Marxists, who try to transfer Marx's dialectical epistemology to Marx's philosophy (to his world outlook). We also reject Colletti, or any other speculative Marxist, who has tried to reduce Marx's epistemology to the science of logic.³⁶ 3. To recognize the existential basis of knowledge, that is, to highlight the relations between thought and being, and between thought and thought. 4. Once this groundwork is laid, as a subfield of epistemology, we study dialectical methodology and method, that is, dialectical mode of production of knowledge.

Part III presents social dialecticism. This section is devoted to a group of theoretical problems, which are at the heart of the most topical concern of Marxism. Social dialecticism has as its object social phenomena. It is the science of those exchanges or conflicting practices, which form and regulate the very origin, existence, changes, and development of human social life.

Social dialecticism is a dialectical macro sociology, or socio-political economy, which does not separate social, political, and economic relations. So, it has at its object all social relations, all tendencies, all social phenomena, all mental and material means of production and reproduction of human social life, and nature. Dialectical sociology is the science of laws that exist in the essence and nature of social phenomena. Its primary aim is the production of the most concrete knowledge about social life and to provide scientific and humanistic guides for its development. Thus, social dialecticism is not merely a process of production of scientific knowledge about the nature of social phenomena, but it is also a scientific and humanistic means of changing its object, i.e., social

phenomena. It is a revolutionary practice for making history.

In this section we try to move mentally from the general condition of life to its fundamental constituent relations and forces. Here, we start from the fact that to live, humans have some basic, historically created needs, interests, and demands. To satisfy them, men enter a dialectically interrelated relations with nature, with each other, and with their mental and material means of production and reproduction, and consumption of their social life.³⁶

These distinct but dialectically interrelated practices constitute the general condition and the ultimately determining elements of social life, and are, therefore, a clue to its understanding.

Social life has not always been the same, but much like natural phenomena, it has passed through different stages. The specific way that men interrelate with nature, with each other, and with their mental and material means identifies different social modes of production and reproduction of life. With these new concepts of the general condition of life and social modes of production and reproduction of life, social dialecticism arrives at completely new concepts of class relations, social apparatuses, and states, which hitherto have been either ignored or not realized by macro sociologists, including Marxists.

Social dialecticism is against the isolation of sociology from philosophy, natural sciences, epistemology, and history. It is an effort to prevent Marx's historical materialism from fragmentation into economics, historicism,

³⁶ See Part II.

humanism, and structuralism. It maintains the impossibility of isolation of social, political, and economic relations from each other or from class relations. So, by socio-politico-economy, we mean dialectical interconnections of social, political, economic relations, so that, each one has been produced and functioning by the two others and their class relations. Dialecticism retains the impossibility of separation of superstructure from infrastructure. It holds the impossibility of the reduction of social modes of production and reproduction of life to any economic, political, or ideological mode of practice. Social dialecticism breaks with all those Marxists who try to define social classes within the process of material production. It will break with all those Marxists, who regard apparatuses (institutions) and, especially, any state apparatus as a passive instrument in the hands of this or that class; as a reflection of economic, political, or ideological relations; as a sui-generis structure with its own will; as an absolute subject; or as something external, alongside, above or under class relations.

Social dialecticism rejects Marx's theory of value and surplus value. In Part III, we try to show how machines, like humans, can produce value and surplus value.

This study departs from all those Marxists who regard the globalization as the result of the trade between nations, or as the outcome of articulation of structural levels of different social formations ³⁷ and strives to explain globalization as an extension of capitalism, an articulation of different modes of production and reproduction – class relations.

PART I

Dialectical Philosophy

CHAPTER 1

The History of Dialectics

Dialectics Before Marx

The word dialectics from the Greek expression “dialego” originally meant the art of conversation, discussion, or debate.³⁸ Dialectics perhaps originated in the fifth century B.C. Aristotle attributes the earliest invention and employment of dialectics to Zeno of Elea. For Zeno, dialectics was the refutation of the hypotheses of opponents by drawing unacceptable consequences from those hypotheses. As this method relies on logical arguments for philosophical purposes, Zeno can be regarded as a pioneer of the science of formal logic.³⁹ Zeno believes that being is one and without motion. He regards the concept as the form of the real and the conceptual world as the only true world. Thus, for Zeno, a pioneer of idealism, dialectics involves negation in the form of a break with direct experience; that is the negating character of thinking as the only way to truth.⁴⁰

38 J. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 4; N. Bukharin, *Historical*

Materialism, p. 75; Politzer, *The Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 159.

39 R. Hall, “Dialectic,” in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 385-386; Lee, *Zeno of Elea* (London: Cambridge, 1963).

40 *Ibid.*, p. 386.

16 Dialecticism

Heraclitus (544-475 B.C.), known as the father of dialectical materialism, was the first to give us a dialectical concept of the Universe.⁴¹ He believed that the Universe was not created by God, man, or idea, but it was, it is, and ever will be a living process which systematically changes. To him, things in the world were divided into opposites, and changes could be expressed as relations between opposites.⁴² He tried to understand the world in its interrelations rather than in its material form.⁴³ To him, everything flows, nothing is constant. Contradiction is inherent in all things; everything is an interrelation of opposites or different beings. Thus, he believed that it is only through these interrelations of opposites that one can discover the essence of the Universe.⁴⁴

Dialectics, in the hands of sophists, lost its logical/philosophical basis, and became a mere instrument for winning a dispute, or, in Plato's terminology, a technique of eristic argument.⁴⁵

Socrates stands in contrast to the sophists, and unlike them, he was seeking the truth by questions and answers from all sides. Thus, dialectic for Socrates became the art of arriving at the truth by dialogue, by the disclosing of the contradictions in

41 Politzer, *The Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, pp. 86-88.

42 J.O. Urmson, ed., *Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, (N.Y.: Hawthorn Books Inc., 1976). p.162; Lenin, quoted by Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 12.

43 Ibid.

44 Politzer, *The Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 164.

45 Ronald Hall, *Dialectic*, p. 384.

the argument of opponents and overcoming these contradictions.⁴⁶ He regarded the dialectician as the man who knows how to ask and answer questions.

Plato introduced dialectics as the power of thinking and comprehending the highest level of the world of ideas. As such, dialectics is, primarily, the art of extracting all the positive or negative consequences contained in an idea, and secondly, it is the rational movement of thought, which ascends by successive stages from perceptible data to ideas.⁴⁷ Plato held that only “ideas” exist in reality; therefore, ideas were the genera of being, the eternal and immutable principle of things, which had direct connection with God. Thus, to him dialectics is nothing more than the science of ideas.

Aristotle held that dialectics does not involve inductive reasoning. It is not a method of acquiring knowledge proper or science. Dialectics is essentially different from philosophy. It is in fact a technique of persuasion which is grounded in probable premises space (logic of probability), that is, those premises accepted by everyone, or by philosophers. It is the theory of correct reasoning; it is “a process of criticism; it contains the path to the principles of all inquiries.” And, as such, it is useful intellectual training for discussion with others. Thus, a

DIALECTICISM REJECTS THE CLASSIC LAW OF CONSERVATION OF ENERGY AND THE THEORY OF THE BIG BANG.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 159, Robinson, *Plato’s Earlier Dialectic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Hall, *Dialectic*. p.386.

18 Dialecticism

dialectician is one “who knows how to claim and contest.”⁴⁸

Dialectics, in the Middle Ages, was known either as the ordinary name for logic, or as a part of logic. The idea of negation as a positive power of knowing received further development and was a popular method among theologians. In this period, the materialist point of view of dialectics was also developed by Spinoza, Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, and La Mettrie.⁴⁹

We might not understand Kant’s dialectics unless we grasp his transcendental doctrine of elements:




Figure 1: Kant’s Transcendental Doctrine

One of the fundamental concepts of Kant’s philosophy is that perceiving and

⁴⁸ Evans, *Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectics*, (London: Cambridge, 1977); Owen, *Aristotle on Dialectics*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1977); Hall, *Dialectics*,

p. 387; Urmson in *Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy*.

⁴⁹ Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. 58.

thinking, on the one hand, and understanding and reasoning, on the other hand, are different. Thus, the aesthetic/logic line traces a distinction between senses and intellect. Apprehension of particulars belongs to the faculty of senses or aesthetic; apprehension of concepts belongs to logic. And the analytic/dialectic line similarly distinguishes between understanding and reasoning. In other words, Kant sees the analytic as concerned with one intellectual faculty (understanding), and dialectic with dialogue with each other, i.e., with reason. He also draws a distinction between analytical judgment and dialectical (synthetic) judgment. In fact, Kant's transcendental dialectics was a critique of a dialectical illusion of his time. It was concerned with exposing the illusion of the transcendental judgments, which profess to pass beyond the limits of experience.⁵⁰ It is worth noting here that Kant regards the unity of opposites as the structure of reality, and negation as the fundamental determination of everything positive.⁵¹

Hegel gave a new turn and perspective to dialectics. To him, dialectics is not merely a process of thought or kind of reasoning, but it is the science of the world-process for the whole universe. Reverting to the old idea of Heraclitus, he believes that the universe exists in constant motion, changes, transformations, and developments.⁵² Hegel, for the first time, transferred the power of negation beyond Kant's transcendental sphere and regarded it as "the energy of thinking" and as a

50 Bennet, Kant's Dialectic, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

51 Ibid.

52 Politzer, Elementary Principles of Philosophy, P.91; Urmson, in Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Hall, Dialectic.

20 Dialecticism

determination of substance itself. As Hegel was an idealist, dialectics, in his hand, became the science of the motion of thought. It was regarded as the movement of an idea through successive stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis until the absolute idea is attained. Thus, dialectics is a progression from one logical determination to another; it is the “scientific application of the regularity found in the nature of thought.”⁵³

Here, the idea has a direct connection with God and constitutes the fundamental condition of existence and motive force of history. Thus, although Hegel was a dialectician, he subordinated dialectics to idealism. He denies the true reality of things, and ascribes being to the idea, as the real substance of existence.⁵⁴

Since, for Hegel, thought and being are identical, dialectics as the science of the motion of thought is, at the same time, the science of formal logic and a theory of being. Hence, no separation of philosophy from epistemology or logic is possible or appropriate.⁵⁵

⁵³ Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, P.151; Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, P. 67.

⁵⁴ Mao Zedong, *Selected Readings* (Peking: F.L.P., 1971), p. 86; Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, pp. 14, 19-20, 59; Mepham & Ruben, *Dialectics and Method*, (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 1979); Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, (N.Y.: M.R.P., 1972), p. 111, and *Marxism and Hegel*, (London: N.L.B., 1973), p. 7; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, (Connecticut: G.P., 1973), pp.4-7, 35, 45, and *Soviet Ideology Today*, (N.Y.: F.A.P.P., p. 1966), pp.15- 18; Parsons, *Social System and the Evaluation of Action Theory*, (N.Y.: F.P., 1977) p. 153.

⁵⁵ Hegel believes that the mode of consciousness is represented in two forms: first, “in itself” which covers the original identity of the hidden undeveloped contradiction within a thing; second, “for itself” which seeks to grasp the contradiction and is the locus of their conflict.

Marx's Dialectics

Marx's philosophical efforts were largely transformed by Hegel's idealism and Feuerbach's materialism. "Marx's dialectic is not only different from the Hegelian but is its direct opposite. The process of thinking, which under the name of the idea, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurges of the real world, and the real world is the external phenomenal form of the idea. With Marx, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought." ⁵⁶

Marx and Engels rescued dialectics from its idealistic world and applied it in the material conception of nature and history, as their world outlook (philosophy), which was called later dialectical materialism by the Russian Marxist G.V. Plekhanov. In fact, dialectical materialism was born, linked to, dependent on, progressed, and evolved with the positive sciences. "Where speculation ends – in real life – where real positive science begins... Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place." ⁵⁷

For dialectical materialism, things in the world have the character of self-movement. Their essence consists in the fact that they rest upon real contradictions, which impel them into change and motion. Hence, dialectical materialism regards things in their motion, changes, life, and their reciprocal influence on one another. Nothing is final, absolute, sacred, or eternal. Things do

⁵⁶ Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 19.

⁵⁷ Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 48.

22 Dialecticism

not remain themselves. There exists no matter without motion. Things go through uninterrupted changes of coming into being and passing away. Motion and changes are, in fact, the mode of existence of matter.

Dialectical materialism has at its object all phenomena. It strives to grasp the nature of the universe.⁵⁸ It is the “science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”⁵⁹ It is the “comprehensive and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, (and) at the same time...the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up.”⁶⁰

Dialectics After Marx - Classical and Modern Marxist

Concepts of Dialectics After Marx, dialectical materialism was interpreted and defined in many ways by his followers, 1) as the science of thought; 2) as the science of the contradiction in phenomena; 3) as the science of politics and history; 4) as the science of logic; 5) as the method of scientific analyses; 6) as the method of presentation; and 7) as the science of sciences – the spirit of science. These different Marxist concepts of Marx’s dialectical materialism will be understood better if we continue to study dialectics historically.

⁵⁸ Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, pp.3, 12-15; Mao Zedong, *Selected Work*, p. 86; Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 19-20; Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 47-49, 141; A.J. Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, (N.Y.; Random House, 1965), p. 20; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. 75; Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, p. 244; E. Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*, p. 8; M. Fix, “Dialectic and Ontology,” in Mephram & Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 140.

⁵⁹ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, P. 155.

⁶⁰ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 20.

The first misinterpretation of Marx's philosophy was offered by Engels. He believed that "as soon as each separate science is required to get to its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous. What still independently survives of all former philosophy is the science of thought and its law - formal logic."⁶¹ "The great basic question of all philosophy... is concerning the relation of thinking and being."⁶² Engels excludes nature and history from Marx's philosophy and regards it as the theory of knowledge. Thus, according to him, dialectical materialism is superfluous and must be destroyed, and yet preserved in positive sciences, and every attempt at resurrecting it would be taking one step backwards.⁶³ Hence, what separates Marxism from idealism is not a philosophical question but an epistemological one.⁶⁴

For Lenin, dialectics is the "study of contradiction in the very essence of objects. It is the doctrine of the unity of opposites."⁶⁵ It is "the recognition of the contradictory, mutually exclusive opposite tendencies, and all phenomena and the process of nature."⁶⁶ **Lenin's concept of dialectics leaves us with a big mystery.**

⁶¹ Engels, quoted by Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 251.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 281.

⁶³ *Ibid*, pp. 138, 251, 254-255; see also *Anti-Dühring*, p. 43.

⁶⁴ Engels says: "The question of the relation of thinking to being...is the paramount question of the whole philosophy...The answer which philosophers gave to this question split them in two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature...comprised the camp of idealism, the other, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism (quoted by Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p.13).

⁶⁵ Lenin, quoted by Althusser, *For Marx* pp.193-194; see also Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* p. 9.

First, it is not enough to posit the contradictions inside phenomena, without telling us anything about where they come from. Second, Lenin, by focusing on internal contradictions, isolates phenomena from each other and their condition of existence, and fails to study phenomena in their interrelations, that is, in their internal and external relations – in their life, which is the only way to eliminate artificial isolation. Nothing lives internally, therefore, to study phenomena internally is to isolate or to kill the object, and study not a real object, but a dead one.

Lenin, in *Materialism and Empiric-Criticism* changes his mind. Therein his concept of dialectics becomes “the theory of knowledge of Hegel and Marxism,” ⁶⁷ or is characteristic of all human knowledge in general. Therefore, Lenin, much like Hegel, claims that logic, epistemology, and philosophy are the same. ⁶⁸ And he, much like Engels, believes that what separates dialectical materialism from idealism is not a philosophical question but an epistemological one. ⁶⁹

As modern Marxists, Marxist historicists deny Marx’s philosophy, and attempt to reduce his dialectical materialism to historical materialism, which is, to them, nothing more than the science of politics and history. ⁷⁰ “The great conquest in the history of modern thought,” says Gramsci... “is precisely the concrete historicizing

66 Lenin, quoted by Cornforth, *Materialism and Dialectical Method*, p. 54.

67 Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, (N.Y.: I.P., 1973), p. 379.

68 See Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp.253, 258.

69 Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, p. 274.

70 Gramsci, *Selection from The Prison Notebooks*, p. 13.

of philosophy and its identification with history.⁷¹ “Only knowledge of society,” Lukacs says, “and the men who live in it is of relevance to philosophy.”⁷² It is worth noting here that later, Lukacs, in his statements of 1962, acknowledged that all the theoretical shortcomings of his work, *History and Class Consciousness*, were based on two essential points: 1) the failure to recognize the fundamental principle of the Marxist theory of knowledge; and 2) the denial of Marx’s dialectic of matter.⁷³

Marxist humanists believe that “for Marx’s philosophy the central issue is that of the existence of the real individual man.”⁷⁴ Man, as the substance of the world, is the object of philosophy. Marx’s philosophy is neither materialism, nor idealism, but humanism. It is nothing more than “spiritual emancipation of man.”⁷⁵

Marxist structuralists believe that “dialectical materialism (Marx’s philosophy) has as its particular object the production of knowledge, that is the structure and functioning of the process of thought. Strictly speaking, the object of dialectical materialism is the theory of the history of scientific production.”⁷⁶ But some

71 Ibid., pp. 434-436; see also Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, pp. 128-130.

72 Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. xvi.

73 Cited by Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, (London: B.L.B., 1973), p. 191.

74 E. Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*, pp. v, vi.

75 Ibid.

76 Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 3; see, also, Gregor, *A Survey in Marxism*, p. 17; Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, p. 251; Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 7.

26 Dialecticism

Marxist structuralists go one step further and try to transfer Marx's philosophy to logic. For example, for "Althusser the First," that is, Althusser in *Reading Capital* and *For Marx*, "philosophy was and is nothing but epistemology."⁷⁷ He says, "the method Marx used in his theoretical practice is precisely the Marxist dialectics."⁷⁸ But there is another Althusser, "Althusser the Second," whose mission is to transfer Marx's philosophy to logic. He puts forward the following prepositions:

1. Philosophy is not (a) science....
2. Philosophy has no object....
3. Philosophy has no history....
4. Philosophy is politics -logic- in the field of theory.⁷⁹

More recently, Lucio Colletti has claimed that dialectics and materialism are necessarily incompatible. He believes that "it is meaningless to speak...of any general law of development of nature, society, and thought."⁸⁰ For Colletti, the dialectic of matter is the relation between being and thought. He, much like Althusser, reduces Marx's philosophy to epistemology, and from there to formal logic, or reason, which accounts for understanding the world as the product of

⁷⁷ Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 174, see also pp. 162, 173, 206; Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, pp. 37, 89-90, 93, 131, 145.

⁷⁸ Althusser, *Essay in Self-Criticism*, (London: N.L.B., 1976), p. 124.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 67, see also pp. 37-38, 58-59, 67-70, 71-72, 150, 159.

⁸⁰ Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin* (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1972), P. 6.

⁸¹ For Colletti (1973:244-245), "reason is the genus of all empirical genera, it is the 'totality; and comprehension of everything. Reason is both everything and nothing: it is 'this as well as that' and also 'neither this nor that'; the 'receptacle' of everything and common in all things, without being any of the particular things or natural species within reason. This accounts for the *tactig seite* and the possibility of understanding of the world as the actualization

ideas.⁸¹ Colletti says that everything is itself and its opposite. Matter exists when it is an idea, and it does not exist when it is in-itself and not an idea. It is this contradiction which puts everything in motion.

He goes back to Kant and makes a distinction between real and logical oppositions. It is not real opposition which involves contradiction, but an unreal reality. Material reality, finite, has its essence in idea, infinite; therefore, matter is idea. But there is no special reason why a materialist outlook should not stress the necessary development, opposition, and changes in things – which is what Marx took to be the core of the dialectic – without asserting that the finite (real) necessarily develops or changes into the infinite- idea.⁸² However, for these Marxists (Marxist idealists), logical categories constitute the substance of all things. They do not only explain the phenomena, but they move them.⁸³

ENGELS EXCLUDES NATURE FROM MARX'S PHILOSOPHY AND REGARDS IT AS THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. FOR ENGELS, MARX'S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IS SUPERFLUOUS AND MUST BE DESTROYED, AND EVERY ATTEMPT AT RESURRECTING IT WOULD BE TAKING ONE STEP BACKWARDS.

of man and of his multi-formed spirit. It also accounts for the conception that sees objects as the objectification of the subject himself.”

82 Ruben, “Marxism and Dialectic,” in Mepham and Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 55.

83 Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, (N.Y.: M.R.P., 1972), p. 6, and *Marxism and Hegel*, (London: N.L.B., 1973), pp. 20-21, 49, 61, 198; Mepham & Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, pp. xi, 19, 54.

CHAPTER 2

Dialectical Philosophy

The previous chapter focused on the history of dialectics and, at the same time, tried to show the philosophical gaps and shortcomings within Marxism. This chapter is mainly based on the five following propositions:

1. To save philosophy from fragmenting into positivism, historicism, idealism, humanism, economism, reasonism, methodologism, and epistemologism.

2. Rejecting the primacy of matter over relation and rejecting the primacy of Marx's materialism over dialecticism – relationalism.

3. The Universe and all its components and all phenomena are alive.

4. The discovery of the law of the incremental of energy, the Universe, and life. The Universe is the creator and not only goes from simple to complex, but it also goes from less to more, i.e., the Universe getting bigger.

5. The Universe has self-sufficient life, i.e. the relationship among beings or existences of the Universe provides conditions for quantitative and qualitative changes, growths, evolutions, diversities, production, and reproduction of life, for increment of the Universe itself and its constituent parts, such as, energy, matter, and mental phenomena. So, the Universe does not need God to create the world, the universe itself is the creator of itself by relations among its constituent parts, by quantitative, qualitative changes and by its incremental process from less to more.

To develop these philosophical perspectives, it is essential to consider: a. What is philosophical dialecticism? b. What are dialectical laws of the universe?

What Is Dialectical Philosophy?

Philosophical dialecticism or dialectical philosophy is a re-evaluation of Marx's philosophy. It is called philosophical dialecticism because it is the most comprehensive and affirmative recognition of relations among diverse beings which constitute the very essence of existences and all phenomena; because it is the scientific explanation of the essence of the Universe in its organic process of existence, development, changes, production, and reproductions. In other words, it is the scientific application of the laws and regularities occurring in the essence of all natural, social, and mental phenomena;⁸⁴ because its object, method, and its scientific point of view are based on relations; because it is the science of the laws of incremental of energy and the Universe;⁸⁵ in short, because it is the science of relations among existences, or the science of life in general. The objects of philosophical dialecticism are all phenomena, or all constituent parts of the Universe. It does not look for the properties of things. It is not a descriptive technique, not a process of differentiation, codification, or generalization of any object, but it has as its central

84 Meikle, "Dialectical Contradiction and Necessities," in Mephram and Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 26; Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 5; Stalin, In Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 213; Wetter, *Soviet Ideology Today*, (N.Y.: F.A.P.P., 1966), p. 4.

85 Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* p. 3; Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, (N.Y.; Random House, 1965), pp. 48-49; Wetter *Dialectical Materialism*, (Connecticut: G.P., 1973), pp. 96-97, 153, 249-250, and *Soviet Ideology Today*, (N.Y.: F.A.P.P., p. 1966), pp. 4-5. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. xv; Politzer *Elementary Principal of Philosophy*, pp. 4-5

tendencies the understanding of the essence of its object, to explain its origin, existence, and its evolution. **Dialectical philosophy goes behind the appearance of those interrelations among diverse existences which constitute the real essence of its objects. Hence, the object of philosophical dialecticism is a relational object which changes constantly. It studies all phenomena in their interrelations and changes. Therefore, changes, contradictions, structures, or ideas are not our real point of departure, but interrelations among diverse tendencies of existences which constitute the existential basis of our object and, as such, can explain the changes, contradictions, structures, development, and evolution of all phenomena. In fact, scientific representation of the Universe is possible and can be built up just in a relational way. If we are asked why philosophical dialecticism focuses on interrelations among diverse existents, our answer is that being without exchanges or relations is impossible, because exchange is the hidden basis and the secret of the existence and the evolution of all phenomena, the true soul of life, and the key to the self-movement of things. And, as such, relations constitute the most essential element of any reality and is the mother of all happening.**

Here, by relation, exchange, interrelation, connection, we mean transmission of an object or objects (that are all energetic, material, social, and mental phenomena, and their different combinations) among diverse beings which can be realized, characterized, and materialized by quantitative or qualitative changes, that is, the process of taking, giving, or both which creates change and motion. And by tendencies of beings, of existents, and of mental and material phenomena, we mean needs, wills, vital necessities, inclinations, interests, potentialities, forces, and ability of a phenomenon to have relations internally and externally with other.

In other words, we mean the state of being real, i.e., the potentialities of all mental and material phenomena to have relations internally and externally, and consequently, to change quantitatively and qualitatively, to create new phenomena, to go from simple to complex, and to go from less to more. **So, all beings have potential energy for having internal and external relations.**

Hence, (1.) the tendencies of diverse beings or existences, (2.) relations between beings, and (3.) changes, including quantitative and qualitative changes, i.e., evolution, creating new beings, and going from less to more, are the triangle and essence of life and existences. There is a dialectical interrelation among the triangle of existence, namely, there will be no relation and no changes without the tendencies of diverse existences, there are no diverse tendencies without interrelations and changes, or there are no changes without interrelations among diverse beings.

Philosophy, as a science, does not question the foundation of other sciences, or vice versa, but the process of differentiation among sciences lead to a more exact determination of their objects. Whereas the other sciences are confined to some portion of reality, philosophy investigates the laws that operate in realities and existences. Hence, dialectical philosophy is neither superfluous, nor does it constitute a science above other science, namely, the mutual relations between philosophy and other sciences do not consist in subordination of one to the other. But as a general science, dialectical philosophy may furnish scientific means for sciences or vice versa.

Dialectical Philosophy Laws

As we saw, dialectical philosophy has as its object all phenomena - the Universe, and, as an ontological science, it has at its core a tendency to grasp the essence of its object. Thus, it is the main goal of dialectical philosophy to discover the laws of the complex relations among existents which regulate the origin, existence, and development of all phenomena.

Dialectical laws do not fall from the sky, and they come from no spiritual world. They are neither logical laws, nor the embodiment of reason. They are not discovered by one object. But dialectical laws are the most general comprehensive tenets of the existences of the Universe and its development; therefore, "it leaves out of account the particularities of each separate individual process."⁸⁶

Dialectical laws are abstracted from the essence of all natural, social, and mental phenomena.⁸⁷

Dialectical laws are: 1. The law of different types of relations among diverse tendencies as the secret of existence. 2. The law of transformation from quantitative to qualitative changes. 3. The law of creating new phenomena. 4. The law of increment of the Universe, energy, matter, ideas, and in one word, life in general, namely, the law of transformation of the Universe and all its constituent parts from simple to complex and from less to more. 5. The law of potential energy or tendency of all phenomena that enable them to communicate, exchange, or having relations with others.

⁸⁶ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, P. 155.

⁸⁷ Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, (N.Y: I.P., 1979), p. 26; Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, (N.Y.; Random House, 1965), pp. 48-50.

The Universe as a System of Complex Interconnected Practices

When we observe the world around us, the first thing we encounter is the fact that the Universe is not “an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of each other. But a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are connected originally with, dependent on, and determined by each other.”⁸⁸ Quantum Mechanics says: “the Universe is full of beings that are connected and interconnected with each other, where distance and time have no role. Where one end of the Universe is connected or related to the other end, they affect each other and change and move constantly.”

Dialectical philosophy does not regard the universe as a mental product, spiritual unity or as a simple whole. **For philosophical dialecticism, the Universe is by its very nature relational. Everything in the universe exists and develops through relations among diverse tendencies - No relations, no Universe, or no life. Being without relations is unthinkable; therefore, things identify themselves in their relations, i.e., in their internal and external relations. These relationships also determine the nature of each existence.**

It is worth mentioning that beings have the potential power or tendencies that enable them to communicate or to interrelate with other existents. In fact, it is with this dynamic view of the nature of phenomena that dialectical philosophy, as a relational philosophy (Relationalism), expresses its identity and separates itself from materialism and idealism. Here, things are considered in their tendencies or potential energy and relations, in their

88 Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, p. 5.

internal and external interrelations. Thus, things with their potential power or tendencies that are interacting. In fact, it is with this dynamic point of view of the nature of phenomena that dialecticism starts and identifies itself.

Philosophical dialecticism does not regard the Universe as a mental product, as spiritual unity, or as a simple whole.

So. when we abstract from nature, social life, or thought, the first thing that we see is an endless network of complex relations among diverse tendencies which constitute the most secret, hidden basis of existence, transformations, changes, integrations, disintegrations, production and reproductions, expansion, and the increment of the Universe. This is the full meaning of the law of interrelations among diverse tendencies; in other words, this is the most fundamental law of existence, and it is with this law that dialecticism begins.⁸⁹

Interrelations among diverse tendencies may appear relative, transitory, mutual, unilateral, disorganized, semi- organized, organized, direct, indirect, temporary, long-lasting, dialectical, or antagonistic, but their presence in, and their effects on phenomena are absolute.⁹⁰ **Things come into being by relations. This is the power of life that moves things and is the mother of all happening.**⁹¹

Interrelations and beings bring each other into existence. They have been created, existed, changed, transformed, and evolved by their interrelations with each other. None of them can exist without the other; therefore, there are no relations without diverse tendencies, and vice versa.

⁸⁸ Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 5.

⁸⁹ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 26-27, and *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 170; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 52, 312-313.

⁹⁰ Mao Zedong, *Selected Reading*, pp.121-123; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p.166.

⁹¹ Heraclitus, cited by Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, (N.Y.: the Free Press, 1964), p.55; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, pp.72-73.

All phenomena consist of organic hierarchized relations among diverse tendencies. This means: 1. Phenomena consist of varied relations, among which one dominates the others. 2. The dialectical interrelations, i.e., the mutual and established relations, characterized by a definite relation of superiority and inferiority between its disparate tendencies, viz., one tendency dominates the others.⁹² 3. The interrelations between various tendencies involve double contradictory relations: a. The integration process, that is, relations, interconnects different phenomena or diverse tendencies. b. The disintegration process, namely relations, cause or produce evolutions, qualitative changes, transformation, differentiation, new phenomenon, and therefore, disintegration.⁹³ 4. The relations among diverse beings or practices are universal and absolute features of all phenomena, while each phenomenon has its own form of relations and structure, identity, individuality, and structure, which differs from others.⁹⁴

Change as the Effect of Relations on Phenomena

Dialecticism holds that the Universe and all its constituent parts live, and as alive beings, they are not in a state of rest, stillness, stagnation, and immobility, but are constantly changing, moving, innovating, creating,

92 Mao Zedong, *Selected Readings* pp.102, 111-113; Bettelheim, *The Transition to Socialism*, (Great Britain: H.P.L., 1978), pp. 145-146; Cornforth, *Materialism and Dialectical Method*, p. 97; Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 106, 112-113, 115-116, 200- 201, 211.

93 Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 38-39; Mao Zedong, *Selected Readings* pp.91-94, 119-121; Marx, *Capital*, vol.1, p. 103-104.

94 Mao Zedong, *Selected Reading* pp. 85-91, 93, 95-96, 109, 117-118, 126, 128.

evolving from simple to complex and increasing from less to more.⁹⁵

As phenomena change uninterruptedly, nothing remains the same, final, absolute, sacred, or eternal; everything changes.

Change is nothing more than the effect of relations on phenomena; it is the manifestation, effect, and the product of the relations among diverse and sometimes conflicting tendencies on phenomena. Change is considered one of the essential, vital, essential features of the Universe, and it cannot be separated from the relations among beings. There must be relations before something changes, there must be changes after relations between beings. So, changes are inseparable from relations among diverse tendencies.

Change is not merely a simple process of increase and decrease, but it is also the process of transformation from quantitative changes to qualitative changes. There is a quantitative change when the exchange among several existents does not change the nature of phenomena, and there is a qualitative change when the nature of a phenomenon has been changed completely by relations and becomes another entity. In the quantitative changes, the mode of interrelation among diverse tendencies (the mode of life) remains the same, while in qualitative changes the old mode of practice is transformed into a new mode of relations among diverse tendencies-a new type of existence. So, the process of development of things does not “move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle but passes through a real history.”⁹⁶ It passes from one stage to another; it is a movement from an old quantitative state to

⁹⁵ Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 5.

⁹⁶ Engels, quoted by Stalin, *Dialectical Historical Materialism*, p. 6.

a new qualitative state: it is an evolution from simple to complex, from less to more, from a lower mode of life to a higher mode of life, i.e., from energy to matter, from matter to plants, and from plants to animals. Hence, according to this law, evolutions are necessities and exist in all natural, social, and mental phenomena. So, dialecticism holds the law of quantitative to qualitative changes the same as the law of negation of negation, which Lenin and Engels regarded as separate law.⁹⁷

The transition from quantitative changes to qualitative ones is not the same in different phenomena. The form and the manner of the dynamic depends on the nature of the internal and external practices among beings. Hence, things do not change qualitatively just because of internal contradictory practices. In fact, if we study natural, social, and mental phenomena, we see that in lots of cases changes occur from external causes. This refutes those theoreticians who try to explain everything internally, or externally. **If we study natural, social, or mental phenomena, we see that either internal relations or external relations play a dominant role in changing phenomena.**

This was a dilemma for quantum physicists that ultimately have recently

in the universe nothing can be found in absolute isolation

97 Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 27, 29, 36, 174, and *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 68, 139, 149-151, 154-155; Mao Zedong, *Selected Reading*, pp.123-125; Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, p. 49; Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 119; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 299-300, 310-312, 324-325, 355-356, 364-365, and *Soviet Ideology Today*, pp. 92-96, 106-109, 320; Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, pp. 51-54, 114; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, pp.68, 72; Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, p. 136; Fisk, “Dialectic and Ontology”, in Mephram and Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 29.

Discovered and acknowledged that they will be able to understand the ultimate nature of the phenomena of the Universe only when they are related to other phenomena.

Matter Was Created at a Certain Historical and Evolutionary Stage of the Universe.

Engels could find no better definition of matter than that in the context of epistemology. To him, “matter is nothing more than the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted.”⁹⁸ It is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our mind. One can find the same definition of matter in Lenin and Stalin’s writings.

Lenin distinguishes the philosophical and scientific conceptions of matter. The scientific concept of matter is concerned with the physical structure of matter, and the philosophical concept of matter is concerned with the epistemological purposes and has nothing to say about the substance of matter. Wetter writes that “in order to evade discussion of the problem as to the structure and nature of the matter, in view of the difficulties presented in this field, Lenin defined matter in purely epistemological terms.”⁹⁹ So, Lenin says: matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; it is the objective reality given to us by sensation.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore to him the sole property of matter is the property of being

⁹⁸ Engels, quoted by Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 293.

⁹⁹ Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 286-287.

¹⁰⁰ Lenin, quoted by Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 286; see also Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, pp. 78-83, 128-129; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, pp.30- 31; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 119-120, 140-141, 282-294, 298, 300-301, 304-305, 335, 340-341, 421; Lenin, *Materialism and Historico-Criticism*, (N.Y.: I.P., 1972), p. 145! Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, pp. 11, 43.

an objective reality existing outside our mind.

Stalin defined matter as an “objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness.”¹⁰¹

These conceptions of matter are, for sure, a deviation from Marx’s philosophy; they are a divorcement from the ontological tendencies of dialectical philosophy. They do not tell us anything about the nature of matter, but merely define it in terms of its relation to senses and consciousness.

In the past, Marxist philosophers tried to demonstrate that the material world was the only thing real and owed its origin to no other principles.

Scientific expression, and, at the same time, confirmation of the doctrine of the eternity of matter was based on two old narrow conservative principles: the law of conservation of mass and energy. Therefore, for these Marxists, matter has never begun to exist, nor will it ever come to an end. Matter is eternal and constitutes the ultimate source of existence. For example, Engels believed that the real unity of the world consists in its materiality.¹⁰² He considered matter as indestructibly infinite in space and uncreated in time.¹⁰³ In this respect, Lenin claimed that there is nothing in the world but matter.¹⁰⁴ And Stalin said that the world is by its very nature material; there is nothing in the world besides matter.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 12.

¹⁰² Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 53.

¹⁰³ Engels, cited by A. James Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, p. 47.

¹⁰⁴ Lenin, cited by Politzer, *The Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁵ Stalin, cited by Wetter, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, pp. 282-286.

(In the 19th Century) matter was thought to consist in the last resort of invisible, unchanging, and impenetrable atoms, which constituted its essential nature, and represented the ultimate building blocks of nature. But around the turn of the 20th century, it was established, on the evidence of radioactivity, that atoms are made up of still smaller particles, of which the electron was first to be discovered. This fact suggested to many inquiries that perhaps even the electron was not yet the final unit, and that it might possibly be resolved into still further elements, such that perhaps we might never actually arrive at a last element, constituting the ultimate nature of this matter. Under the influence of this discovery, people began to talk of “dematerialization” of the atom and “disappearance of matter” or again, to suppose that matter had now been dissolved into electricity. This not only brought about a revolution in physics, but also created a crisis for philosophical materialism. If matter has been dematerialized, it cannot provide the ultimate foundation of reality.¹⁰⁶

The new discoveries in physics prove that the electron is not matter; its mass is not material mass but electrical charge. Moreover, the advent of quantum physics has made even clearer the fact that we are able to grasp the essence of ultimate essence of existences in the Universe only when they are in connection with other existences. Thus, physics does not any longer pretend to be a science of “matter-in-itself,” or with discovering the essence of ultimate particles, but rather a science concerned with relating phenomena.

Dialectical philosophy dematerializes the essence of the Universe and claims that matter is not the ultimate foundation of the universe but a mode of existence of relations among diverse tendencies at certain stages of its development, evolution, and nothing more. It is an organic life of relations among diverse existences.

106 Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 18-22.

The universe existed before it created the material mode of life. It did not begin with matter. The root of the matter cannot be found in matter itself, but in practice, i.e., in the interrelations among diverse beings or tendencies, which constitute the real heart of existence.

Thus, contrary to idealism, which asserts that the universe was created by its spiritual God, and in opposition to materialism, which replaced a spiritual God with its material God, dialectical philosophy holds that the exchange between different beings is the real creator of the universe, and matter is just the highly developed stage and mode of existence of these practices. *In fact, what differentiates dialectical philosophy from materialism and idealism is the priority of relation over matter and the idea.* Hence, the proper response to Engels seems to be that not only relation is not the mode of existence of matter but that, on the contrary, matter is the mode of existence of practice. One would posit that matter without practice is inconceivable, whereas practice without matter is possible.¹⁰⁷ From that it may be derived that matter is not mortal and practice transitory, but, on the contrary, matter is transitory and the interrelations among different tendencies are mortal.¹⁰⁸ However, by regarding the relations among conflicting tendencies as the cornerstone of the origin, existences, changes, transformations, reproduction, and quantitative and qualitative expansions of the Universe, and by holding matter just as the mode of existence of the former, this study transforms dialectical materialism *TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALECTICISM.*

¹⁰⁷ Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

The Law of the Increment of the Universe

The universe as mentioned did not originally have mass, and matter was nothing more than the mode of existence of interrelations among diverse tendencies at a certain stage of its evolution, that is, the stage of transition from massless life to life with mass. Therefore, matter as a mode of existence of relations, i.e., as the interrelations among diverse interests, is not the ultimate foundation of life. Life is nothing more than the interrelations among diverse tendencies; it exists within, and changes, evolves and accepts different modes and structures by way of relations. Hence, interrelations among diverse interests, but not structures (essence but not forms) constitute the mother, generator, and the heart of the existences and the development of the universe.

Consequently, the world is by its very nature practical. Throughout its historical evolution it has passed through different stages, one arising necessarily from the other(s), and passing from simple to complex, and from less to more. It has been expanding quantitatively, qualitatively, and incrementally.

Henceforth, historical developments of the Universe can be marked by three fundamental characteristics:

1. Quantitative changes.

<p><i>THE UNIVERSE AS A PRODUCT OF RELATIONS AMONG DIVERSE EXISTENCES</i></p>

2. Qualitative changes, that is, the emergence of something intrinsically new, the law of existence of which cannot be traced back to those prevailing at the previous stage.

3. Incremental changes, namely, the increment of more life, by means of the creation of more tendencies and phenomena and, by the increase of more interrelations among these new and old tendencies of phenomena.¹⁰⁹

Here, we come straight to the heart of the dynamic of the Universe. The Universe is alive and expanding from simple to complex and from less to more because it cannot stand still, much like the waves of the ocean, calm is their doom. The Universe is unable to exist and develop without constantly changing and increasing the sphere of its existence, without creating more beings, energies, tendencies, varieties, and diversities. Everything in the Universe is alive, because they exchange, practice, and relate and, therefore they change, they create more transactions, new beings. They also create, use, and exchange more things (matters, energies, ideas, tendencies, existents, beings). That explains why the Universe not only moves from simple to complex, but also from less to more.

¹⁰⁹ Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 29; Gregor, *A Survey of Marxism*, pp. 554-555, 78-83; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 117-120, 164-165, 288-289, 291-292, 296, 298-301, 341-342, 374-375, and *Soviet Ideology Today*, pp. 18-26.

This rejects the law of survival of energy and matter, and the Big Bang religious theory that posits that billions of years ago there was no Universe and as such there was nothing but an empty void. But suddenly an explosion brought the Universe into existence. Wow!?

In short, in the Universe everything is alive. So, to understand the Universe is to understand life. And life is nothing than relations among diverse existences. And the Growth of the Universe is growth of lives, that is from less living existences to more beings, from less diversities to more diversities, form less relations to more relations, from less relations among diverse existences to more relations among diverse beings, therefore, if diversities and relations in the Universe are growing, that means the Universe is growing from less to more, as simple as that.

Dialectical Philosophy believes in an evolutionary and constant creation in the Universe, which is happening right now, that is, every second everywhere in the Universe.

Einstein's Theory Energy and Matter

Before leaving this chapter, it is worth talking more about the relationship between matter and energy. Until a few decades ago, for many physicists, the ontology of matter was based on the illusion that matter is composed of small particles called atoms. But today it has been proven that atoms are not

material but have an immaterial origin and nature. Einstein's famous formula $E=MC^2$ also proves the immateriality of matter, that is, matter can be converted into energy, which has no mass. And energy can also be converted into matter. Therefore, in principle and based on this formula, apart from their way of life, there is no ontological difference between energy and matter. Both are products of interrelation between existences.

The idea of quantum physics of matter is based on the idea that matter emerges from something, but they do not say what that thing is. The conclusion that some physicists reach smells religious, and they say that matter is not made of nothing and end up with the theory of 'No-Thing-Ness', which indirectly means that God created it.

Philosophical dialecticism rejects the origin of matter from NOTHINGNESS or God and believed that matter is born from the relationships between energies existed before its birth or before its emergence, which is the origin of existence.

Here, we witness the fall of Marx's dialectical materialism, which considered matter to be the source of existence. Therefore, the advanced, integrated, and structural of matter consists of relationships between immaterial beings or energies at a certain stage of their historical evolution. So, the ultimate essence of the Universe is not matter or ideas, but the relationships among diverse existences.

PART II

Epistemic Dialecticism

CHAPTER 3

The Existential Basis of Knowledge

What is Epistemic Dialecticism?

Epistemic dialecticism is not idealism but its opposite which asserts that only our consciousness really exists, and that the universe exists only in our consciousness or ideas. Epistemic dialecticism holds the Universe as an objective reality which existed before man and his consciousness.¹¹⁰ Consciousness, much like the world itself, was not created by God, and does not have correspond to any purported spiritual forces. But *consciousness has been created, evolved, and expanded by men's social life and throughout their historical development.*

Epistemic dialecticism is not philosophy, so it does not study the Universe; therefore, unlike Engels, Althusser, Poulantzas, Benton, Politzer, and many other Marxists practitioners, do not transfer Marx's philosophy to epistemology.

Epistemic dialecticism starts from the fact that knowledge (ideas) exists as an objective reality, as an organic part of animal and human social life. And, as a reality, there are definite laws, rules, principles, and regularities in mental

¹¹⁰ Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 12; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. 65; Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, pp. 23-24, 127.

phenomena's existences, changes, and their developments. So, dialectical epistemology has as its object human mental phenomena. It is the science of the laws, principles and regularities which govern the origin, existence, transformations, and development of human mental phenomena, or in short, it is the ontology of knowledge, awareness, information, theories, sciences, new mental achievements, and thought/mind.¹¹¹

Thus, the first task of the science of epistemic dialecticism or dialectical epistemology (but not philosophy) is to understand these laws and rules.

The second task is to use dialectical methodology or the dialectical mode of production of scientific knowledge (see next chapter).

The third task is to use the scientific products or scientific knowledge to change and improve our object and its condition of existence.

It is called epistemic dialecticism since it has a dynamic viewpoint of the nature of thought, because it is the continuation, specification, and application of the general principles of philosophic dialecticism to the mental phenomena, and because it is the most comprehensive recognition of the interrelations among diverse tendencies which constitute and regulate the origin, existence, production, reproduction, and transformation of knowledge.¹¹²

111 Aristotle (quoted by Mephram and Ruben. 1979:23) says: "there is epistemic knowledge of a thing only when we know its essence."

112 Here, by knowledge, we mean all types of ideas – moral, juridical, political, aesthetic, religious, scientific, and so forth.

Where Does Knowledge Come from?

Consciousness was a natural/social product from the outset. It can never be anything else but the conscious existences of animals and humans in their actual life process. Hence, knowledge cannot be considered as something given, and its existential origin should not be attached to any metaphysical roots, but rather sought in the actual processes of life. ¹¹³

Consciousness was at first merely highly developed animal-like consciousness which was based on men's limited communication with nature, with each other, and with their mental and material productive forces. This was the beginning of the transformation of men's instinct to conscious instinct. Human knowledge and consciousness, much like other means of production and reproduction of social life, did not remain at this stage, but continued to grow and develop simultaneously along with growth and development of the human social life. **Hence, the existential basis of human thought and idea are dialectically interwoven with the condition of the human real life, with their actual life-processes, or more precisely, with the process of the production and reproduction of their social life and its corresponding class relations.** ¹¹⁴ **Ideas are not dead, fixed, static, abstract, and isolated phenomenon existing by themselves as a reflection of human life or God's will, but they are the product and, at the same time, the means of the production and reproduction of human social life. In other words, ideas as fundamental force and determining elements of social life, are**

¹¹³ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1968). pp. 510-562.

¹¹⁴ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 47-52.

constituent parts of the very nature of social life and its development. ¹¹⁵

This refutes Engels' idea that our knowledge is derived from our senses through reflection and cannot stand in contradiction to the objective world. ¹¹⁶ In fact, as we shall see in the next part of this book, the specificity of social phenomena is because they are made up of, or have in their very essence, an articulation of mental and physical practices. **So, one of the main characteristics of humans' social life are the production, usage, and development of their mental and material tools and their ability to transmit their means to the next generations and in this way to distinguish and separate their mode of lives from animals' ones.**

Hence, mental phenomena, from the outset, constitute one of the organic parts of social life. Thus, men live and produce and reproduce not only material use-values, but mental ones as well.

So, if we look closely, the main specificity or particularity of epistemic dialecticism is here: the impossibility of the separation of mental phenomena from human social life, and the impossibility of the separation of mental means from actions or practices. And this is exactly what intend to convey or meant by the unity of theory and practice.

¹¹⁵ Althusser, Essay in Self Criticism, p.138; Poulantzas, Political Power, p. 210; Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 516-517.

¹¹⁶ Gregor, A. James, A Survey of Marxism, pp. 55-56, 59; Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, p. 218.

CHAPTER 4

Methodology and Dialectical Mode of Production of Scientific Knowledge

Marxists' Methodological Problems

*It would seem to be the proper thing to start with the real and concrete elements, with actual precondition, e.g., to start in the sphere of the economy with population, which forms the basic and the subject of the whole social process of production. Closer consideration shows, however, that this may be amiss. Population is an abstraction if, for instance, one disregards the classes of which it is composed. These classes may in turn remain empty vessels if one does not consider the factors on which they depend... if one were to take population as the point of departure, it would be a very vague concept of a complex whole and through closer definition one would arrive analytically at increasingly simple concepts; from imaginary concrete terms one would move to more and more tenuous abstractions until one reached the simplest. From there it would be necessary to make the journey again in the opposite direction until one arrives once more at the concept of population, which is met this time not as a vague notion of a whole, but a totality comprising many determinations and relations.*¹¹⁷

Marx, for example, writes: Economists have always considered, as their point of departure, the living organism, the population, the nation, the state, etc. This approach, however, led them always in the end to the discovery of a few decisive abstract, general relations, such as division of labor, money, and value.

¹¹⁷ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 140-141.

When these separate factors were more-or-less clearly deduced and established, conomic systems evolved from simple concepts, such as labor, division of labor, demands, exchange value, advanced to the categories like state, international exchange, and world market. The latter is obviously the correct scientific method. The concrete concept is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in reasoning as a summing up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the real point of origin and thus also the point of origin of perception and imagination. The first procedure attenuates meaningful images to abstract definitions, the second leads from abstract definitions by the way of reasoning to the reproduction of the concrete situation. Hegel accordingly conceived the illusory idea that the real world is the result of thinking which cause its own synthesis, its own deepening, and its own movement; whereas the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is simply the way in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category.¹¹⁸

Although the above statements clearly show Marx's methodology, these statements have now created wide-ranging disagreements among Marxists about what Marx's methodology is. These disagreements are mainly about the relationship between thought and concrete objectivity. According to Marx, neither the real subject is an intellectual perception, nor is the intellectual perception a reflection of the real object. Thus, Marxist methodology, for certain, is neither the empiricism of Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, or Mao Zedong, because it does not reduce thought to the real concrete, nor the idealism of Althusser, Poulantzas, Bettelheim, or Colletti, since it does not reduce the real concrete to thought or logic.

118 Ibid.

Empiricism of Marxism

According to Marxist empiricists, “knowledge is based on the experience of a typified ... individual subject, and the scope and limits of human knowledge are defined in terms of a psychological theory of the scope and limits of the human mind.”¹¹⁹ Marxist empiricists restrict themselves to their own fragmentary experience and believe that the object of science is not the real object but a sensory object. Thus, it is not real objects which need to be investigated and studied, but human perceptions. In other words, “the task of science does not consist in gaining knowledge from the real object itself, but from sensations.”¹²⁰

Marxist empiricists regard thought as a mere reflection of a real object. Here, “external objects are what they seem. They are reflected in some sense in the mind. This reflection is partially correct, because they are conditioned by the physical limitations of the sensory organs themselves. These invalid inferences must be corrected by drawing incorrect reflections from perceptions.”¹²¹ For Marxist empiricists, therefore, science is a passage from perceptual or sensational knowledge to logical knowledge, from cognition inferior to cognition superior, from implicit confused knowledge to explicit distinct knowledge. Lenin regards perception, ideas, and the mind of man as images of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas or perceptions there corresponds the movement of matter.

¹¹⁹ Benton, *Philosophical Foundation of the Three Sociologies*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) pp. 20-21.

¹²⁰ Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p.145.

¹²¹ Gregor, A. James, *A Survey of Marxism*, p. 57.

He believes that “all knowledge comes from experience, sensation, and perceptions.”¹²² Here, experience is not only the object of investigation but also its means.¹²³ Thus, for Lenin, the scientific process consists of two cognitive transitions: a) the transition from matter to sensation; and b) the transition from sensory knowledge to abstract logical knowledge. According to Bukharin, it is man himself who constructs his world from the chaotic mass of sensory elements. Science, to him, is not concerned with discovering the existential basis of any object, but merely with systematizing, classifying, arranging, and clarifying the thought of men; it constructs a complete raiment of scientific ideas and theories out of the fragmentary knowledge.¹²⁴

Mao Zedong believed that “the real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, that is to arrive at logical knowledge.”¹²⁵ To do this, “the first step is to contact the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to systematize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgement, and inference... Here, two important points must be emphasized. The first... is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual knowledge... The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the perceptual stage of knowledge needs to be developed to the rational stage.”¹²⁶

122 Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, (N.Y.: IP., 1973), pp. 125-126. 123 Ibid., p.151.

124 See Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p.145.

125 Mao Zedong, *Selected Reading*, p. 69.

126 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

Dialectical methodology is a break with the empiricism of Marxism and tries to discover the truth not from the sensation, or immediate reflection of our objects, but from the object of investigation itself. Hence, to understand an object, we do not start from the sensations or perceptions, but from the object itself, where the absolute truth exists.

Idealism of Marxism

Marxist structuralists believe that the production of knowledge takes place entirely in thought. They reject the Marxist empiricist idea of scientific knowledge as the creation of individual scientists and believe that thought or knowledge is not a faculty of a transcendental subject or absolute consciousness confronted by the real world as matter; nor is this thought a faculty of a psychological subject, although human individuals are its agents. This idea is the historically constituted system of an apparatus of thought, founded on and articulated as natural and social reality, or in other words, this thought is exactly what Durkheim called “collective conscience,” that is, “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society (which) forms a determinate system which has its own life,”¹²⁷ and has a determinate objective reality.¹²⁸

MENTAL PHENOMENA, FROM THE OUTSET, CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE ORGANIC PARTS OF SOCIAL LIFE.

¹²⁷ Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1964), p. 79.

¹²⁸ Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, pp. 41-42.

This collective consciousness or concrete totality “is what assigns any given thinking subject (individual) its place and function in the production of knowledges,” it “defines the roles and functions of the thought of individuals who can only ‘think’ the ‘problems’ already actually or potentially posed,” and, “ultimately, it, as real object, constitutes the object and the raw material of the production of knowledge. Moreover, theoretical practice has its own criterion for validating the quality of mental products. Once the products of scientific practice are “constituted and developed they have no need for verification from external practices (real object) to declare the knowledges they produce to be true, i.e., to be knowledges.”¹²⁹ Thus, science, for Marxist structuralists, neither starts from, nor should be verified by, the real object, but they, following Durkheim, regard science as “consciousness carried to its highest point of clarity.”¹³⁰

According to Althusser, scientific practice takes place entirely in thought. It produces Generality III (scientific knowledge) by the work of Generality II (theory) on Generality I (ideological concepts as the raw material of the scientific practices).¹³¹ Here, the opposition between thought and the object of investigation lies wholly in the realm of thought. In fact, scientific practices, for Althusser, are nothing more than the transformation of Generality I to Generality III, that is, “the transformation of ideological Generality to scientific Generality.”¹³²

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 59.

¹³⁰ Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, p. 52.

¹³¹ Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 185.

According to Poulantzas, “theoretical work proceeds from a raw material which consists not of the real concrete, but of information, notions, etc.”¹³³ Thus, the scientific process of production of scientific knowledge goes from the most abstract concepts to the most concrete concepts.¹³⁴

Bettleheim says that “The generality from which the scientific approach starts is not itself the outcome of an abstracting process, but of complex social processes taking place at the level of technique and ideology. It is upon these abstractions that science works in order, gradually, to go forward to fresh abstractions, enriched by increasingly ‘concrete’ knowledge, and thus forging scientific concepts (which will eventually become the negation of the ideological and technical concepts with which investigation began.) It is this process of enrichment (of progress toward the concrete) that is the essence of scientific thought and of the dialectical materialist approach.”¹³⁵

Reasonism of Marxism

Lucio Colletti reduces Marx’s epistemology and methodology to logic.¹³⁶

132 Ibid., 185: see also pp. 186, 191, 252; Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, pp. 40-42, 82, 86-87, 156-157; Perry Anderson, *Arguments within English Marxism*, p. 5.

133 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 12. 134 Ibid.

135 Bettelheim, *The Transition to Socialist Economy*, (Great Britain: The Harvester Press Limited, 1975), p. 150.

136 Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, (London: N.L.B., 1973), p. 199.

methodology to logic.¹³⁶ For Colletti, “the process of development ‘according to nature’ is the process of reality; the process of development ‘according to notion’ is the logical process. The first gives us the situation as viewed by the ‘intellect’; ... the second gives the situation as depicted by ‘reason’.”¹³⁷ Here, Colletti tries to show “how the logico- deductive process and the inductive process, or the process of reality are intertwined with one another. (Hence,) the focal point, which one must start from, is... the twofold nature...of thought, i.e., thought as ‘intellect’ and thought as ‘reason’.”¹³⁸

As a hallmark of Marxism, Colletti holds that there is no contradiction in reality – only in thought. Forces and processes in nature that are opposed to each other are distinct and independent; they have no dialectical ‘unity’ or ‘identity’ with one another.¹³⁹ Thus, to understand the concrete object, we must reduce all its oppositions to logical contradiction.

Here, as we see, Colletti does not deal with the relation of thought to being, but rather with the relationship between thought and logic. In fact, as he says: “the relationship of thought to being coincides with the relationship of thought to itself. The passage from being to thought, from the empirical reality of knowledge, from the concrete to the abstract, presents itself as a passage within knowledge: from

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 123.

¹³⁹ Benton, *Philosophical Foundation of the Three Sociologies*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 159.

‘cognitio’ inferior to the ‘cognitio’ superior, from implicit knowledge to explicit knowledge, from the obscure and confused ideas or senses to clear and distinct ideas.”¹⁴⁰

Colletti’s denial of contradiction in reality is, in fact, a return to idealism. The dialectical analysis cannot coincide with his logical analysis. The dialectical mode of the production of scientific knowledge, as we shall see in the next pages, always starts from, works on, and is verified by the facts. “It is one thing,” Marx says, “to develop a science to the point where one can present it dialectically, and something else altogether to apply an abstract and ready-made system of logic.”¹⁴¹

Dialectical Methodology and dialectical Method

As a subfield of dialectical epistemology, dialectical methodology is the science of scientific practices. It is the science of those practices that produce the most concrete knowledge of the nature of phenomena. It is the science of how researchers can move mentally within objects of investigations and produce the most authentic knowledge about the essence of these objects.¹⁴² It is called dialectical methodology, because it has an ontological point of view of its objects, because it is the science of the struggles between thought and the real concrete to produce scientific knowledge of the principles and regularities

¹⁴⁰ Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, pp. 90-91.

¹⁴¹ Marx, quoted by Mepham & Ruben, *Philosophical Issues in Marxism*, p. 10.

¹⁴² Marx (cited by Mandel, 1972: 15-16), in a letter to Kugelmann writes: “this ‘free movement in matter’ is nothing but...the dialectical method.”

which govern the origin, existence, development, production/reproduction, and the transition of the object of investigation; because it starts from, works on, and is verified by real facts; and because it is the scientific foundation of revolutionary practice.

The dialectical methodology starts from the fact that there exist determinate orders, regularities, or principles within and between phenomena, which can be understood and discovered, and being used to change, reform, and revolutionized the life of the phenomena and with that human social life.

But science is not a free enterprise. It is not a neutral technological process. It never exists in a pure form. Every science arises from practice, from the condition of life, from man's social life – from his interrelations with other men, nature, existing mental and material means of production and reproduction of life, and from its corresponding class struggles.¹⁴³

Dialectical methodology insists on the relative character of all sciences. It holds science as a process which never ends. With the dialectical mode of production of knowledge, we arrive at a completely new approach which deals no longer with the so called “logico-empirical” aspect of science. It cannot be limited to theory and method or cannot be confined to confrontation and comparison of idea with idea.

DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY IS THE SCIENCE OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICES

¹⁴³ Bukharin, Historical Materialism, pp. IX-XII.

The dialectical methodology is not fetishism; it is not the science of how to measure or describe the appearance of things, but it goes beyond the appearance to the essence of its object to explain not only the nature of phenomena, but even these appearances. **The dialectical mode of production of scientific knowledge identifies and differentiates itself from other modes mainly through 1) its central tendencies; 2) its object of investigation; 3) its scientific labor; 4) its mental and material means of production; and 5) its methods.**

The Central Tendencies

Today under the title of science, a great deal of research is conducted to explore or describe an object. But can scientific tendencies be reduced and confined to exploratory or descriptive purposes? ¹⁴⁴ For dialecticians, the answer is “no.” As Aristotle says, “there is epistemic knowledge of a thing only when we know its essence.” ¹⁴⁵ Thus, although dialectical methodology may have exploratory and descriptive approaches, its central tendency is always an explanatory one. In fact, **one of the main characteristics which identifies and differentiates science from other techniques is its ontological tendencies.**

¹⁴⁴ Babbie, E.R. *The Practice of Social Research*, (California: W.P.C.I., 1979), pp. 84-85.

¹⁴⁵ Aristotle quoted by Scott Mickle, in Mephram & Ruben, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 23.

Hence, the main purpose of the dialectical mode of production of knowledge is not exploratory or descriptive investigations. Dialectical methodology is neither Hegelian classification,¹⁴⁶ nor is it a Weberian process of differentiation, codification, and generalization (ideal type) of realities.¹⁴⁷ We are not looking for properties of things, but for their existence. We do not intend to measure reality by an idea or a ready system of ideas, but our main intention is to know how to produce the most concrete knowledge about the nature of our object; namely, how to discover the laws of existence, variation, reproduction, manifestation of our object, how to study the vital interrelations among several tendencies which govern and regulate the origin, existence, and development of our object. It is with this ontological tendency that dialectical methodology starts and presents itself as a science in the Aristotelian sense.

The strength and validity of dialectical methodology is not just based on understanding how to grasp the essence of phenomena, but upon its revolutionary tendencies. This means the final purpose of dialectical methodology is to understand how to apply, use and redirect scientific values

EVERY SCIENCE ARISES FROM HUMANS' SOCIAL LIFE

146 For Hegel, the main purpose of science was to distinguish things one from another and to categorize them (see Ruben, in Mephram & Ruben, 1979: 43).

147 For Weber, the scientific procedure is the construction of types, that is "to investigate and to make fully comprehensible all those irrational, affectively determined, patterns of meaning which influence action by representing them as deviation from a pure type (ideal type) of action as it would be if proceeded in a rationally purposive way (see Runciman, 1978)."

in real life, how to guide and solve existing problems, how to change and develop human social life. ¹⁴⁸ *The production of scientific knowledge “becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice.”* ¹⁴⁹ *Hence, dialecticism tries not only to explain the world, but to change it. This is exactly what Marx meant by the unity of theory and practice in social life. “Without revolutionary theory there would be no revolutionary practice.”* ¹⁵⁰ *So, knowledge for dialecticians is a constituent part of social actions; it constitutes the most effective means in production and reproduction of social life; it becomes the guiding principle for national and international plans.*

The Object of Investigation

In the dialectical mode of production of knowledge, our point of departure, is neither individual ideas nor “collective conscience.” We do not start from Lenin’s sensory object, Mao Zedong’s perceptual knowledge, Althusser’s Generality I or Colletti’s intellect. We do not separate the object of knowledge from the real object and try to produce scientific knowledge of an unreal object. But we start and produce the most scientific knowledge from the real facts. We work on the real concrete and do not abandon it even for a moment.

The real objects constitute a vital locus in the dialectical methodology. They are

¹⁴⁸ Mao Zedong, Selected Reading, p. 76.

¹⁴⁹ Stalin, quoted by Mao Zedong, Selected Reading, p. 77.

¹⁵⁰ Lenin, quoted by Althusser, For Marx, pp. 164-166.

the only place of connection between thought and real objects, and it is through this dialectical interconnection that the former assimilates the latter and tries to reproduce it as concrete thought. This is exactly the methodological point that differentiates dialectical methodology from idealist and empiricist methodologies and presents its scientific values.

The question may be asked, appropriately, what should we do if the object of investigation belongs to the past, or we do not have any access to it and cannot investigate it directly? The answer is that in such cases we should study our object through existing and reliable sources, which is, the objective knowledge that has been produced scientifically from our real object. However, regardless of whether we are working on our object directly, via reliable sources, or both, the final aim of the dialectical mode of production of knowledge is the production of the most concrete knowledge of the real object.

When we observe closely the things around us, the first picture presented to us is of an endless set of relations among diverse tendencies, by which nothing remains what it is, but everything changes. Thus, the object of the dialectical mode of production of scientific knowledge is neither a spiritual unity, nor a simple immobile whole, but real processes. Hence, if we want to produce authentic knowledge of complex interrelations, we must study our object in its actual life. That is, in its internal and external interrelations, changes, reproductions, developments, destructions, and transitions.

For the dialectical methodology real life, interrelations among diverse tendencies constitute not only its point of departure and its object, but they are also its

criterion of truth and the final goal of knowledge. This means that the real object plays three fundamental roles in scientific practices:

a. It constitutes the object, the foundation, and the point of departure in scientific practices.

b. It is the criterion of the truth of scientific practices. That is, the entire process of the dialectical mode of production of scientific knowledge must be verified and attested to by facts.¹⁵¹ “All mysteries,” Marx says, “which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in comprehension of this practice.”¹⁵² “In practice human must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.”¹⁵³

c. It constitutes the final goal of scientific practices. This means we produce scientific knowledge to change our object, its condition, and our life. Thus, the real object is the foundation of the entire dialectical methodology, from the beginning to the end.¹⁵⁴

The influence of the metaphysical and atomic mode of thinking, the separation of sciences from philosophy, and the divisions and sub-division within and between sciences, left us a legacy: an inclination to study a specific object in itself, detached

¹⁵¹ Mao Zedong, *Selected Reading*, pp. 67-68, 77-81; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 507-512.

¹⁵² Marx, quoted by Irving M. Zeitlin in *Rethinking Sociology*, p. 245.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.244.

¹⁵⁴ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 29; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. xi; Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 316, 507-508.

from its natural and historical connections, in isolation from other phenomena, and from the system to which it belongs. The dialectical methodology is a break with all metaphysical and atomic concepts of phenomena. To dialecticism, there is no independent isolated phenomenon, produced by God(s), existing as a single isolated entity, and changing in accord with its will. Here, Spirit or isolated things are not at issue at all, but relations, the real life, existences, changes, developments, production and reproduction, and expansion by the interrelations among historically created diverse tendencies are real issues.

Dialectical methodology rejects those Marxists and non-Marxists who isolate phenomena from each other and try to study their objects internally or externally. As phenomena are not isolated in real life of existences, thereby, to study things internally or externally is to investigate things not in their life, it is like to kill the object of science, and try to produce vague knowledge of a dead object, it is like to transfer real to unreal, existence to non-existence, and try to produce fantasy knowledge of an artificial object. For example, we cannot understand humans' relations to each other without their relations to nature, and vice versa.

We cannot grasp the social structure of the oppressed third world countries, detached from their relations with the oppressive capitalists.

This refutes Bukharin's idea that in any phenomenon the cause of change and

ONE OF THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS WHICH IDENTIFIES AND DIFFERENTIATES SCIENCE FROM ARTS OR OTHER TECHNIQUES IS ITS ONTOLOGICAL TENDENCIES.

alteration is based on external relations.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, this denies Stalin's¹⁵⁶ or Althusser's¹⁵⁷ attempts to understand things internally. For dialecticism, in general, there are no distinct internal or external practices. An external practice may reflect internal struggles from a broader point of view, or an internal practice may derive from an external relation from a narrower point of view. "Hence, that which can be studied by the scientists as the external 'interaction' between two phenomena at one level are in fact internal 'contradictions' at the more inclusive level where the two interacting phenomena form a more complex system."¹⁵⁸

The Dialectical Theory

The dialectical theory is not an abstract process functioning in the realm of ideas. It is neither a mental movement of thought in thought, nor a mental exploration or description of reality; therefore, for dialectical methodology Althusser's concept of theory as "the system of theoretical concepts," or any other idea regarding theory as something independent of the real object is nonsense.¹⁵⁹

The dialectical theory is like an actual process of production. It is a mental labor which acts with certain scientific means on real objects to extract the most concrete knowledge from the nature of its objects. The dialectical theory reproduces reality

¹⁵⁵ Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p.107.

¹⁵⁶ Stalin, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 8.

¹⁵⁷ Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 212-213.

¹⁵⁸ Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, p. 62.

¹⁵⁹ Althusser, *Reading Capital*, pp. 109-110.

in thought, therefore, the dialectical categories express the forms and the conditions of existence and development of our object. It is the mental process of thought for understanding, explaining, reproducing, and changing the real life of our phenomena. As the most intellectual, purposive, productive, and humanistic activity, it tries to find out the laws which regulate the origin, existence, developments, transitions, and the death of phenomena.

The dialectical theory consists of three distinct but dialectically interrelated processes: a) abstraction; b) reproduction; and c) revolutionary practices.

a) Abstraction

By abstraction we mean those mental practices that assimilate and appropriate the nature of phenomena. It is those mental practices that track down the object of investigation into those fundamental interrelations among diverse existences which constitute the essence of its object. Hence, the dialectical abstraction cannot be reduced to a Weberian process of classification and categorization, nor to Colletti's process of isolation of phenomena.¹⁶⁰ **But by abstraction, dialectical methodology means the one which works on reality, and attempts to move mentally into the essence of the object of investigation. Hence, abstraction is dialectical only when we try to grasp the nature of phenomena.**

THE DIALECTICAL THEORY REPRODUCES REALTY IN THOUGHT

¹⁶⁰ Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, p. 151.

In abstraction, therefore, we do not start from without, we do not descend from heaven to earth; abstraction cannot be constructed in an arbitrary way, but it is the result of an ontological analysis of the aspect or area of reality that is under investigation. Hence, abstraction process, we do not fly, like Poulantzas,¹⁶¹ from the real to the ideal concept, or like Colletti, from the concrete to a logical process and try to measure real with unreal or concrete with logic.

In ascending from the concrete to the abstract, thought does not get farther away from the real object, only comes closer to it. In fact, it moves mentally from real to real, and it remains in constant contact with the real object and its history.

If the object of investigation is real, its essence cannot be something unreal which, as Poulantzas claims, does exist.¹⁶²

But, for dialecticians the object of investigation and its essence are real phenomena. In fact, by the dialectical process of abstraction what we must do is to discover the dialectical relations between these two realities. We move conceptually from our real object into its real constituent processes, which govern its existence and its development. This is exactly what Marx meant by dialectical theory, that is, by the free movement of thought in realities. Thus, following Marx, dialecticians “start out from the real premises and do not abandon them for a moment.”¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Poulantzas, Political Power, p. 15.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 47.

b) Conceptual Reproduction of Reality

By the dialectical process of reproduction, we mean the explanation and presentation of our object via its essence. Once we appropriate the object under study, or once we discover the existential basis of our object, it is time to explain and the nature of our object. Hence, by producing mentally the concrete object in thought, we are not reconstructing the abstraction in an arbitrary way, but reproducing it dialectically in thought, that is, in the same way that our object was created, has existed, has been operating, changing, and developing; something that can be done only in a dialectical way, that is, by taking account of the real historical condition of existence of the phenomena.

c) Revolutionary Theory

The strength and the scientific validity of dialectical theory is based on its practical-critical practices. Here, the main task is to find out how to apply scientific products in real life, how to liberate people from their problems, and how to change reality to modify and develop human social life. Revolutionary theory, therefore, “is a question of revolutionizing the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things.”¹⁶⁴ Without this revolutionary theory, there would be no revolutionary practice.”¹⁶⁵

The Means of Production of Scientific Knowledge

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁶⁵ Lenin, as quoted by Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 164-166.

Marxist structuralists believe that scientific practices take place entirely in thought, therefore, they try to produce knowledge not of the real but of notions, ideas, information, and common “conscience.”¹⁶⁶ They do not recognize the difference between the object and the means of scientific practices, and by regarding existing knowledge as the object of science, they ignore completely the real object.

As mentioned before, the dialectical mode of production of knowledge does not begin with the idea, rather it works on real facts, and by the means of certain reliable mental and material tools, attempts to produce the most concrete knowledge of these facts. By the means of production of scientific knowledge, we mean mainly two things: 1) all existing knowledge; and 2) all existing physical tools.

The means of production and reproduction of knowledge constitute one of the fundamental elements of all sciences and provide the key to the development of scientific practices. It is worth noting here that when we cannot study our object directly, we investigate it through reliable sources. But no matter whether we work on our object directly, through scientific knowledge, or both, the final aim of the dialectical mode of scientific practice is always the production of the most concrete knowledge of our real object.

Dialectical Methods

The dialectical method is the implementation of rules, procedures, principles, processes, protocols and mental and material tools required by the

¹⁶⁶ Althusser, *For Marx*, pp. 41-42; Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp.17-18

dialectical methodology for any specific scientific practice to create the most scientific knowledge about the essence and nature of the objects of the study. This for sure differs from on-sided, a historical, and deductive analysis of Marxist structuralists 'method'.¹⁶⁷

To know an object, dialecticians “embrace, study all its sides, all connections and ‘mediation.’ We shall never achieve this completely, but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.”¹⁶⁸ This all-sidedness is nothing more than Marx’s dialectical method, which implies an abductive analysis, namely, deductive, and inductive approaches.

This method consists of the two separate, but interrelated, analytical procedures: deductive method and inductive method.

The Deductive method:

The deductive method consists of two distinct but related analysis:

1) The historical deductive method through which we move conceptually from the present condition to the past and try to produce scientific insight into the past by understanding the present situation. For example, the understanding of capitalism provides the key to the understanding of origin.

2) The momentary deductive method through which we move mentally from our object to its constituent parts and try to discover its existential basis, its essence.

¹⁶⁷ Althusser, Reading Capital, pp. 64-65, 122-125.

¹⁶⁸ Lenin, as quoted by Mao Zedong, Selected Reading, p. 101.

The Inductive Method:

This method consists of three distinct but interrelated analyses:

1) The historical inductive method. Here, we try to understand an object via its past. For example, the understanding of origin of capitalism provides the key to the understanding of capitalism at present time.

2) The momentary inductive method, by which we try to produce and explain our object via its essence.

3) The revolutionary inductive method, by which we move mentally from the past and present situations to the future condition of our object, to provide the most concrete knowledge and the most scientific guides for revolutionary practices.

Method and Sources for the Next Part of This Study

This study is designed to employ primarily the secondary sources technique. The main reason for that is its efficiency for historical and theoretical studies and its economic advantages in terms of time and money. ¹⁶⁹ Here, research method is related to the specific questions posed and defined in this study:

1) What is the general condition of life?

2) What is the mode of production and reproduction of life?

3) What is a social class?

169 Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, (California: Walsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1976), pp. 252-253.

4) What is social a social institution? What is a state?

6) What is the world capitalist system?

To examine the general condition and its historical modes of human social life (questions 1 and 2) this study will focus on men's relations to nature, to their mental and material means of life, and to each other. This requires a comprehensive review of Marxist literature, which will enable us to disclose the existential basis of our object: Althusser, 1979; Althusser & Balibar, 1979; Anderson, 1978 and 1980; Bettelheim, 1978; Bottomore, 1973; Bukharin, 1965; Bloch, 1969; Braverman, 1974; Brewer, 1980; Colletti, 1972 and 1973; Cornforth, 197B; Engels, 1976 and 1978; Fine & Harris, 1979; Fromm, 1966; Giddens, 1978; Gramsci, 1980; Inkels, 1974; Lenin, 1977 and 1979; Luxemburg, 1913; Mandel, 1978; Marx, 1977a, 1977b, 1979, and 1980; Marx Engels, 1978; Nomani, 1972; Pietre, 1973; Poulantzas, 1978 and 1979; Show, 1978; Stalin, 1972; Mao Zedong, 1971 ; Trotsky, 1978 ; Tucker, 1978; Wetter, 1966.

To examine social classes (question 3) is to focus on the contradictory conditions of social life and to study the effects of a social mode of production and reproduction on its agents. To do this, we will study the most relevant sources and will try to offer the most scientific knowledge about social classes, their struggles, and their effects on the social production and reproduction of life: Adibi, 1975; Althusser, 1979; Althusser & Balibar, 1979; Anderson, 1978; Bendix, 1966; Bettelheim, 1978; Bottomore, 1969; Bukharin, 1965; Braverman, 1974; Engels, 1976 and 1978; Fine & Harris, 1979; Frank, 1976; Giddens, 1975; Gramsci, 1980; Gurvich, 1973; Heller, 1969; Howe, 1988; Inkels, 1973; Jazani, 1973; Lenin, 1977 and 1979; Lukacs, 1971; Marx, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1978, and 1979;

Marx & Engels, 1978 and 1979; Nomani, 1972; Petras, 1970; Poulantzas, 1978 and 1979; Show, 1978; Skotnes, 1979; Trotsky, 1978; Wallerstein, 1976.

This study will try to understand social apparatuses and especially those of state apparatuses (questions 4 and 5) through class relations. To deal with this question, there will be an in-depth investigation of Marxist literature which will enable us to disclose the nature of institutional practices: Althusser & Balibar, 1979; Bettelheim, 1978; Bloch, 1969; Engel, 1976 and 1977; Gramsci, 1980; Lenin, 1976, 1978 and 1979; Marx, 1976, 1977 a, 1977b, 1977c, and 1979; Marx and Engels, 1978; Petras, 1970; Poulantzas, 1978 and 1979; Wallerstein, 1976.

This book will address itself to the capitalist world system (Question 6) by raising two further questions:

1. What is capitalism?
2. What does it do to itself and to dependent- capitalist modes of production and reproduction?

To answer the first question, it will be necessary to discover the existential basis of capitalism. This requires a historical comprehensive review of Marxist literature concerning the nature of capitalism: Althusser, 1976 and 1979; Bottomore, in Heller, 1966, 1973; Braverman, 1974; Bukharin, 1965; Colletti, 1972 and 1973; Engels, 1976 and 1978; Fine & Harris, 1979; Gramsci, 1980; Gurvich, 1971; Lenin, 1977 ; Lukacs, 1966; Mandel, 1978; Marx, 1976, 1977, 1979a, 1979b; Marx Engels, 1978 and 1979; Poulantzas, 1978 and 1979; Shah, 1978; Wallerstein, 1979; Wright, 1979; Wetter. 1966.

This will enable us to understand how separation of the means of production from immediate producers, centralization of them in a few hands and articulation of the capitalist mode of production with other modes give rise to the world market.

To deal with the second question, we will attempt, on the one hand, to grasp the nature of interrelations between different capitalist social formations, and, on the other hand, to understand how the aggressive and exploitative forces of the capitalist mode of production and reproduction draw non-capitalist modes of life into the world system, destroy their natural economy, and transform them to the capitalist mode of production and reproduction.

Thus, to study this question is, in fact, to understand the articulations of different modes of production and reproduction of life. This necessitates a comprehensive and extensive review of the classical and modern Marxist sources, which are concerned with this object: Amin, 1974 and 1978; Arrighi, 1973; Baran, 1973; Bill, 1980; Brewer, 1974; Emmanuel, 1972 and 1974; Frank, 1976 and 1978; Luxemburg, 1951 and in Bukharin, 1972; Hobson, 1965; How, 1980; Lenin, 1968 and 1979; Marx & Engels, 1978 and 1979; Petras, 1970; Poulantzas, 1979; Wallerstein, 1976; Warren, 1971 and 1973.

On this ground, we will also conduct an extensive review of those sources which are concerned with Iran's integration into the capitalist world system and her transition to dependent capitalism. This will help us to disclose properly the nature of the capitalist world system: Alban, 1972; Ashraf, 1980; Arani, 1980; Banani, 1961; Bill, 1972; Groseclose, 1974; Jazani, 1973; Keddie, 1966; Khosravi, 1959 and 1979; Nomani, 1972; Pahlavi, 1980; Roosevelt, 1979; Wachtel, 1980; Zonis, 1971; Yavari, 1982.

PART III

Social Dialecticism

CHAPTER 5

What Is Social Dialecticism?

As a science, Marxism cannot stand still, it develops and is perfected. In its development, Marxism cannot but be enriched by new experiences, new knowledge — consequently some of its formulas and conclusions cannot but change in the course of time, cannot but be replaced by new formulas and conclusions, corresponding to the new historical tasks. Marxism does not recognize invariable conclusions and formulas, obligatory for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism. ¹⁷⁰

—Stalin

A science which hesitates to forget its founder is lost. ¹⁷¹

j—Alfred North Whitehead

The Main Problems with Marx's Historical Materialism?

As a historical and revolutionary science, Marxism cannot stand still. It develops and is enriched by new scientific knowledge. It requires continual re-examination of its basic categories and assumptions, corresponding to the new historical facts and tasks. “In the absence of such critical reflection, theoretical principles can

170 Stalin's Letter of Linguistics, Cited by Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, p.264.

171 Cited by Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 1.

76 Dialecticism

become ossified into outworn formulas which no longer correspond to the reality of contemporary societies.”¹⁷²

The efforts to re-examine and update Marx’s historical materialism have often ended in various kinds of reductionism. They have often re-evaluated Marxism as economism, historicism, humanism (anthropologism), and structuralism.

Marxist Economist School

Stalin, Bukharin, Mandel, Cornforth, and Shaw, as typical representatives of this school, believe that the notion of society has to be explained by reference to the economic infrastructure alone,¹⁷³ that is, to the contradiction between the relation of production and the forces of production, and the supremacy of the latter over the former.¹⁷⁴ Marxist economists do not recognize the role of superstructure in the production and reproduction of social life and try to explain (reduce) everything by reference to the economic infrastructure. Althusser writes:

*To forget about the role of the ‘superstructure’ in the reproduction of production relations, to want to explain everything by reference to the economic infrastructure alone, is of course.*¹⁷⁵

172 Barris, “Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research,” *Insurgent Sociology*, (Summer, 1979), p. 4.

173 Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, (Peking: FLP., 1972); Bukharin *Soviet Ideology Today*, (N.Y.: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1962); Shaw, *Marx’s Theory of History*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978); Mandel, *Lake Capitalism*, (London: Verso, 1978); Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, N.Y.: I.P., 1977).

174 Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism*, pp. 5-6, 62-64, 69; Bukharin *Historical Materialism*, pp. 60-62, 244-245; Shaw, *Marx’s Theory of History*, pp. 8-9, 17, 29, 45, 54-57, 61, 69, 75-76, 98, 139, 152, 156-157.

175 Althusser, *Essay in Self Criticism*, pp. 14-15.

And:

It is 'economism' (mechanism) and not the true Marxist tradition that sets up the hierarchy of instances once and for all, assigns each its essence and role and defines the universal meaning of their relations; it is economism that identifies roles and actors eternally... It is economism that identifies eternally in advance the determinant-contradiction-in-the-last-instance with the role of the dominant contradiction, which forever assimilates such and such an 'aspect' (forces of production, economy, practice) to the principal role, and such and such another 'aspect' (relations of production, politics, ideology, theory) to the secondary role. ¹⁷⁶

For Marxist economists, modes of production, class struggles, social changes, social transitions, types of society, art, science, or in short, the whole superstructure is a mere function or reflection of productive forces. ¹⁷⁷ Marxist economists want sensuous objects distinct from thought objects. They do not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. They regard the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived as fixed processes. Hence, they do not grasp the significance of Marx's revolutionary idea of practical-critical activity. Here, the great emphasis is on the idea that the economic system is completely determined by objective laws which operate the force of natural laws, independent of human will. For example, for Stalin, "the material life of society is an objective reality existing independently of the will of

¹⁷⁶ Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 213.

¹⁷⁷ Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, pp. 90,162, 164-165, 170-181, 224-231, 242- 244, 262-272; Shaw, *Marx's' Theory of History*, pp. 69,75; Politzer, *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*, p. 146; Cornforth, *Materialism and Dialectical Method*, p. 40.

78 Dialecticism

man.”¹⁷⁸ Therefore, the social laws are not created by the will of man, but by economic forces.¹⁷⁹ Marxist economists are concerned with the changing of circumstances and fail to remember that circumstances are changed by men.¹⁸⁰ They ignore the fundamental role of the class struggle in social life and its transformation. They do not realize the fact that “where it is a question of a complete transformation of the social organization the masses themselves must also be in it.”¹⁸¹ However, for Marxist economists, Marx’s historical materialism is nothing more than the science of the economic structure of society.

Marxist Historicist School

Historicism in Marxism emerged in response to the development of ongoing social events and in reaction to the Marxist economist school around the time of the October Revolution.¹⁸² Georg Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci, as typical representatives of this school, reduce Marxism to the science of politics and history. This school does away with the economic infrastructure and holds ideological and political structures (superstructure) as the major determinants of the historical development of social life. From the Marxist historicist viewpoint,

178 Stalin, cited by Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 214; See also Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism*, pp. 2-5, 7-8, 87-88.

179 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

180 Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 121.

181 Marx, *Class Struggle in France*, (N.Y.: I.P., 1964), p. 25.

182 About the historical origin of the Marxist historicist school, see P. Anderson, *Consideration of Western Marxism*, (London: Verso, 1979); Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, pp. 120, 314; Ben, *Western Marxism*, p. 146.

there is always a determination, in the last instance, in the category of totality – the supremacy of the whole over the part. Here, ideology and politics constitute the concrete totality, and govern reality. They “determine not only the object of knowledge but also the subject.”¹⁸³ They serve to cement the unity of the entire process of social life.¹⁸⁴ Hence, for this school, modes of production, social classes and struggles among them, social changes, social transition, and social development are merely subject to history and political class consciousness. Thus, historicism in Marxism is the consciousness of historical tasks and necessities. Politics constitutes the motive force of history, and sociology (Marx’s historical materialism) is nothing more than the science of politics.

Marxist Humanist School

Humanist interpretations of Marxism emerged from The Institute for Social Research, in Frankfurt, Germany, in reaction to the concrete development of ongoing social events, in response to the Marxist economist school, and particularly, as a critique of Russian statism. Benton believes that “Marxist humanism is... concerned with a type of personal liberation from bureaucratic collectivism, as many have termed the Soviet-style centralized political and economic structure... There are two grounds on which the Marxist humanists indict state-socialism: a) in the first place, state-socialism denies fundamental human

183 Ibid., pp. 120, 128, 130, 188-189; Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p.38; Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. xxi, xvi, 10, 27-28, 30-40, 46-51; Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, pp. 176-181, 243, 456; Benton, *Western Marxism* (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing, 1979), pp. 12, 31-32, 69-70, 75, 102-104, 116-126, 147-148.

184 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, cited by Althusser, *Reading Capital*, p. 128.

rights: b) in the second place, state-socialism does not sufficiently emancipate the person from alienated labor.”¹⁸⁵

Humanism in Marxism is an anthropological interpretation of Marxism. It reduces Marxism to individualism. Marxist humanists, following Marx and Feuerbach, believe that “for Marx’s philosophy, the central issue is that of the existence of the real individual man who is what he is, what he does, and whose nature unfolds and reveals itself in history.”¹⁸⁶ It is “a protest against man’s alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing; it is a movement against the dehumanization of man inherent in the development of Western industrialism. It is ruthlessly critical of all ‘answers’ to the problem of human existence which try to present solutions by negating or camouflaging the dichotomies inherent in man’s existence.”¹⁸⁷ They believe “in man, in his capacity to liberate himself, and to realize his potentialities,”¹⁸⁸ therefore, they reject all those Marxists who gave man “a passive role in the historical process... as a passive object of circumstances.”¹⁸⁹ Here, “man, the real and total man, ‘the real living individuals’... are the subject matter of history and of the understanding of its laws. Marx’s interpretation of history (is) an anthropological interpretation.”¹⁹⁰ Marxist humanists attempt to

¹⁸⁵ Benton, *Western Marxism*, pp. 194, 197. About the origin of Marxist humanism see Anderson, *Considerations of Western Marxism & Arguments Within English Marxism* (London: Verso, 1980); Althusser, *For Marx*, Chapter 7.

¹⁸⁶ Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*, (N.Y.: Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966), p. v.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. vi.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

explain modes of production, social formation, class struggles, socialism, and all other aspects of social life through the concept of man, as the originating subject, not realizing that “the human essence” as Marx said, “is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. It is the ensemble of social relations.”¹⁹¹ How then can it be the universal aim and the motive force of history? For the Marxist humanist school, however, man is the motive force of history, and sociology is nothing more than the science of man and his historical alienation and, at the same time, his spiritual emancipation, or in other words, sociology (Marx’s historical materialism) is nothing more than the science of the ‘full realization of individualism.’¹⁹²

Marxist Structuralist School

Althusser, Poulantzas, and Bettelheim, as typical representatives of this school, reduce Marx’s historical materialism to the science of structural levels of social formation.¹⁹³ For this school, social formation, as a complex whole, is the subject of history, and, therefore, there is always a determination in existing totality over the elements from which it is composed. Here, the whole ends in itself, or in Althusser’s words, “the structure of the whole is the very essence of the whole.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 122.

¹⁹² Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*, p. 3.

¹⁹³ Althusser, *For Marx*, and *Reading Capital*; Poulantzas, *Political Power and Class in Contemporary Capitalism*; Bettelheim, *The Transition to Socialist Economy* (Great Britain: The Harvest Press Limited, 1975).

¹⁹⁴ Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 205.

They try to understand the whole through the whole, social formation through social formation. “The structure of the social whole,” Althusser writes, “must be strictly interrogated to find in it the secret of the conception of history.”¹⁹⁵ So, for Marxist structuralists, the social totality and its contradictions do not come from man’s real life, but from structural levels of social formation. “The contradiction is inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found.”¹⁹⁶

Marxist structuralists do not recognize the fact that these structures are just as much produced by men as roads, cars, houses, shoes, etc. They do not appreciate the fact that the energy of the whole has its source in the interrelations among diverse tendencies of which it is composed. In fact, what Marxist structuralists try to explain is how the structures of social formation condition one another.

However, one should remind them that “it is one thing to say how the elements of a given structure condition one another: it is another thing to explain whence the elements arose and combined.”¹⁹⁷ Social formations do not exist because they are composed of structural levels, or just by our admission that they constitute the real basis of society and the motive force of history, without explaining where from these levels and their dynamics come.

According to structuralist tendency, social formation, as many hierarchized overlapping and intersecting structures, is the real basis of production and reproduction of social life; it is the site of changes and development; it is the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid p. 97

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁹⁷ C.J. Arthur, in Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 33.

strategic node of uneven development of different modes of production, different forms of state, and social contradictions; it is the nodal point of class determination, class struggles, class consciousness; it is the site of reproduction of economic, political, and ideological relations; it is the locus of the existence of imperialism.¹⁹⁸ Thus, for Marxist structuralists, to understand human social life is to understand social formation. But let us examine what they mean by social formation. This is essential, because understanding their concept of social formation will help us discover the nature of the Marxist structuralist school. Here, “the term social formation refers strictly to structural levels.”¹⁹⁹ Hence, to understand social formation is to understand social structures. But what do Marxist structuralists mean by social structures? By social structure, they mean “the unity of ideological unity,”²⁰⁰ or the ideological function which “covers the organizing matrix of institutions.”²⁰¹ And by institution, they mean “a system of norms or rules which is socially sanctioned.”²⁰² Thus, here, it is ideology “which presents itself explicitly as a whole ...or as an intention of totalization.”²⁰³ It is ideology which constitutes the subject of history and the ‘real conditions of existence’ of human social life. It is in/by ideology that society lives, it is in/by ideology that the modes of production and reproduction, class struggles, social contradictions can be

198 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 13-15, 41-42, 69-70; and *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 22, 23, 27, 30; Althusser, *Essay in Self Criticism*, p. 14.

199 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 69.

200 Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 67.

201 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 115.

202 Ibid.

203 Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 67.

84 Dialecticism

expressed.²⁰⁴ Is this Marxism or structural functionalism? This is, for certain, structural functionalism. This is, for sure, idealism, not Marxism. It is worth noting here that by ideology Marxist structuralists do not mean man's consciousness, but "perceived accepted suffered cultural objects,"²⁰⁵ such as norms and beliefs, or in Durkheim's words the "collective conscience." Marxist structuralists' cardinal sin is their idea that history is completely blind. Human beings are conceived as mere supports (traders) of structures. "The true 'subjects' ... are therefore not these occupants or functionaries ... are not 'concrete individuals', 'real man'- but ...the true 'subjects' are these definers and distributors (structures)."²⁰⁶ Thus, for this school, "it is impossible to relate practices to an originating subject."²⁰⁷ Marxist structuralists deprive men of any freedom and maneuver and turn them into the 'bearers' of ideological forces which they are not able to change. This tendency is of course another form of reductionism, determinism, and an idealization of Marxism alien to real Marxism.

However, for Marxist structuralists, structures, as the 'unity of ideological unity,' are the motive force of history. So, the science founded by Marx is nothing more than the science of these structures.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 232.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 233. Ideology, for Marxist structuralists, means two things: first, it means ideological structure as distinct from political and economic structures; second, it refers to a totality, composed of intersecting structures which constitute the condition of existence of all societies.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 180.

²⁰⁷ Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 90.

Social Dialecticism as the Science of Social Life

Social dialecticism is not a continuation and on no account a repetition of Marx's historical materialism. It uses the fundamental principles of Marx's historical materialism and methodology as its means and sources and tries to produce the most concrete knowledge about human social life. *It is called social dialecticism because it is the extension, application, and specification of the general laws of dialectical philosophy to the study of social life and its development,*²⁰⁸ *because it is the most affirmative and comprehensive recognition of laws of the interrelations among diverse tendencies which regulate the very origin, existence, and changes in social phenomena; because, here, social relations (including class relations), constitute the fundamental condition of existence and development of human social life.*

Social dialecticism has as its object human social life. It is the scientific recognition of regularities and laws found in social phenomena. It is the science of the origin, existence, change, development, transition, and variation of social phenomena. It is the science of those relations – disparate relations within diverse things or tendencies – under which humans produce and reproduce their social life, that is, their mental and material means, needs, interests, demands, developments, and make their own history. SOCIAL DIALECTICISM

PRESENTS ITSELF BY ITS ONTOLOGICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES. It is not looking for properties of social phenomena. It is neither a Hegelian process of differentiation and classification, nor a Weberian process of empirical differentiation, codification, and generalization of social phenomena, but

208 Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, p. 1. Social dialecticism has as its object human social life

it is the process of the production of the most concrete knowledge of the ‘essence’ of social life. It is an inquiry into the ‘nature’ of social phenomena.

The strength and the validity of social dialecticism is also based on its revolutionary tendency. We do not just explain the social phenomena, but we study human social life to change it – it is a science of relations among divers phenomena or tendencies, changes, and development. Thus, social dialecticism is the science of the conditions and forms under which various human societies have produced and reproduced themselves. At the same time, it is the science of revolutionary practices for changing and developing those conditions. Hence, **the basic theme and the general strategy of social dialecticism is to understand the nature of social life to provide the most scientific solutions to its problems, and to offer the most humanistic and effective guides for its development.**

Social dialecticism is in direct opposition to the isolation of sociology from philosophy, epistemology, and history. It arises from the struggle to save Marx’s historical materialism from collapsing into economism, historicism, humanism, and structuralism. Social dialecticism holds the impossibility of isolation of the infrastructure from the superstructure. It rejects the isolation of social practices from mental practices. It insists that ideas constitute an organic part of social life. It holds the impossibility of isolation of political, economic, and ideological relations from each other and from class relations. It is a break with all those Marxist schools that seek to reduce the mode of production of life simply to the material mode of production. It is a break with all those Marxists who strive to understand social life through social institutions, politics, processes of material production, or

man. We reject all those Marxist notions that regard the state as a passive instrument in the hand of the ruling class, as a *sui-generis* structure with its own will, or as something external, above, or under class relations. Social dialecticism departs from all those Marxists who hold globalization (the world capitalist system) as the result of the trade among nations, or as a product of the articulation of structural levels of different social formations but as an extension of capitalism.

Social dialecticism starts from the fact that for humans to live and satisfy their natural and historically determined needs, demands, interests, and customs, they must produce and reproduce. This is the primary determinant factor of all human history. But the production and reproduction of life involves humans' relations to nature, to each other, and to their mental and material means of life, the ensemble of which constitutes the general condition of all human societies.

Through the production and reproduction of their life, men have also developed their mental and material means of life, and, thereby, changed their social relations.

So, social life, throughout its historical development has undergone many changes, passed through various stages, taken distinct forms, entailed numerous divisions and sub-divisions, which have had various effects on human interests and demands. Humans, their mental and material means of life, nature, and the relations among them, as productive forces, constitute the four fundamental factors in the existence, changes, and development of social life. The specific way men combine and interrelate with each other

distinguishes different stages (modes) of production and reproduction of life. It is with these real facts that social dialecticism begins and attempts to produce the most concrete knowledge about the nature of social life.

Thus, the next part is a presentation of new doctrines about the nature of the general condition of life, social modes of production of life, class relation—political ideological and economic relations, social institutions, state, and the world capitalist system, which is at the heart of the most topical concerns in Marxism.

THE BASIC THEME AND THE GENERAL STRATEGY OF SOCIAL DIALECTICISM IS TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF SOCIAL LIFE TO PROVIDE THE MOST SCIENTIFIC SOLUTIONS TO ITS PROBLEMS, AND TO OFFER THE MOST EFFECTIVE GUIDES FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT.

CHAPTER 6

The General Condition of Life

According to the materialist conception of history the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence, if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that position into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. ²⁰⁹

—Engels

Until now, the general conditions of life have been either neglected by Marx's followers or reduced to economic, political, ideological elements, or to man's nature. But if we read the above quote closely, the whole idea about the real basis of social life is there: the impossibility of reducing social life to economic, political, ideological, and spiritual elements, or the impossibility of separation of social life from history and nature. Human social life is based neither on metaphysical power or will, nor on some natural forces, but on man's real life, man's social life. ²¹⁰

Thus, in direct contrast with economism, historicism, humanism, and the structuralism of Marxism, we do not start from economic, political, ideological elements, or from man, but from “the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make history.” ²¹¹ ***Consequently, the determining factor***

209 Engels, cited by Althusser, For Marx, p. 112.

210 Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, pp. 7-9, 12-13, and Marxism and Hegel, pp. 228-229; Althusser, Reading Capital, p. 172; Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, p. 40; Bettelheim, The Transition to Socialist Economy, p. 122.

211 Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 48.

of social life is the process of production and reproduction of humans' social life.

*The process of production and reproduction of social life involves basically four dialectically interrelated but distinct practices: 1. The production and reproduction of mental and material means of life; the production and reproduction of productive, and consumptive means of social life.*²¹² *2. The production and reproduction of new needs. This process is based on the fact that "the satisfaction of the first needs leads to new needs."*²¹³ *Thus, humans needs and interests, and" the mode of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country."*²¹⁴ *3. To make and remake other humans –'the production of species', "the relations between man and woman, parents to children, the family."*²¹⁵ *4. The production and reproduction of social relations.*

In the process of production and reproduction of their lives, humans act not only on nature, but on each other. Hence, the process of production and reproduction of life is always social. Here, "by social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner, and to what end."²¹⁶

²¹² Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, p. 71.

²¹³ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 49.

²¹⁴ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 171

²¹⁵ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 49.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

As soon as it is accepted that the process of the production and reproduction of life cannot be confined to economic, political, or ideological relations, the following consequences can be extracted:

1. The general condition of life is based on categories which are abstracted from, and, therefore, are common to all stages of the production and reproduction of human social life. Hence, the “premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but the existence of living human individuals from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity.”²¹⁷

2. History is made up of many intersecting forces. dialecticism is not materialism, nor can it be idealism or humanism. Societies are not creatures of nature, material tools, ideas, or humans, but they are the product of the combination of those things and their interrelations. Therefore, social dialecticism rejects all those theories based on individualization, idealization, or materialization of social life.

3. According to the dialectical conception of social life, “the existence of living human individuals,” that is, the production and reproduction of real life, is the ultimate determining element of social life. It is a clue to the recognition and understanding of the nature of human societies.

<p>THE SATISFACTION OF THE FIRST NEEDS LEADS TO NEW NEEDS.</p>

²¹⁷ Ibid., p.50.

The social production and reproduction of life or the general condition of social life involves a triple relationship: a) human's relationship to nature; b) the relationship of human to his fellow human; and c) human's relationship to his mental and material means of production and reproduction of life. Here, these dialectically interrelated relationships appear in such a way that the restricted relationship of men to nature determines their restricted relations to one another and to their mental and material means; the restricted relationship of men to each other determines men's restricted relations to nature and to their mental and material means; and their restricted relationship to their mental and material means determines their restricted relations to nature and to one another. ²¹⁸ *Hence, from the outset, there are dialectical relations between humans and nature, humans and their means of life, and among men themselves, which are as old as men themselves.* ²¹⁹

Thus, man, nature, mental and material means, and the way they interrelate with each other are social productive forces. It is the dialectical interrelations among these productive forces which constitute the ultimately determining elements of the production and reproduction of social life. Hence, social relations of production and reproduction of life, the mode of cooperation, or the way men interrelate with each other, nature, and mental and material means of life, are not something on the outside or a reflection of productive forces, but “this mode of cooperation is itself a productive force.” ²²⁰ This refutes all those ideas that

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p.50.

²²⁰ Ibid.

separate the relation of production from the productive forces and attempt to regard one of them as mere reflection of the other one. Hence, in the production and reproduction of their lives, men enter distinct, restricted relations with each other, nature, and the mental and material means, which are not a matter of individual deliberate choice, but correspond to a definite stage of the development of their productive forces. The total sum of these relations constitutes the general condition of life — the real foundation that governs origin, existence, and development of social life.

4. The process of production and reproduction of human social life is a continuous process without which society cannot exist. When the social production of life is viewed as an incessant process, it implies, at the same time, social reproduction of life.²²¹ Social life is essentially relational, and it changes constantly. All aspects of men's existence are the sites of distinct relations. As men interrelate, their lives never stay at one point, but it is always in a state of change. Thus, the process of production and reproduction of life calls forth quantitative and qualitative changes in men's productive forces, and, in turn, in the whole social system. Hence, social history is the history of relations, changes, developments of the social productive forces and their historically determined articulations.

MAN, NATURE, MENTAL AND MATERIAL MEANS, AND THE WAY THEY INTERRELATE ARE SOCIAL PRODUCTIVE FORCES WHICH CONSTITUTE THE ULTIMATE DETERMINING ELEMENTS OF THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LIFE.

²²¹ Marx, Capital, vol.1, p. 566.

5. If man's life is social, then the division of labor is the necessary tools and conditions of its existence and development. The division of labor constitutes a universal characteristic and one of the chief factors in the historical development of social life.²²² Social life involves many social and technical divisions of labor, none of which is independent, isolated from other practices, or from social life as a whole; but they constitute different moments of the process of production and reproduction of human life. This refutes those Marxists who do not realize the general condition of life and its historically produced division of labor. They separate social practices from each other, and try to understand social life through economic, political, or ideological relations.²²³

The social division of labor is not a natural or neutral division, but a social one; that is, it has been created, existed, changed, and developed by the process of production and reproduction of life, and its corresponding class relations. It is not just a particular exclusive sphere of men's activity, but it is, at the same time, a particular means of social differentiation and the division of men into classes.²²⁴

6. humans are natural beings. They are part of nature. They are not just natural beings, but they are, at the same time, a conscious social beings. They identify and separate themselves from other natural species by their higher consciousness and by the mode of production and reproduction of their social life.

²²² Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 53.

²²³ Marx, *Capital*, vol.1, pp. 42, 351-352, 354-355; Althusser, *Reading Capital*, pp.316, 320; Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 141-145.

²²⁴ Adam Smith (cited by Fromm, 1980:160) believes that "the diversity of human talents is more the effect than cause of the division of labor." See also chapter 8.

Humans distinguished themselves from other animals, as soon as, in the process of production and reproduction of life, they were able to produce and develop his means of life; as soon as they could produce, use, develop, and transfer his mental and material means of life to next generations. And, thereby, as soon as, they were able to satisfy, change, and develop their needs and interests— their nature. ²²⁵

Thus, humans do not have a fixed, unchanging nature, determined purely biologically; on the contrary, humans' nature is quantitatively and qualitatively ever changing. Their nature is neither a mere product of material forces (as materialists claim), nor is it the result of his idea or some metaphysical forces (as idealists claim), but there is always a dialectical relation between humans' needs, demands, and tendencies, and the condition of their life, the process of production and reproduction of their lives and its corresponding class relations. ²²⁶ *Hence, humans make his nature through social practices; in other words, humans' nature is "the ensemble of the social relations."* ²²⁷ *Thus, the process of production and reproduction is not just a process of production of use-value, for it is, at the same time, the process of production, reproduction, and development of humans' nature, that is, humans' ideas, interests, tendencies, and needs. The more humans develop and transfer their mental and material means of life to the next generation, the more they remove themselves from animal modes of life.*

²²⁵ Marx, Capital, vol.1, pp. 179, 202; Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42.

²²⁶ Feuerbach transfers the religious essence into human essence, and for Hegel human essence comes from man's consciousness.

²²⁷ Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 122.

7. Another fundamental question among Marxists concerns is the role of man in history. Marxist economists believe that “material life is an objective reality existing independently of the will of men.”²²⁸ Even class struggles cannot change these objective laws. Hence, for Marxist economists, it is not men, but his material circumstances that are the motive force of history.

For Marxist structuralists, the true subject of social life is not man, but social structures. Here, man is never anything more than the occupant of these structures. Hence, social history is completely blind. It deprives man of freedom and maneuverability in history and turns him into the “bearers” of some ideological forces.²²⁹ Marxist economists and Marxist structuralists do not realize the revolutionary or practical-critical activity of men in history. They seem to be only concerned with how material conditions or social structures determine and change man’s life, but do not realize that these circumstances are created, changed, and developed by man.

THE MORE HUMANS PRODUCE, DEVELOP, AND TRANSFER THEIR MENTAL AND MATERIAL MEANS OF LIFE TO THE NEXT GENERATION, THE MORE THEY REMOVE HIMSELF FROM ANIMAL MODES OF LIFE.

²²⁸ Stalin, quoted by Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, p. 214; see also Stalin,

Economic Problems of Socialism, pp. 2-5, 7-8, 87-88.

²²⁹ Althusser, Reading Capital, p.180.

Marx's reply to this question is very clear and may be grasped through his works. For example, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx states that "men make their own history, they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."²³⁰ In his theses on Feuerbach, Marx rejects any doctrine that ignores the active, creative, and determining role of man in history.²³¹ In the *German Ideology*, he writes that history "shows that *circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.*"²³² In the *Class Struggles in France*, Marx notes that when it is a question of human social life, men themselves must be in it.²³³ All these passages acknowledge the fact that there is a dialectical relation between man and his condition of existence. Humans are both the product of and the potential transformer of circumstances. He is both the object and the subject of history.

THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION IS NOT JUST A PROCESS OF PRODUCTION OF USE-VALUE, FOR IT IS, AT THE SAME TIME, THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION, REPRODUCTION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANS' NATURE, THAT IS, HUMANS' IDEAS, INTERESTS, TENDENCIES, AND NEEDS.

²³⁰ Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, (N.Y.: I.P., 1977), p. 15.

²³¹ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 121-123.

²³² Ibid., p. 59.

²³³ Ibid., p. 59.

Man has evolved his condition of life as much as the latter evolved him.

8. Man lives in nature. To survive he must exchange with nature. For social dialecticism, this unity of man and nature is organically part of the condition of the existence and development of human social life. It dominates all other activities of man and constitutes the most fundamental element in man's social life.

9. Man produces and reproduces his life by certain historically created means. Here, by these means, we mean all those mental and material productive forces, such as machinery, roads, computers, religions, beliefs, expectations, dreams, norms, rules, laws, plans, institutions, division of labor, customs, culture, traditions, and all made by humans, which have been produced, used, developed, and transmitted by humans in his real social life. These means serve as the conductor of man's social practices. They distinguish not only human modes of life from each other and from animal modes of life, but they are the most scientific criteria of the degree of development of societies.

Social life is closely bound up with the means of production. The multitude of these means that are accessible to man determine the nature of social life.²³⁴ In acquiring new means, man changes his mode of life. For social dialecticism, the means of production and reproduction of life are on no account reducible to some material means of production such as machinery, roads, buildings, etc. The concept also includes all mental means of production and reproduction of life, such as social regulations, norms, customs, superstitions, beliefs, traditions, rites, rituals, conventions, science, etc. Thus, when we speak of the means of production, we

²³⁴ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 50.

speak of the mental and material ones. For Marxist economists, the key to understanding social life is: 1) the degree of development of material means of production; and 2) who controls these means. Social dialecticism does not deny the essential role of the material means of production, and the importance of the control over these key economic resources. However, we believe that this is not sufficient for understanding social life. Men do not live and become differentiated from each other just through their relation to some material means of life. Social life is directly interwoven with mental means as well. In fact, the material means of production always have a dialectical relation with the mental ones. Each one is the condition of existence and development of the other.

Thus, it is not always the degree of development of material means of production that determines the nature of social life, but mental means of production and reproduction of life play a significant role in the historical development of societies. As an example, let us compare the Russian statist mode of production of life, with Western Capitalism. These two systems, with almost the same degree of development of material means of production, have two different modes of life.

The mental means of human social life do not have a fixed character, but much like the material means, they are directly interwoven with the process of production and reproduction of social life with men's actual life. Mental means do not fall from the sky. They do not have any metaphysical or spiritual roots. They are neither an independent entity, isolated from life and the processes of society, nor mere reflections of the infrastructure of society. But they are produced by men in the

process of production and reproduction of their lives. Hence, neither man's consciousness nor existing mental means of social relations, belong to a realm of their own, but they are born, exist and change through the social production of life and its corresponding class relations.

Thus, by considering ideas as the means of production and reproduction of life, this study attempts to, on the one hand, combine the one-sided perspectives of materialism or idealism into a comprehensive all-sided approach — into social dialecticism — and, on the other hand, to reconstruct all economist, historicist, humanist, and structuralist categories into social categories, which can cover the process of production and reproduction of human social life as a whole.

THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LIFE INVOLVE HUMANS' RELATIONS TO NATURE, TO EACH OTHER, AND TO THEIR MENTAL AND MATERIAL MEANS OF LIFE, THE ENSEMBLE OF WHICH CONSTITUTES THE GENERAL CONDITION OF ALL HUMAN SOCIETIES.

CHAPTER 7

Social Modes of Production and Reproduction of Life

Marx applies the concept of mode of production in numerous ways. Sometimes he defines it through the process of material production and sometimes via social relations. Therefore, the concept of mode of production has been interpreted in different ways by his followers.

To Marxist economists, the concept of mode of production specifically refers to the mode of material production.²³⁵ Here, the mode of material production determines the political and ideological life process in general. In fact, Marxist economists want the sensuous object distinct from the thought object. They do not consider man's consciousness and the existing mental means of production as a constituent part of social production and reproduction of life. They do not appreciate the significance of Marx's concept of the 'practical-critical' activity of men, and believe that the mode of production is operated, changed, and developed by objective laws, independent of humans' will.

Marxist structuralists regard the mode of production as the mode of articulation of structural levels of social formation. It "constitutes an abstract-formal object which does not exist in the strong sense in reality. Capitalist, feudal, and slave modes of production, which equally lack existence in the strong sense, also constitute abstract-formal objects."²³⁶ The modes of production cannot exist in themselves, but they "exist only and reproduce themselves within social formations that are

²³⁵ Stalin, *Economic Problem of Socialism*.

²³⁶ Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 15.

Historically determinate.”²³⁷ Thus, what distinguishes one mode of production from another and, consequently, specifies the form of existence of a mode of production does not drive from the nature of the mode of production itself, but from the particular matrix, i.e., the particular articulation maintained by the ideological structures of social formation.²³⁸

Generally, there is a prevalent tendency among Marxist reductionists to understand social relations through either economic, political, or ideological relations. To them, social relations appear as the effect, rather than the cause, of economic, political, and ideological relations. In fact, this constitutes the basis of all forms of economism, historicism, and structuralism. This implies conceptual splits between the so-called infrastructure and superstructure, between social structures and social relations (in which social structures are not social relations), and between social relations and men’s needs; all of these, for sure, are alien to scientific Marxism. For example, in the following passage from Poulantzas, all these kinds of isolation can be realized clearly:

The scientific Marxist conception of social relations of production itself provides the radical critique of any economic anthropology which relates the economy in general to the needs of human ‘subjects’ and consequently the radical critique of the conception of social relations as intersubjective relations. This is true in two senses: on the one hand, the instance of economics is composed of the unity between the labor process (concerning the material and technical conditions of labor and of production (concerning

²³⁷ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 22.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 48; Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 15.

the relations of agents of production and the means of labor). Consequently, the relations of production do not simply denote interrelations between agents of production, but rather these relations in specific combinations between agents and material technical conditions of labor. On the one hand, social relations of production are relations among agents of production. It seems, then, that we can only make a radical critique of any 'anthropologism'... if we clearly distinguish structures and social relations ... (Social relations as class relations are not and) cannot cover the structure of social relations of production... These remarks are just as valid for the other instances; the structure of political ... and equally of the ideological, are not social classes (social relations).²³⁹

According to a dialectical conception of history “the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life.”²⁴⁰ In the social production and reproduction of their lives, men enter definite historically created relations corresponding to a determinate stage of development of their mental and material productive forces. The totality of these relations constitutes the general condition of human social life, the real foundation from which we can explain the nature of human social life.²⁴¹

***THERE IS A DIALECTICAL RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND HIS
CONDITION OF EXISTENCE. CONDITIONS MAKE MAN JUST AS
MUCH AS MAN MAKES CONDITIONS. MAN IS BOTH THE PRODUCT
OF AND THE POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER OF CONDITIONS, THEY
ARE BOTH THE OBJECT AND THE SUBJECT OF HISTORY.***

²³⁹ Ibid. pp. 64-66.

²⁴⁰ Engels, cited by Wetter, *The Dialectical Materialism*, p. 50.

²⁴¹ Marx, cited by Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 10.

Human social life has not repeated itself, but it has entailed many divisions, suffered continual quantitative and qualitative changes, and taken on new forms.

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, and the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations. Consequently, on the one hand, it continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. ²⁴²

Therefore, there is no social life in general. When we speak of human social life, we always have in mind the process of production and reproduction of men's social life at a definite stage of its development. "Every historical period has laws of its own... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws." ²⁴³

For social dialecticism, humans, mental and material means of life, (that is, men's labor, ideas, interests, needs, roads, tools, machinery, needs), and nature, as the social productive forces, are always the imminent factors of social life. For production to go on at all, they must unite. The specific manner, in which this union is accomplished, the specific way men interrelate to nature, to existing mental and material means of life, specifies a social mode of production, and, in turn, distinguishes different modes of production from each other. So, a mode of production cannot refer to the structural levels of social formation. It "must not be considered" as Marx said, "simply as being the production of the physical

²⁴² Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 57.

²⁴³ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 18-19.

existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life.”²⁴⁴ Hence, in general, social history is the history of the development of productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces, men change their mode of living – their social relations. However, the changes are not always quantitative. At certain points in the changes in productive forces, men (revolutionary classes) come into conflict with existing social relations. This contradiction, which appears as class struggles, brings about often social crises, and leads, in the end, to a qualitative change, that is, to a breakdown of the existing mode, and its replacement by a new one.

The historical development of productive forces and the historical transition of a mode of production do not always result from internal relations, but sometimes, external relations play the fundamental role in social transitions. For example, in Iran, the feudal mode of production was transformed to dominated capitalism not as a result of the development of her productive forces, not because of class struggles between farmers and landlords or bourgeoisie and landlords, but rather because of the aggressive forces of capitalism, which gradually drew Iran into the whirlpool of the world market, and ultimately, in 1963, through the so-called ‘White Revolution’ completely destroyed the Iranian feudal mode of production, transformed her into An alienated dominated state-capitalism.

***SOCIAL HISTORY IS THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRODUCTIVE FORCES***

244 Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42.

Consequently, the historical transition of modes of production does not always follow the same pattern. There is no unilinear pattern of development of a particular mode of production. All feudal modes do not necessarily end in capitalism. The process of production and reproduction of life was divided by the development of human social life into distinct but interrelated relations, such as political, economic, and ideological relations. A mode of production and reproduction of life should not be confused or reduced to economic, political, and ideological modes of practices, which are nothing more than different moments of the former. None of these relations can live by themselves, in isolation from other practices, but each of them is the precondition of existence and development of other relations.

A social mode of production and reproduction of life consists of two hierarchical structures which should not be confused with each other:

1. Social life depends on nature but not vice versa. Men before being social beings were natural beings. Their lives require before anything else eating, drinking, clothing, shelter, and the propagation of their lives, that is, the production and reproduction of immediate needs. "Therefore, in any interpretation of history, one has first to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its

THERE ARE DIALECTICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN HUMANS AND NATURE, HUMANS AND THEIR MEANS OF LIFE, AND AMONG HUMANS THEMSELVES, WHICH ARE AS OLD AS MEN THEMSELVES.

implications and to accord it due importance.”²⁴⁵

2. The determining role of men’s relations with nature should not be confused or mixed with the class structure of modes of production, which simply implies the relation of domination and subordination among agents of a mode of production in the process of production and reproduction of their lives. In general, any mode of production is structured by class relations, i.e., by the relation of domination and subordination, in which, on the one hand, one class, as the ruling class, dominates other classes and governs and controls almost all mental and material means and, in turn, the whole process of production and reproduction of life; and, on the other hand, one fraction of the ruling class dominates all other fractions, which simply means that a mode of production is structured in dominance by its political, economic, or ideological agents of a fraction of ruling class over other fractions — the superiority of one level over other levels. For example, in Russia or in all so-called underdeveloped countries, the political fraction of the ruling class dominates economic and ideological fractions, while, in capitalist countries, it is the economic fraction of the ruling class which dominates other fractions.

HUMANS’ LIVES BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE REQUIRE EATING, DRINKING, CLOTHING, SHELTER, AND THE PROPAGATION OF THEIR LIVES, I.E., THE PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

²⁴⁵ Marx, “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy”, in Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 146

CHAPTER 8

Social Classes

What Are Social Classes?

For some sociologists, social classes are ordinal or gradational groups, differentiated from each other according to the degree that they possess some quantitative socio-economic criteria which constitute the basic characteristics of those classes.²⁴⁶ For example, according to Sorokin, social classes are “the differentiation of a given population into hierarchically supposed classes in terms of their socio-economic status.”²⁴⁷ According to this descriptive and arbitrary concept of social classes, it is theoretically possible to have as many kinds of classes as one can think of objective criteria for differentiating people. According to a more psychological interpretation, social classes are essentially subjective in character. A class is no more nor less than what people collectively think it is.²⁴⁸

In contrast to these gradational and psychological interpretations, there are sociologists who try to define social classes by their contradictory places within a social relation. Here, classes are not defined by criteria based on researchers’ ideas in an arbitrary manner, but in terms of their existence as social facts-in-reality, in the real processes of life. One may categorize relational concepts of class in terms of “market relations,” “authority relations,” and “production relations.”

²⁴⁶ Erik Olin Wright, *Class Structure and Income Determination*, (N. Y.: Academic Press, 1979).

²⁴⁷ Parsons, *Social System and the Evaluation Action Theory*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977); Warner & Eells, “Status Inequality,” in Heller, *Social Inequality*, pp. 175-183; Wrong, “Social Inequality without Social Structuration,” in Heller, *Structured Social Inequality*, pp. 513-520.

²⁴⁸ Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Class*, (New Jersey: Russel & Russel, 1961).

Sociologists within the Weberian tradition reduce class relations to market relations. For Weber, class is “(i) a large number of men have in common a specific causal factor influencing their chances of life, insofar as (ii) this factor has to do only with the position of economic goods, and the interests involved in earning a living, and furthermore (iii) in the conditions of the market in commodities or labor.”²⁴⁹

In the most general terms, market relations are the relations of exchange between the seller and buyer of various kinds of commodities. For example, for Weber, classes in American society are determined by three different market dimensions: “the market for labor, the market for credit, and the market for commodities. These three market values determine six classes; employers (capitalists) and workers, creditors and debtors, and sellers and consumers.”²⁵⁰

Conflict theoreticians see social classes as arising from authority or power relations within social institutions. For example, for Lenski, class is “an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in similar positions with respect to force or some specific form of institutionalized power.”²⁵¹ And according to Dahrendorf’s

249 Weber, “Class, status, group, and parties,” in Runciman, *Weber Selections*, pp. 43-44.

250 Weber, in Greth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1978); Runciman, *Weber’s Selections*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Giddens, *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*, (N.Y.: Harper Row Publishers, 1979); Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, (N.Y.: Free Press, 1971).

251 Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, (N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 75.

model, “class signifies conflict groups that are generated by the differential distribution of authority in ‘Imperatively Coordinated Associations.’”²⁵²

In Marxism, social classes are determined by their places in production relations. But, besides this general agreement, there is no consensus about the determining factors for social classes. Hence, to understand Marxist concepts of social classes, the first question to be studied is What constitutes a class? For Marx himself, social classes were based on identity and sources of revenue. For example, in the capitalist mode of production (CMP), “the owners merely of labor power, owners of capital, and landowners whose respective source of income are wages, profit and ground rent, in other words, wage-laborers, capitalists, and landowners, constitute then the three big classes of modern society.”²⁵³

Marx’s texts and the distinctions he made between economic and political struggles, *class-in-itself*, and *class-for-itself*, have been interpreted differently by his followers and raised many theoretical debates which may be summarized in three groups: 1) economist interpretation; 2) historicist interpretation; and 3) structuralist interpretation.

Marxist Economist Concept of Class

According to this interpretation, social classes are located only in production relations, and are determined and distinguished from each other by their relations

²⁵² Ralf Dahrendorf, “Social structure, group interest, and conflict groups,” in Heller, *Structured Social Inequality*, p. 469.

²⁵³ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, pp. 885-886.

to the material means of production.²⁵⁴ Lenin, as a typical representative of this interpretation, believes that “classes are large groups of people which differ from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in the most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor and, consequently, by the dimensions and methods of acquiring the share of social wealth of which they dispose. Classes are groups of people, one of which can appropriate the labor of another owing to the different places they occupy in definite systems of social economy.”²⁵⁵ Thus, each mode of production consists basically of two classes: “on the one hand, the class which commands, monopolizing the instruments of production; on the other hand, the executing class, with no means of production, which works for the former.”²⁵⁶

Marxist Historicist Concept of Social Classes

Marxist historicists reject the primacy of economic factors in the historical development of social life and believe that it is the category of totality, that is, the unity of subject and object, superstructure and infrastructure, theory and practice, and the supremacy of the former over the latter which constitutes the motive force

²⁵⁴ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 32; Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. 278.

²⁵⁵ Lenin, quoted by Wright, in *Class Structure and Income Determination*, p. 16.

²⁵⁶ Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, p. 282.

of history.²⁵⁷ They believe that to understand this totality is to understand social classes. For historicists, social classes are conceived of as mere subjects of history and politics. A class exists only from the moment that it possesses its own class consciousness and can organize itself in its own political party. Therefore, the process of organization of a class is a historical-political process. According to this interpretation, the concept of class leads to the theoretical division of a double status of social classes: a) class-in-itself, “determined by position within the process of production;”²⁵⁸ and b) class-for-itself, determined by class consciousness and political class struggle, which is the motive force of history and the vehicle of revolution.

Marxist Structuralist Concept of Social Classes

For Marxist structuralists, much as for other Marxists, social classes are defined by their respective places in the process of production. To them, the production process is composed of the unity of the labor process (men’s relation to nature) and the relations of production, which consist of a double relationship: first, men’s relation to the object and the means of labor; second, men’s relation to each other – class relations. Within this unity, it is always the relations of production which dominate the labor process and the productive forces.²⁵⁹ This dominant role of the relations of production over labor process and productive forces is based on class power, determined by structural functions of social formation. Therefore,

²⁵⁷ Lukacs, *History of Class Consciousness*; Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*.

²⁵⁸ Lukacs, *History of Class Consciousness*, p. 46.

²⁵⁹ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 18-21.

according to this interpretation, social formation is the subject of history. It constitutes a totality whose unity is structured by the dominant role of ideology which “presents itself explicitly as a whole... as an intention of totalization”.²⁶⁰ Thus, in contrast to economism, it is ideology which puts the labor into motion, and legitimizes the economic ownerships, or it is ideology which determines the base and its corresponding class relations.

Thus, for Marxist structuralists, social classes and the struggles among them are not determined by men’s mode of production (that is, by men’s relations with nature, their mental and material means of life, and each other) but by the effects of ideological structures of social formation.²⁶¹

For example, Poulantzas, a representative of this school, believes that “social class is a concept which shows the effects of the ensemble of structures of social formations on the agents which constitute its supports: this concept reveals the effects of the global structure in the field of social relations. In this sense, if a class is indeed a concept, it does not designate a reality.” (See figure 2)²⁶²

Dialectical Concept of Social Classes

Hitherto, for Marxists, classes have been located always and exclusively in the field of material productions as a whole, therefore, human in the superstructure

²⁶⁰ Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 67.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

²⁶² Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 67-68.

have been deprived of class memberships, and their fundamental roles in the process of production and reproduction of life have been ignored.

For social dialecticism, classes are located within social relations (in the economic, political, and ideological relations). Each mode of production of life produces and reproduces not only mental and material use-value, but it also creates the contradictory conditions in social life that give rise to social classes, which separate people's mode of life, their interests, requirements, needs, wills, and ideas from each other; and the struggles among which, in their turn, constitute the most fundamental elements and forces of the existence and evolution of social life. ²⁶³ This implies the following points:

1. Social classes arise from contradictory conditions, located within historically created modes of production of life. They are nothing more than the effects of a historically produced mode of production and reproduction of life on its agents. ²⁶⁴ For social dialecticism, a mode of production of life cannot be reduced to a mode of material production, exchange, or consumption. Therefore, social classes, arising from contradictory conditions of social life, are not located just within the production process or market relations but within social relations of production and reproduction of life, including economic, political, and ideological relations of a historically created mode of social life,

²⁶³ Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

²⁶⁴ "The existence of classes," Marx says, (1963:139) "is bound up with a particular historical phase in the development of production."

2. According to this new concept of class, it is impossible to separate class relations from men's social life, from the social relations of production and reproduction of human life. **There is no mode of production without social classes, from those of primitive stages to those most advanced ones. Thus, to think of any mode of production is to think of its contradictory classes and of its class relations. In fact, a social mode of production and reproduction and its corresponding classes are dialectically interrelated; they mutually bring each other into existence, and none of them can exist and change without the existence and changes of the other; they are different moments of the same process, which constantly reshape each other.**

The dialectical concept of social classes immediately rejects Marx's view that the existence of classes and, correspondingly, the disappearance of classes, are tied to property ownership. Marx believed that, since, in primitive and communist societies property is owned by the community, there are no classes in these societies. Contrary to Marx's idea, studies of primitive communities reveal specialization and class relations in these societies. "One of the earliest records of thought on this subject is found in the writings of Hebrew prophets who lived 800

EACH MODE OF PRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LIFE PRODUCES AND REPRODUCES NOT ONLY MENTAL AND MATERIAL USE-VALUE, BUT IT ALSO CREATES THE CONTRADICTIONARY CONDITIONS IN SOCIAL LIFE THAT GIVE RISE TO SOCIAL CLASSES, WHICH SEPARATE PEOPLE'S MODE OF LIFE, THEIR INTERESTS, REQUIREMENTS, NEEDS, WILLS.

years before Christ. In the writings of Amos, Micah, and Isaiah, we find repeated denunciations of the rich and powerful members of communities. They were concerned not merely with the use of wealth and power, but, more significantly, with the means by which they had been acquired.”²⁶⁵ “In India, also, men gave thought to the basis of social inequality long before the Christian era...in the introduction to the laws of Manu, compiled by Hindu priests about 200 B.C., we find ...that social inequalities were divinely ordained for the good of the world.”²⁶⁶

Marx’s concept of a classless society can be rejected as soon as we accept men’s life as social life, that is, as in the co-operation of several individuals. “The rejection is because all modes of production or any organization of life in which many individuals cooperate, require a ‘directing authority’, or ‘commanding will’, to run, regulate, and coordinate that organism. Nobody realized this fact better than Marx himself. Marx writes that “all labor in which many individuals co-operate necessarily requires a commanding will to co-ordinate and unify the process, and functions which apply not to partial operations but to the total activity of the workshop, much as that of orchestra conductor. This is a productive job, that must be performed in every combined mode of production,”²⁶⁷

Thus, division of labor, and, correspondingly, social differentiation are universal attributes of human social life. They exist in all modes of life, whether property and the material means of production are owned by the community, or privately by individuals. Thus, *a classless society is a myth*. “The history of all hitherto existing

265 Lenski, Power and Privilege, (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 3-4. 266 Ibid

267 Marx, cited by Poulantzas in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, p. 226.

society is the history of class struggles.”²⁶⁸

3. Social classes, arising from contradictory conditions of a historically determined mode of production and reproduction of life, differ from each other in the lifestyles of their members; their relations to the existing mental and material means of production and reproduction; their roles and powers in the process of production and reproduction of life; their sources of income; and their common interests, ideas, and needs. Of course, this general definition does not mean that what constitutes classes and struggles among them are identical in all modes of production and reproduction of life, but on the contrary, **each stage of development of social life, each mode of production and reproduction of life, has its own means of differentiation of men into classes, and its corresponding class relations. Social classes exist, change, grow, and evolve by the existence, changes, growth, and evolution of their corresponding modes of production and reproduction of life, and vice versa.**

4. Class relations are power relations. *In general, by power, we mean the capacity of a man, a class, an apparatus, a community, or a country to realize his/its historically created interests in the process of production and reproduction of life, even against the resistance of other wills and interests.*²⁶⁹

Power relations are the effects of historically determined modes of production and

²⁶⁸ Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 9.

²⁶⁹ Power, for Weber, refers to “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are

their corresponding class relations. They are located at different levels of social relations. They cover not only economic relations but, as class power, they also cover political and ideological relations; they exist not only within a mode of production or a social formation but between different modes of production, social formations or different societies (countries).

The power of the dominant class in every social system is the ruling power. Thus, “each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aims, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form; it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.”²⁷⁰ The ruling class has to protect its interests, and manipulate the existing order by, and represent its power as, the national power of the society as much as possible.

5. Social classes always exist in class struggles. As class relations exist not only in economic relations, but in political and ideological relations as well, thus, from the outset, class relations are economic, political, and ideological relations.

One should differentiate between the existence of the social classes and the

***CLASSLESS SOCIETY IS A MYTH AND CLASS RELATIONS
ARE POWER RELATIONS.***

participating in the action.” (Cited by Zeitlin, 1973:133). For Poulantzas, power is “the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests.” (1978:104).

²⁷⁰ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 65-66.

various forms of struggle they perform in different conditions (so-called class-in-itself and class-for-itself). Social classes exist even though their struggles are either weak, scattered, and unorganized; or their struggles are performed by individual agents, trade unions, or political parties.

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle ... this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests.²⁷¹

Marx's differentiation between the existence of social classes and the various forms of struggles among them are very clear in *The Communist Manifesto* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual laborers, then by the work people of a factory, then by operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploit them... At this stage, the laborers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country and broken up by their mutual competition... The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing,

***CLASSES ARE NOTHING MORE THAN THE EFFECTS OF A
HISTORICALLY PRODUCED MODE OF PRODUCTION AND
REPRODUCTION OF LIFE ON ITS AGENTS.***

271 Cited by Shaw, Marx's Theory of History, p. 50.

makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon, the workers begin to form combinations (trade union) against the bourgeoisie; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots. ... This union is furthered by the improved means of communication which are created by modern industry, and which place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to realize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes.²⁷²

6. Social classes are not a homogenous whole; they constitute a complex whole, full of internal and external contradictions. As social modes of production and reproduction of life have developed, with the historical division of labor, class fractions and class strata have evolved.

At the primitive stages of social life, when social production and reproduction of life were not yet divided into economic, political, and ideological relations, social classes were also primitive. They consisted of small numbers of individuals, determined by the natural division of labor within and between families. At this stage, classes were not yet divided into fractions or strata.

But as social life developed, social relations were divided and subdivided. So, the process of production and reproduction of life involves simultaneously economic, political, and ideological relations, which, in turn, create new contradictory

²⁷² Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 17.

conditions within social classes and class relations, giving rise to class fractions and class strata. Now, a political fraction of a ruling class may rule, or regulate, the whole society without any direct participation in the process of material production. For example, look at the statist mode of production in Russia, or almost any dominated country in the capitalist world system, in which the political fractions of the ruling class, without any direct participation in material production, rule and govern the whole society.

Thus, in advanced modes of production and reproduction of life, say the capitalist mode of production (CMP), social classes are not located just in the process of material production or economic relations, the way most Marxists claim. Political and ideological agents do not constitute a group outside, alongside, under or above social classes. But social classes arise from contradictory conditions located within economic, political, and ideological relations; that is, in CMP, social classes are made up of three economic, political, and ideological fractions, dominated by the economic fraction of the ruling class. Thus, in CMP, the working-class (dominated class) is not just that class “which performs the productive labor,” as Poulantzas claims.²⁷³ **But the concept of the working class covers all those individuals who do not own or control the mental and material means of the capitalist mode of production and reproduction of life and must sell their labor to those who do and who subjugate them directly and indirectly.** Thus, class fractions and class strata are nothing more than historically designated divisions within social classes,

²⁷³ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 20.

created by the effects of economic, political, and ideological divisions of labor of the advanced modes of production and reproduction of life.

***SOCIAL CLASSES ARE CREATED FROM AND LOCATED
WITHIN SOCIAL RELATIONS, THAT IS, WITHIN THE
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.***




Figure 2: A typology of the definition of class.

CHAPTER 9

SOCIAL STRUCTURES, ORGANIZATIONS

STATE ORGANIZATIONS

Marxists' Problems in Defining Social Organizations

By organizations Marxist structuralists mean “a system of norms or rules which is socially sanctioned.”²⁷⁴ It is “an axiomatized system of rules and norms which distribute spheres of activity and competence.”²⁷⁵ It is a normative authority, an obligatory means of acting which exists sui generis, dominates the life of its members, and as such, is the motive force of history. But the concept of organization as normative authority does not cover social relations. It exists beyond the visible relations within and between organizations and constitutes the hidden basis of social life. Moreover, Marxist structuralists believe that the relations within and between social organizations are not class relations. Social classes do not cover the relations within organizations.²⁷⁶ So they separate class relations from institutional practices. They believe that social classes “do not manifest themselves inside the structures.”²⁷⁷ “There is no theoretical homogeneity between the concept of class, ... and those concepts denoting structures.”²⁷⁸ Thus, there are “two types of relations, that of structures and that of social relations.”²⁷⁹ For example, “the structure of relation of production (just as the structure of the

274 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 115. Poulantzas' definition of social apparatuses is very similar to Durkheim's (1964:53) concept of social structure: “All the rules of action which are imperatively imposed upon conduct, to which a sanction is attached.”

275 Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 274. 276 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 66. 277 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

278 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

279 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

political and ideological) cannot be directly grasped as relations of classes or relations of power.”²⁸⁰ This leads Marxist structuralists to say that “the various social institutions - in particular the institutions of the state - do not, strictly speaking, have any power.”²⁸¹

This is, for sure, fundamentally different from Marxism. Marxist structuralists do not realize the fact that social apparatuses are, on no account, reducible to some rules and norms which, in fact, are nothing more than mental tools, produced, used, and evolved by men’s social life and its corresponding class relations, and like the material means of life, have their own effects on social relations. They do not realize the fact that these structures could not exist if there were no men or no relations. They do not understand that social institutions do not keep going just because they are systems of norms, but they keep going because their existence, and their transformation, are based on men’s social life and its corresponding class relations.

Social organizations (apparatuses), in fact, are the sites of group of humans working together within the process of production and reproduction of their social life, i.e., in their relations to nature, to each other, and to their mental and material means of life, with their corresponding class relations, and differing from each other by their purposes. They constitute the organized field of social relations, which could not exist and develop except within historically produced social modes of production and reproduction of life, and their corresponding class relations.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 102.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 115.

They exist and are continually evolving out of the humans' social life.²⁸² They are, in Wallerstein's words, "those coral reefs of human relations."²⁸³ They are nothing more than the organization of economic, political, and ideological relations of historically produced modes of production and reproduction of life. Thus, all relations within and between social apparatuses are social relations, and simultaneously, class relations.

Social apparatuses have their own integrity which cannot be reduced to or understood by their isolated parts. *In the most general sense, in the process of production and reproduction of their social life, in which men work together side by side (whether in one and the same process, or in different but connected processes), with certain historically produced mental and material means, and toward the achievement of organizational aims, they constitute an apparatus(organization), whose mode of existence and development is quantitatively and qualitatively different from its constituent parts. This is also true, in a more specific sense, in all economic, political, and ideological structures which consist of 2 or more organizations of social life. In fact, what an apparatus does could either not be performed at all by its isolated parts or could be performed by more expenditure of time and labor.*²⁸⁴

Thus, social apparatuses, as organized sites of social relations, and class relations, have their own power, needs, and interests, always created, and evolved dialectically by man's social process of production and reproduction of life, and its

²⁸² In *Class Struggles in France*, Marx (1967) clearly brings out the interrelations among social modes of production and reproduction of life, their constituent class relations, and social apparatuses.

²⁸³ Wallerstein, *The Modern World Systems*, p. 3.

²⁸⁴ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 325-327.

corresponding class relations. But they differ quantitatively and qualitatively from the power, needs, and interests of their individual constituent parts.

Social apparatuses are not made up by themselves, by spiritual forces, or any other power external, alongside, above, or under the process of production and reproduction of man's social life, and its corresponding class relations. They are nothing more than the apparatuses or means of social relations or class relations; therefore, their origin, existence, changes, developments, functions, rules, norms, interests, powers, needs, and their transformation, are not neutral, spiritual, *sui generis* or independent, but as institutionalized processes of social relations, they are involved, manipulated, regulated, and changed by class relations, and a good majority of them are dominated by the ruling class, or the ruling interest.

State Apparatuses

For classical Marxists and Marxist economists, the state apparatuses are conditioned and determined by the economic structure of social life. These Marxists attribute a derivative and subsidiary character to state apparatuses, deprive them of any power, and reduce them to passive instruments in the hands of the dominant class, which is always located exclusively within the process of material production or of economic relations. For Engels, for instance, the state “is a product of society at a particular stage of development.”²⁸⁵ It is always the state of the ruling class. It is the organization of the exploiting class; It maintains by force the economic, political, and ideological interests of the ruling class against the ruled class.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁵ Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, pp. 229-232.

²⁸⁶ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 165.

“State was the official representative of society as a whole... ; but it was this only insofar as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole.”²⁸⁷ But “when ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous ... and ceases of itself, ... it withers away.”²⁸⁸

For Lenin, “the state is a product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class contradictions. The state arises where, when and to the extent that class contradictions objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that class contradictions are irreconcilable.”²⁸⁹ It is “an instrument for exploitation of the oppressed class.”²⁹⁰

Bukharin believes that “the economic structure of society also determines its state and political structure.”²⁹¹ State is “a precise reflection of the contradiction in production.”²⁹² Thus, for Bukharin, “state organization is exclusively a class organization: it is the class which ‘has constituted its state power; it is concentrated and organized social authority of the class.’”²⁹³ For Trotsky, the “state is only a machine in the hand of dominating social forces.”²⁹⁴

²⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 306-307.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, p. 9.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁹¹ Bukharin, *Historical Materialism*, pp. 151-152.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid., pp. 302-304.²⁹⁴ Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution*, p. 62.

²⁹⁴ Trotsky, *the Permanent Revolution*, pp. 5-6

Gramsci, as a representative of Marxist historicism, believes that state apparatuses are created alongside class practices. For example, capitalist entrepreneurs create alongside themselves state organizations which function in economic and political fields and create the conditions most favorable to the expansion of the capitalist class.”²⁹⁵ Hence the state is nothing more than a mere tool which the ruling class uses for its internal and external purposes. It is the clerk of the ruling class. It does not have any power of itself, but its unity, power, prestige, and functions depend on the will, needs, and power of the ruling class.²⁹⁶

To grasp the Marxist structuralists’ theory of state, let’s start from Poulantzas’ contradictory remarks:

The various social institutions, in particular, the institution of the state, do not, strictly speaking, have any power. Institutions, considered from the point of view of power, can be related only to social classes which hold power.²⁹⁷

Classes or fractions of classes do not have any power of themselves, but their power depends on structural levels of social formation which determine social classes, their role, and their power.”²⁹⁸ The third remark contradicts the two others and is more confusing: “State is neither a class nor a fraction of class, and, therefore, it does not have any power in itself,” but, immediately, Poulantzas forgets what he said, and believes that the state constitutes a social force; it

²⁹⁵ Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, pp. 5-6.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

²⁹⁷ Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 115.

possesses a relative autonomy which creates, transforms, and makes reality.²⁹⁹

In fact, as we tried to show in previous chapters, with Marxist structuralists, everything stands on its head, on the ideological functions of social formation. Marxist structuralists consider 'collective consciousness' or 'ideological totality' as an independent reality - as the real chain or bond of society, which determines the nature and the dynamics of all social phenomena. Thus, the state does not exist and reproduces itself within the social modes of production and reproduction of life or their corresponding class relations; it is not created or taken over by ruling classes. State actions are not reducible to class relations.³⁰⁰ But they believe that the state constitutes a privileged place which concentrates the contradictions of the structural levels of social formation and organizes the relation between these structures and class relations.³⁰¹ It has as its object social formation. It is the cohesive factor in social formation and the nodal point of its transformations.³⁰² To them, the whole problem of the state is that it constitutes a specific category. Its function is not determined by classes, but it exists and reproduces itself by its place in the structural levels of social formations. not tied to a class.³⁰³ This social category, as a social force, performs objective functions on behalf of state

298 Ibid., pp. 357-359.

299 Poulantzas, *State Power Socialism*, p. 30.

300 Ibid. p. 14.

301 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 95-96.

302 Ibid., p. 93.

303 Ibid., pp. 164-165.

apparatuses, and intervenes in the political field and the class struggle with a weight of its own.³⁰⁴ It is precisely this characteristic which allows the state to function with relative autonomy vis- a-vis the hegemonic class or fraction.³⁰⁵

Poulantzas believes that the relative autonomy of the state in CMP results from the separation of the political space from the relations of production,³⁰⁶ from the separation of the political functions vis-a-vis the functions of the social classes, that is, in its (the state's) function as (a) factor of political organization of dominant classes, ... (b) its function as the factor of political disorganization; its function of preventing the working class from organizing itself into an autonomous political party.”³⁰⁷ Thus, for Poulantzas, the state is an organization outside class relations, which comes to organizing dominant classes and disorganize dominated classes; in

SOCIAL CLASSES ARE DETERMINED DIALECTICALLY BY THEIR LOCATIONS (PLACES) WITHIN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONS OF A MODE OF PRODUCTION OF LIFE, THEREFORE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONS OF ANY MODE OF PRODUCTION ARE CLASS RELATIONS

304 Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 185-186.

305 Poulantzas, *Political Power*.

306 Poulantzas, *State Power Socialism*, pp. 21-22, 49.

307 Poulantzas, *Political Power*, p. 33.

other words, classes do not form the state, but they are formed by the state.³⁰⁸

The state is a form of human social organization distinguish from other organizations by its governing, executive, and mainly political purposes. A scientific understanding of the nature of the state is possible, if historical evolution of social modes of production and reproduction of life, their articulation with each other, and their historically created division of labor – economic, political, and ideological relations – are taken into consideration. To produce and reproduce their life, humans enter into definite relations with nature, with each other, and with their mental and material means, which constitute various historically produced modes of production and reproduction of life. A mode of production, throughout its historical development has passed through different stages, and has undergone many divisions, such as economic, political, and ideological relations. This simply means that economic, political, and ideological relations are nothing more than distinct but interrelated sections, moments, or sites of the production process of social life at certain stages of its development. Therefore, we believe that a mode of production cannot be reduced to a mode of economic, political, or ideological relations, but it is a mode of production of life, which has at its very essence the articulation of economic, political, and ideological relations.

It was via this new concept of the social mode of production, that we concluded that:

1) social classes and their fractions are determined dialectically by their locations (places) within economic, political, and ideological relations of a mode of

³⁰⁸ Fine & Harris, *Rereading Capital*, p. 96.

production of life.

2) economic, political, and ideological relations of a mode of production are class relations; therefore, their agents, much like economic agents, do have class membership.

Thus, in general, social dialecticism rejects any attempt to understand a phenomenon through one of its isolated parts. Therefore, we reject all those Marxists who try to understand a mode of production of life through its isolated economic, political, and ideological relations; we reject all those attempts which try to understand social apparatuses through isolated individual agents, or dominant classes. In fact, when humans work together, they create a new phenomenon, a new organism, a new apparatus, which has its own individuality, interests, needs, and power, which are not identical with the interests, powers, and needs of its constituent individuals - humans or classes. This of course does not mean that the new organism constitutes an independent or *sui generis* entity; on the contrary, the existence, changes, developments, and transitions of this organism are produced, manipulated, on the one hand, by the interrelations among its constituent parts, and, on the other hand, by the interrelations of the organism with external phenomena. Here, each class tries to remold the system to its advantage, needs, and wills. Hence, the fact that state apparatuses are produced and evolved by man's social life and its corresponding class relations, does not mean that state apparatuses can be reduced or understood by isolated individual agents or classes. But, in fact, this simply means that the state is neither a passive instrument, nor an absolute subject, a *sui generis* structure, or a system of norms, rules, and moral

ideas onto itself, existing by itself as an entity, with its own power, will and interests. It cannot produce and reproduce itself outside the process of production and reproduction of life and its corresponding class relations.

The state is by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it the reality of an ethical idea; the image and reality of reason. ³⁰⁹

The State can in no way be reduced to a passive organization or a machine in the hands of a particular class or fraction. The state power, needs, wills, and requirements in no way can be reduced to the power, need, wills, and requirements of any dominant or dominated class. The state does not exist and cannot wither away because of the interests of a single class or fraction. The state was created by the process of production and reproduction of human life and its corresponding class relations at a certain stage of its development. ***Human social life, in which many individuals cooperate, requires a government organization or a state organization, i.e., a commanding power to coordinate, legitimize, organize, reorganize, disorganize, protect, support, maintain, supervise, and unify the process of production and reproduction of life and its corresponding class relations. This necessity is as old as social life itself.*** Even in primitive societies, in which the state did not exist as a distinct sphere of social relations, this necessity for a commanding power for coordination of social relations was realized and performed

309 Engels, The Origin of the Family, p. 9.

by the chief individual of the community.³¹⁰

However, as societies and their corresponding class relations developed, the state was formally created, evolved, expanded, and developed in many forms. The state has as its object the process of production and reproduction of social life and its corresponding class relations. It constitutes a tremendous force in organizing, reorganizing, disorganizing, defending, maintaining, supporting, and legitimizing the condition of existence and development of social production and reproduction of a historically produced dominant mode of production of life; its articulation with other modes — inside and outside its social formation; and the corresponding class relations. Thus, as the constituent part the process of production and reproduction of life, and its corresponding class relations, the various economic, political, and ideological functions that the state fulfills are not neutral, sui-generis, or independent, but they are produced, manipulated regulated, ruined, by class relations, and dominated by the ruling class.

Consequently, although the state may, at a given moment, serve the interests of the dominant class, the dominated class, or common interests of the people, but in the final analysis it has always been a representative force supporting the dominant class at the expenses of dominated classes. Hence, there is no free, or people's, state in an absolute sense.

Hitherto, one of the characteristics of Marxism has been its neglect of political and ideological fractions and strata within social classes in advanced modes of

310 Marx, Class Struggle in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte; Engels, The Origin of the Family..., p. 231; Lenin, The State and Revolution, p. 16; Poulantzas, Political Power, pp. 230, 279-282

production of life. All Marxists, whether classical or new Marxists believe that social classes are located within the process of material production or economic relations. As social classes are the motive of history, and, according to Marxists, they are in economic relations; therefore, they believe the ideological and political sectors, including state apparatuses, do not have any power of themselves. Thus, they deprive not only the superstructure of any power, but also all political and ideological agents of class membership. **These Marxists face a real theoretical problem when they interpret those historical periods in which the state constitutes the dominant power of a society. As always, Marxists use different terms like ‘universal suffrage’, ‘Bonapartism’ (Marx / Engels), ‘Caesarism’ (Gramsci), or ‘absolutist state’ (Poulantzas). They try to justify their theoretical shortcomings and consider these periods as exceptional cases.**³¹¹

However, the theoretical failure of Marxism is based on the reduction of the mode of production and reproduction of life and its corresponding class relations to economic relations. They do not realize the fact that a mode of production has as its very essence the articulation of economic, political, and ideological relations; therefore, its corresponding class relations are not located merely in economic relations, but in economic, political, and ideological relations and are determined by them. Hence, economic, political, and ideological relations are class relations, and, therefore, much like economic agents, political and ideological functionaries (bureaucrats), as the political and ideological fraction of the classes of a mode of production, have class interests, class power, and class membership. They constitute social forces and play an essential role in the process of production and

311 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, pp. 293, 220; Poulantzas, *Political Power*, pp. 160- 163, 165-167, 192, 256, 285-289, 293-294, 302, 325-327.

reproduction of life and its corresponding class relations.

It is with this new concept of the class membership of political agents that we can discover the nature of state power; it is with this new concept of state power that we reject Marx's *universal suffrage*, Gramsci's Caesarism, or Poulantzas' absolutist state, and it is with this new concept of the nature of the state and state power that we are able to explain the nature of statism in Russia, and the dominant power and essential role of the state in almost all dependent capitalist or statist countries, either in the capitalist world system, or in the ex-Soviet Union world system.

For social dialecticism, the type and power of the state directly depend on the existing power relations among social classes and go on to create three types of states:

a) The State is immensely powerful and reflects the interests and worldview of the ruling classes, such as the states of Third World Countries in the present capitalist world system, or in the sub-statist regimes in the formerly Socialist Soviet Union world systems, where the civil society is weak or non-existent. Consequently, the high-ranking members of the states occupy not only the key positions of the governmental institutions but also in socio-economic systems as well, so much so that they establish the ruling class. Here, the state is not merely beholden to the ruling class but rather is the ruling class.

b) State is relatively powerful, and the working classes are organized and similarly powerful, however, the ruling classes are still dominant such as the case in the European Union countries.

c) State is weak, and so is the working classes, however the ruling class is imminently powerful, much like in the United States. There is a dictatorship of the nongovernmental ruling class. It is the dictatorship of the corporation – and the political system is CORPORATOCRACY. Here corporatocracy replaces democracy where the society and even elected officials directly or indirectly are governed or controlled by corporations. The ruling class (corporations) controls political parties, the elections, manipulates or influences the high-ranking politicians, and almost owns all news media. Such a set up amounts to the dictatorship of the corporations, the establishment, or deep state. In other words, all three branches of the government act analogous to marionettes in the dexterous hands and interests of the national and international corporations.

HUMAN SOCIAL LIFE, IN WHICH MANY INDIVIDUALS COOPERATE, REQUIRES A COMMANDING POWER OR A STATE ORGANIZATION, COORDINATE, LEGITIMIZE, ORGANIZE, REORGANIZE, DISORGANIZE, PROTECT, SUPPORT, MAINTAIN, SUPERVISE, AND UNIFY THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL LIFE AND ITS CORRESPONDING CLASS RELATIONS. THIS NECESSITY IS AS OLD AS SOCIAL LIFE ITSELF.

CHAPTER 10

The Capitalist World System

Marxist Theories of Imperialism

Along with the development of the “capitalist mode of production” (CMP), the last three hundred years have witnessed two distinct but interrelated processes. On the one hand, we have observed the rapid and revolutionary role of CMP, which, by constantly revolutionizing all mental and material means of life, by constant increase in the productivity of labor, has revolutionized men’s social life. The capitalist mode of production has created much more productive forces than all preceding modes together had created. “It has been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian Pyramids, Roman Aqueducts, and Gothic Cathedrals.”³¹² But CMP cannot exist by itself within a country. limited consumptions and unlimited productions compel the CMP to go over the whole surface of the globe. “It must nestle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”³¹³

Therefore, we have observed the growth of international relationships, the universal interdependence of nations, and the increase in inequality of wealth, power, and rights among different countries of the world. The non-capitalist countries have been drawn into the capitalist world system, lost their natural independent modes of life and their national identities, and become dominated, and alienated nations. However, these changes have raised, especially in recent years,

³¹² Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, pp. 11-12.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

many theoretical questions and have triggered debates about the nature of these relations and the effects of these relations on the social structures of dominated countries. Even in recent decades, firms in advanced countries, such as the U.S., Japan and Western Europe, outsourced or offshored millions of industrial and information technological jobs to other nations such as China and India to take advantage of cheap labor and operation costs. High wages and high operation costs at home forced these companies to outsource jobs overseas to cut cost by any means. So, the domestic economy, small businesses and workers in the advanced countries suffered the worst part of this problematic process. Therefore, globalization lost its support in advanced countries as the protection of the national economy has become a rallying cry, and Protectionism, as a policy tool has gained momentum. Protectionism is now being seen as a serious threat to globalization.

Marxist theories of the capitalist world system tend to fall generally into two groups: the classical Marxist theories and the modern Marxist theories of the capitalist world system.

The Classical Marxist Theories of Capitalist Expansion

To understand the relationship between the capitalist countries and the less developed areas of the world, the classical Marxists concentrate on the internal structure and progressive role of capitalism. Here, the capitalist mode of material production, its corresponding class relations (the class struggles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat), and the competition between capitals are at the heart of their analysis. The development of capitalism constantly increases the demand for 1) natural resources; 2) cheap labor; 3) higher rates of profit; and

4) new markets. Thus, it is for these requirements that capitalism chases over the whole surface of the globe, establishes connections everywhere, draws less developed countries into its whirlpool, and compels them to adopt the capitalist mode of production.

Marx

Marx argued that there have been three historical phases in the colonial system of capitalism. The first stage corresponds to the primitive accumulation underlying the capitalist mode of production —before the middle of the seventeenth century, in which the colonial system captured gold, silver and other wealth necessary for industrial capitalism. “Manufacture and the movement of production in general received an enormous impetus through the expansion of commerce which came with the discovery of America and the sea-route to the East Indies.”³¹⁴ “The second period began in the middle of the seventeenth century and lasted almost to the end of the eighteenth century. Commerce and navigation had expanded more rapidly than manufacturing, which played a secondary role; the colonies were becoming considerable consumers; and after long struggles, the separate nations shared out the opening world market among themselves. ... The nation dominant in sea-trade and colonial power naturally secured for itself also the greatest quantitative and qualitative expansion of manufacture.”³¹⁵ The need for new markets compels the bourgeoisie to chase over the whole surface of the world. “It

³¹⁴ Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 74.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”³¹⁶

At this stage, the sale of products constitutes the main aim of capitalism, without intending to affect the mode of production of colonial areas. But where it takes root, capitalism, by its cheap prices of commodities, gradually draws all nations into civilization, and puts an end to their feudal, patriarchal modes of life.³¹⁷

The more capitalism became dependent on colonial areas, the more it felt the necessity of creating new productive forces to replace their native ones. “You cannot continue to inundate a country with your manufacture, unless you enable it to give you some produce in return.”³¹⁸ Thus, Marx’s third phase is defined by the dominant role played by modern industry in the capitalist world market, and the development of capitalism in colonial areas.

The expansion of foreign trade, although the basis of the capitalist mode of production in its infancy, has become its own product through its needs for an ever-expanding market. So “it is not commerce in this case which revolutionizes industry, but industry which constantly revolutionizes commerce.”³¹⁹

The bourgeoisie, through the exploitation of the world market, gave a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every nation. It “created everywhere the same relations between classes of society, and, thus destroys the

³¹⁶ Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 12.

³¹⁷ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 2, p. 34.

³¹⁸ Marx, “On Colonialism and Modernization,” quoted by Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism*, p. 25.

³¹⁹ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, p. 333.

peculiar individuality of various nationalities.”³²⁰ The development of capitalism and freedom of commerce (the world market) gradually erases national differences and antagonism among people; gives a uniformity in the form of production and destroys national differences and antagonism between nations; it compels all nations to become capitalist themselves.³²¹ Thus, for Marx, the development of capitalism leads to growing uniformity in the mode of production and standard of life of nations. Of course, for Marx, all this did not happen through mere economic relations in the capitalist world system, but each step in the development of capitalism was accompanied by the establishment and improvement of the modern state which could manage and support the common affair of the whole bourgeoisie.³²² But where does the ‘innate necessity’ of capitalism for an ever-expanding market come from? For Marx, the capitalist world system is a response to the capitalist law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Therefore, to understand Marx’s concept of the necessity of capitalism for the world market is to understand the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. But we cannot understand Marx’s concept of this law, unless we grasp the following propositions: Men’s labor can only produce value and surplus value. “Value exists only in articles of utility, in objects.”³²³ It is a combination of matter and human labor.³²⁴

To understand these propositions, an appreciation of Marx’s concepts of variable

320 Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 78.

321 Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, pp. 13, 28.

322 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

323 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, p. 202.

324 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 43

and constant capital, and value and surplus value is key. For Marx, capital (C) is made up of two components: variable capital (v), the sum of money expended upon the labor power (wages), and constant capital (c), the sum of money laid out upon the means of production.³²⁵ He believes that “means of production never transfer more value to the product than they themselves lose during the labor-process by the destruction of their own use-value.”³²⁶ In other words, the means of production can never add more value to the product than they themselves possess independently of the process in which they assist. Even, “machinery, like every other component of constant capital, creates no new value.”³²⁷ Only men’s labor can produce value, and surplus value (s). Thus, surplus value is then purely the result of that variable capital (v), that is, the capital invested into labor power.

In the capitalist mode of production, the value of labor-power and the value which that labor power creates, are of two entirely different magnitudes. The value of labor power paid for by the capitalist is much less than the value which that labor power produces for the capitalist. It is this difference between the two values that constitutes surplus value.³²⁸ Marx calls s/v (surplus value/variable capital) the rate of surplus value; regards $s/c+v$ (surplus value/constant capital + variable capital) as the rate of profit; and c/v as the technical composition of capital. He believes that by gradual growth in the productivity of labor, by the improvement of the means of

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 212

³²⁶ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, p. 204.

³²⁷ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 387.

³²⁸ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, pp. 193-195, 217-218.

production, less labor is required to produce the same product, and, therefore, less surplus value can be produced from the same products. So, the gradual growth of constant capital in relation to variable capital must necessarily lead to the gradual fall of the general rate of profit, so long as the rate of surplus value or the intensity of exploitation of labor by capital remain the same.³²⁹

Since foreign trade partly cheapens the elements of constant capital and partly the necessities of life for which the variable capital is exchanged, it tends to raise the rate of profit, by increasing the rate of surplus value and lowering the value of constant capital... Capitals invested in foreign trade can yield a higher rate of profit, because, in the first place, there is competition with commodities produced in other countries with inferior production facilities, so that the more advanced country sells its goods above their value even though it is cheaper than the competing countries.³³⁰

Moreover, the capital invested in foreign countries may yield higher rates of profit for the simple reason that the rate of profit is higher there due to backward development, and likewise the exploitation of labor, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc.³³¹

If capital is sent abroad, this is not done because it absolutely could not be applied at home, but because it can be employed at a higher rate of profit in a foreign country.³³²

Marx's concept of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is based on

³²⁹ Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 212.

³³⁰ Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 237.

³³¹ Ibid., pp. 237-238.

³³² Ibid., p. 256.

his confusion about the nature of production of value and surplus value. First, social dialecticism rejects Marx's idea that "value exists only in articles of utility, in objects."³³³ Use-value and exchange value are not always a combination of matter and human labor, but they can also consist of mental products, and different kinds of services.

Second, social dialecticism rejects Marx's idea that only men's labor can produce value and surplus value. We believe that machine labor, much like human labor, produces value and surplus value as well. Here, it is essential to differentiate between machines and other instruments of the production process. With the instruments of labor, man is the motive power, while the motive power of a machine is something different from man (for instance, fuel, electricity, water, wind, and so on).³³⁴ Machinery produces use-value, exchange value, and surplus value, not only through increasing the productivity of labor; not merely by converting the labor into a higher degree of efficiency, as Marx claims, but as another source of generation of labor power. Much like human labor, machine labor is a fundamental source of creation of use value, exchange value, and surplus value. The value of machine-labor-power is less expensive than the value of human-labor-power. And this is exactly what capitalists are looking for. What they are looking for is surplus labor, whether this labor is produced by man's mental or physical labor, by natural labor, or by machine labor. Hence, value is not an outcome merely of human labor, but labor, that is, human mental and material,

³³³ Ibid., p. 202

³³⁴ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 371-372.

natural, and machine labor. Hence, surplus value is not just related to human surplus labor but to machine surplus labor as well. What is true in man's labor is also true for machine labor. So there is a competition among the capitalists to improve the means of production (i.e. industrial machinery).

Rosa Luxemburg

Rosa Luxemburg deviates from all those classical Marxists who try to understand capitalism through class relations between capitalists and the workers. She argues that this is legitimate for certain aims of investigation, but it no longer seems adequate when we deal with the real process of capitalist development, with accumulation of capital.³³⁵

She rejects all those Marxists who try to understand capitalist expansion or the capitalist world market through the law of the falling rate of profit, the presence of cheap labor abroad, or the inability to invest at home. She believes that capitalist expansion and the creation of the world market are absolute necessities for the existence and the development of capitalism.³³⁶ Capitalism is “the first mode of economy, which is unable to exist by itself, which needs another economic system as a medium and soil. Although it strives to become universal and, indeed, on account of this tendency, it must break down – because it is incapable of becoming a universal form of production.”³³⁷ Hence, for Luxemburg, the capitalist system is

335 Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, (N.Y.; Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 61. 336 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

337 Luxemburg, *Accumulation*, quoted by Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, p. 62.

not a unified system in

which all other modes of production have already disappeared, but it is made up of capitalist and non-capitalist sectors.

Since its first appearance on the stage of history, capitalism has demonstrated its enormous attraction toward non-capitalist countries... It is a fact that... there never has been, nor does there exist at present, a country with exclusively capitalist production, where there are only capitalists and wage earners. ³³⁸

Workers alone do not represent a sufficient market for accumulation. The capitalist accumulation needs an additional market in non-capitalist strata and nations. ³³⁹

Thus, capitalism expands because of its mutual relationship with non-capitalist social strata, and countries, accumulation at their expense and at the same time pushing them aside to take their place. ³⁴⁰

In Luxemburg's argument, there is no room for international exploitation, or a flow of surplus from non-capitalist to capitalist countries. Instead, the apparent surplus flowing from the former to the latter was created at capitalist centers and realized in non-capitalist nations. In other words, the non-capitalist countries are not a sphere of exploitation but the site where commodities are exchanged for money; they are necessary as sites of realization of surplus-value. ³⁴¹

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 80.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

³⁴¹ Howe and Sica, "Political Economy" in *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, vol. 1, p. 240.

Lenin

Lenin sees the beginning of the twentieth century as the turning point from the competitive phase to the new stage of domination of finance capital or imperialism. “Free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly.”³⁴² Thus, for Lenin, imperialism “emerged as the development and direct continuation of fundamental attributes of capitalism in general.”³⁴³

Imperialism emerged from the fact that “capitalism cannot exist and develop without constantly expanding the sphere of its domination, without colonizing new countries and drawing old non-capitalist countries into the whirlpool of world economy.”³⁴⁴ Imperialism “is nothing more than the monopoly stage or highest stage of capitalism.”³⁴⁵ It is the supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital. Thus, for Lenin, “The characteristic feature of imperialism is not industrial capital, but finance capital.”³⁴⁶ It is not the export of goods (as prevailed in the competitive stage), but the export of capital, which arises from the fact that capitalism has become overripe and the capitalist cannot find a field for profitable investment at home.³⁴⁷ It is at this stage that capitalism loses its destructive and oppressive nature, and becomes a constructive means for the development of capitalism in backward countries. Lenin, following Marx, believes that “the export of capital affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those

342 Lenin, *Imperialism*, (NY.: Hawthorn Books, Inc. 1967), p. 20. 343 *Ibid.*, p. 88. 344 Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, pp. 600-601. 345 Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 15. 346 *Ibid.*, p. 9. 347 *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 62, 89, 93

countries to which it is exported.”³⁴⁸

However, in his work on imperialism, Lenin paid little attention to the relationships between advanced capitalist and less developed countries. By regarding imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, Lenin concentrated on the economic relations of capitalism, and tried to understand the capitalist world system just through the capitalist mode of production itself. His concept of imperialism can be summarized under the following four principles: 1) Monopoly arose out of the concentration of production at a very advanced stage of development of capitalism; 2) Monopolies have accelerated the capture of the most important sources of raw materials; 3) Monopoly has sprung from banks; and 4) it has grown out of colonial policy.³⁴⁹

Modern Marxist Theories of the Capitalist World System

Modern Marxist theories of the Capitalist world system tend to fall into three groups: Marxist economist, Marxist structuralist, and Marxist circulationist, (Marxist dependency theories).

Marxist Economist Theory of the Capitalist World System

Marxist economists try to understand imperialism through economic relations, and, especially, through the process of material production. Here, the capitalist mode of material production constitutes the determining element of the existence and development of the capitalist world system. Marxist economists do not, of course,

³⁴⁸ Lenin, *Imperialism*, quoted by Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, p. 113.

³⁴⁹ Lenin, *Imperialism*, pp. 123, 124.

negate the importance of circulation, but they believe that the secret of imperialism lies in the production process; therefore, in general, they are concerned not with the circulation process, but with the process of material production; not with realization of surplus value, but with the production of surplus value, its crises, and the roles of capitalists and workers in overcoming these problems.

Marxist economists believe that imperialism is the product of the development of capitalism and its integration with non-capitalist systems.³⁵⁰ It is “a global system of production of surplus value encompassing separated but articulated modes of production.”³⁵¹ But within this unity, they pay little attention to the effects of imperialism on the non-capitalist societies. As the heart of their analysis, they focus on the world system of capitalist production and its internal contradictions. They attempt to show how internal conditions of the capitalist system shape its articulation with non-capitalist modes of production. Thus, for the Marxist economist, imperialism is not the outcome of the export of commodities or capital; it is an answer to the crises of capitalism at the highest stage of its development.³⁵²

Marxist economists divide the history of imperialism into two phases: 1) the internationalization of capital; and 2) internationalization of production.

The first stage of imperialism (the export of capital) is related to the impossibility of the further intensification of labor at home and the inability to extend the system

³⁵⁰ Palloix, in Howe, “Introduction,” paper provided for introduction to Palloix, “Travaillet Production,” Washington, DC., p. xxii.

³⁵¹ Howe, “Political economy,” the presentation at LASA 1980, Bloomington, Indiana, p. 49.

³⁵² Palloix, in Howe, “Introduction,” pp. iii-iv.

of relative surplus value. It corresponds to the development of primary production in peripheral areas.

The second phase of imperialism roughly corresponds to the post-1945 period and is characterized by internationalization of production. It corresponds to the maturation and stagnation of the capitalist system of production of surplus value at the core.³⁵³

Marxist Structuralist Theory of the Capitalist World System

Marxist structuralists seek to understand imperialism through the uneven development of CMP. They see imperialism as the outcome of the articulation of the capitalist and non-capitalist social formations.

The CMP is characterized in its extended reproduction, by a twofold tendency: to reproduce itself within a social formation ... in which it takes roots and establishes its dominance, and to expand outside of this formation ... Although this twofold tendency has characterized the CMP since its origin, it assumes a special significance in the imperialist stage ... The reproduction of CMP within this twofold tendency attests to the fact that the CMP can only exist by subordinating other modes and forms of production and by appropriating their elements (their labor power and means of labor).³⁵⁶

For Marxist structuralists, imperialism has been distinguished by a fundamental cleavage, on the one hand, within imperialist metropolises, and on the other hand, between the capitalist social formations and social formations dominated by and dependent on capitalism. This implies two kinds of exploitation within the

³⁵³ Ibid., p. viii-xvii.

³⁵⁴ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, pp. 42-43.

imperialist chain: 1) the exploitation of popular masses of the dominated formations by the ruling classes of the metropolises; and 2) the exploitation of popular masses in Europe by American capitalists.³⁵⁵

In the Marxist structuralists' view, social formation is dominant because of its control of the raw material and the market; its direct investment in the dominated social formations; its exploitative position over the dominated social formations; and its determining political role in the production and reproduction of the imperialist chain. "A capital which overflows its national limits certainly has resources to national states – not only to its own state of origin but to other states as well."³⁵⁶

*And "a social formation is dominated and dependent when the articulation of its specific economic, political, and ideological structure expresses constitutive asymmetrical relationships with one or more other social formations which enjoy a position over it. The organization of class relationships and state apparatuses within the dominated and dependent formation reproduces within it the structure of the relation of domination, and thus expresses in a specific manner the forms of domination that characterize the class or classes in power in dominant social formation(s)."*³⁵⁷

Here, the periodization of imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism, is not the same as the periodization of the capitalist mode of production, but it is based on

355 Ibid., p. 43, 65-69.

356 Ibid., pp. 82-83.

357 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

different phases within the monopoly stage of imperialism. Moreover, the transformations that mark different phases of imperialism are not based on some intrinsic and self-sufficient technical process, but they are characterized by a rise in the organic composition of capital, and intensive exploitation of labor.³⁵⁸ Marxist structuralists believe that the export of capital at this stage has complex effects on the dominated social formations. The differential forms that these effects assume on the international scale delineates the phases of the imperialist stage. Thus, each phase is distinguished by different forms realized between CMP and dominated social formations.³⁵⁹

Poulantzas, for example, as a representative of this school, distinguishes the following phases of imperialism:

*(i) The transition phase from the stage of competitive capitalism to the imperialist stage, lasting from the end of the nineteenth century up till the inter-war period; within the metropolises, this was essentially the period of unstable equilibrium between competitive capitalism and monopoly capitalism... During this period, both the imperialist metropolises themselves, and their relations with the dominated formations, were characterized by an unstable equilibrium between the dominance of the political – i.e. of state. (ii) The phase of consolidation of the imperialist stage: this came into being between the two wars ... Within the metropolises, monopoly capitalism established its domination over competitive capitalism, and this involved the dominance of the political (the state) within these formations.*³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 245.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 44-48.

Poulantzas also believes that in the second phase the export of capital prevailed over the export of commodities.

*Imperialist social division of labor between the metropolises and the dominated formations was still to all intents and purposes one between town (industry) and country (agriculture) [that is, between industry and agriculture.] (iii) The present phase of imperialism, gradually established after the end of the Second World War. This phase corresponds to modifications in the relation between the metropolises and the dominated formations. The CMP no longer just dominates these formations from 'outside', by reproducing the relation of dependence, but rather establishes its dominance directly within them; the metropolitan mode of production reproduced itself in specific form within dominated and dependent formations themselves ... Present phase of imperialism is marked by an upsurge of struggle by the popular masses ... affecting both the peripheral formations and the metropolises, particularly Europe. It is this accumulation of struggles which gives rise to certain determinate conjunctures of this phase --the character of a crisis of imperialism.*³⁶¹

Marxist Dependency Theories of the Capitalist World System

The period of the mid-1960s witnessed a significant reorientation of Marxist theory away from the analysis of the internal contradictions of capitalism to specific social formations and towards an emphasis upon the dynamics of the capitalist international system, understood by dependency theory.³⁶² This reorientation was at first a response to the failure of the classical Marxists' ideas about the progressive role of capitalism in backward countries.³⁶³ National differences and

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Palloix, cited by Howe, "Introduction," p. i.

³⁶³ Bill Warren, *Imperialism*, (London: Verso, 1980), p. 157; Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, pp. 15-16.

antagonism between people are vanishing gradually from day to day, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to the uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.³⁶⁴

*The export of capital affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported.*³⁶⁵

Secondly, this reaction was influenced by “the idea, advanced in 1928 by the Communist International, that the underdeveloped countries are the product of the effects of imperialism.”³⁶⁶

The essence of dependency theory is the proposition that any theory of CMP and peripheral countries can only make sense when we study the capitalist world system as a whole, i.e., when capitalism is defined as a world system. According to this school, CMP was created, has existed, and developed within the world market. Thus, CMP is as old as the capitalist world system, imperialism. It was endowed with its aggressive nature from the outset. For example, the articulation of Latin America into the world capitalist system and, therefore, its under-development, is viewed from the sixteenth century.

Dependency theoreticians divide the capitalist world system into two zones: capitalist countries and underdeveloped areas. These Zones exist in constant

³⁶⁴ Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 28.

³⁶⁵ Lenin, *Imperialism*, quoted by Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, p. 113.

³⁶⁶ Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism*, p. 69.

struggle. They are engaged in constant interaction whereby capitalist nations exploit underdeveloped regions and extract surplus value from them. Thus, for dependency theoreticians, the capitalist world system appears hierarchized in terms of control, and exploitative in terms of exchange.

Dependency theoreticians attempt to show how trade relations between capitalist nations and the periphery create, on the one hand, capitalism, and, on the other hand, underdevelopment. Underdeveloped countries are what they are as a result of being exploited by the capitalist countries. Thus, capitalism is not characterized by a specific relation between classes, but rather by production for profit within a world system of exchange and by exploitation of the periphery by capitalist centers. Imperialism does not promote the development of all nations but the development of capitalist nations at the expense of the periphery.

Dependency theoreticians believe that capitalist state machines play a key role in the creation, development, and maintenance of the global system of the capitalist world market.

Wallerstein

Wallerstein writes that in the late fifteenth century, the capitalist world system, embracing world commerce, came into existence and took the form of world economy.³⁶⁷ This modern world system, as an economic mode, is founded on the fact that economic factors operate within an arena larger than that which any political entity can totally control.³⁶⁸ It was a new form of surplus appropriation

³⁶⁷ Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, pp. 15-16.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

based on more efficient and expanded productivity (industry) by means of artificial assist of state machineries.³⁶⁹

For Wallerstein, “what characterizes a social system is the fact that life within it is largely self-contained, and that the dynamics of its development are internal.”³⁷⁰ He sees a capitalist world economy as the one in which there is extensive division of labor, such that the various nations within the system are dependent upon economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the society. To him, this division is not merely occupational, but geographical. That is to say, “the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world-system. In part, this is a consequence of ecological considerations, to be sure. But for the most part, it is a function of the social organization of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups within the system to exploit the labor of the others that is to receive a larger share of the surplus.”³⁷¹ In Wallerstein’s view, “Three things were essential to the establishment of such a capitalist world-economy: an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question, the development of variegated methods of labor control for different products and different zones of the world economy, and the creation of relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core states of this capitalist world economy.”³⁷² Thus, for Wallerstein, the most important aspect of the advent of capitalism was not the novelty of the technology

³⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 220.

³⁷¹ Ibid., p. 231.

³⁷² Ibid., p. 29.

or the capitalist mode of production (because he believes that these were unknown in the 16th century). But the capitalist world system “was built on a world-wide division of labor in which various zones of this economy... were assigned specific economic roles, developed different class structures, used consequently different modes of labor control, and profited unequally from the workings of the system. Political action occurred primarily within the framework of states which, as a consequence of their different roles in the world-economy, were structured differently, the core states being the most centralized.”³⁷³ Therefore, he believes that the dynamics and development of the state can only be understood within the context of the dynamics and development of the world system.³⁷⁴

For Wallerstein, the relations of production, which, for Marxists, define the capitalist system, are not the relation of internal production to the capitalist social formation, but exchange relations among nations (core and periphery).³⁷⁵

The modern world system, according to Wallerstein, does not consist of different modes of production. Capitalist and feudal modes cannot exist side-by-side within this system. “It has one form or the other. Once it is capitalist, relationships that bear certain formal resemblances to feudal relationships are necessarily redefined in terms of governing principles of a capitalist system.”³⁷⁶ In other words, the capitalist world system, as a network of exchange relations, once established

³⁷³ Ibid., p.111.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p.51.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p.88.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

compels other modes of production to function in a certain way that can be fitted into the politico-social framework deriving from capitalism, that is, homogenization of relations within the capitalist world system.³⁷⁷

The distinctive feature of the capitalist system is that it constitutes an economic but not a political system.³⁷⁸ “The technique of modern capitalism and the technology of modern science ... enabled this world economy to thrive, produce, and expand without the emergence of a unified political structure.”³⁷⁹ In other words, capitalism has flourished “because the world system has had within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political systems,”³⁸⁰ in which state structures are relatively strong in the core areas, and relatively weak in the periphery.³⁸¹ Within this system, economic decisions are oriented primarily to the arena of the capitalist world economy, while political decisions are oriented primarily to the nation states within the capitalist world system.³⁸²

Wallerstein believes that capitalist expansion is a function of social solidarity at home and the ability to use cheap labor far away. It involves, on the one hand, the development of the capitalist countries, and on the other hand, the development of

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 58.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 230.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p.237.

³⁸² Ibid., p. 51.

the peripheral areas “wherein production is primarily of lower ranking goods (that is, goods whose labor is well rewarded) but which is an integral part of the overall system of the division of labor, because the commodities involved are essential for daily use.”³⁸³ In other words, “the logic of Wallerstein’s position... is that capitalist underdevelopment is as much the cause of capitalist development, as capitalist development is the cause of capitalist underdevelopment.”³⁸⁴ For Wallerstein, the capitalist world system went through four stages: first, the emergence of the European world economy (1450-1640 A.D.); second, the period of the dominance of mercantilism and the emergence of a single dominant state within the system (1640-1730 A.D.), third, the industrial revolution in which the European world system eliminated other world systems, to incorporate the entire globe (1730-1917 A.D.), and, fourth, the period of consolidation (1917- to the present).³⁸⁵

Wallerstein divides the capitalist world system into three zones: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The essential differences between these are the strength of technology and, especially, the state machines which cause unequal exchange and transferral of surplus value from the periphery to the core. Thus, “capitalism involves not only appropriation of surplus value by the owner from the laborer but an appropriation of surplus value of the whole- As Wallerstein himself acknowledges, he tried not to world-economy by core areas.”³⁸⁶

383 Ibid., pp.199-200.

384 Brenner, *The Origins of Capitalist Development*, quoted by Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, p. 265.

385 Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism*, p. 85.

386 Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, quoted by Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism*, p. 86.

explain, but to describe the capitalist world system.³⁸⁷ He fails to grasp the world capitalist system as a human product, as an accomplishment of classes. To him “it is the overall system with its structured pressures for certain kinds of political decisions ... which is crucial to explain the expansion.”³⁸⁸

*If world-systems are the only real social systems (other than truly isolated subsistence economies) then it must follow that the emergence, consolidation, and political role of classes and status groups must be appreciated as elements of this world-system.*³⁸⁹

Frank

Frank starts his book, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, with a sentence which sums up the essence of his thesis.

*I believe ... that it is capitalism, both worlds, and national, which produced underdevelopment in the past, and which still generates underdevelopment in the present.*³⁹⁰

More precisely, the capitalist development and its internal contradictions “have generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was exploited, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centers which appropriate that surplus – and, further, that this process still continues.”³⁹¹

³⁸⁷ Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, p. 8.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

³⁹⁰ Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment*, p. xi.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Frank distinguishes three principal contradictions that underlie the relations between the center and its satellites: 1) the expropriation of economic surplus from the many and its appropriation by the few; 2) the polarization of the capitalist system into metropolitan centers and the peripheral satellites; and 3) the continuity of the fundamental structure of the capitalist system throughout the history of its expansion and transformation, due to the persistence or re-creation of these contradictions everywhere and at all times. ³⁹²

Frank argues that capitalism can only be analyzed on a world scale. To him, economic development of the metropolitan centers and underdevelopment of peripheral satellites are the opposite faces of the same coin. “They are the product of a single but dialectically contradictory, economic structure of the process of capitalism. Thus, they cannot be viewed as the product of supposedly different economic structures or systems or of supposed differences in stages of economic growth achieved within the same system.” ³⁹³

The world capitalist system is characterized by a metropolis-satellite structure, in which the metropolis has a monopolistic position because each metropolis has several satellites, while each satellite confronts only one metropolis. This monopolistic position of the centers over the satellites has existed through the history of capitalist development and has always resulted in the expropriation of economic surplus produced in the satellites by the bourgeoisie of the center.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Ibid., p. 9.

In Frank we found the essential characteristics of the world capitalist system within the sphere of circulation, as market exchange. Capitalism is a system of monopolistic exchange, which acts to transfer surplus from subordinate areas to the imperialist center.

Unlike Wallerstein, Frank sees the world capitalist system as a human (bourgeois) product. When he refers to capitalism, the focus is upon the collective capitalist. Capitalism appears as a world market, governed and controlled by the bourgeois actors who try to maximize their surplus value. Thus, the theory in its essence is highly subjectivistic and voluntaristic. The dynamic of the system is the dynamic of the collective capitalist.³⁹⁴ The bourgeoisie play the roles of the operator, regulator, and dominant power of the whole system.

Frank believes that capitalism, through exchange relations with underdeveloped countries, compels them to become capitalist themselves.³⁹⁵ Thus, to him, peripheral countries are not non-capitalist formations. Hence, the problem of underdevelopment arose not from imperialists' preservation of non-capitalist social structures, but from the transformation of all peripheral satellites into capitalist societies. It is this capitalist nature that has retarded their progress.

The heart of Frank's analysis is that the states of the capitalist countries play a critical role in the development of the core and the underdevelopment of the peripheral satellites. Frank distinguishes three main stages in the process of development of capitalists which are based on specific functions of the periphery

³⁹⁴ John Howe, *Presentations*, p.9.

³⁹⁵ Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment*, p. 25.

at the service of the essential needs of accumulation at the center: 1) mercantilist (1500-1770 A.D.); 2) industrial capitalist (1770-1870 A.D.); and 3) imperialist (1870-1930 A.D.).

During the mercantilist stage, Europe had no product of its own to offer the industrially more advanced and self-sufficient Chinese and Indians. The only European possibility for expanding trade was to pay with silver from the west. This permitted Europe, through simple trades, to realize and accommodate part of the value of Asian labor. In this period, the new world of America, by exporting gold, silver, dyes, tobacco, sugar, and other products, also made the largest contribution and suffered the greatest development of underdevelopment.

During the second stage, which is characterized by the industrial revolution in the core, the center of gravity of capital moved from commerce to industry. This period involved: a) a vast expansion of world trade; b) important changes in international division of labor; and c) important changes in the modes of production in both the metropolis and the satellites. The third stage is characterized by the export of capital, an unequal exchange between core and peripheral satellites.³⁹⁶

Amin

The titles of Samir Amin's two main works – *Accumulation on a World Scale* and *Unequal Development* - imply his main theses: 1) the process of accumulation takes place on a world scale; and 2) accumulation does not create uniformity

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

among constituent nations of the world capitalist system but divides them into two zones: those of the center and those of the periphery, whose interrelations form the essence of Amin's study of accumulation on a world scale.

Amin believes that his thesis seeks to mitigate most of the major lines of Marxist dependency theory, which does not embrace the domain of historical materialism. He argues that as Marx studied CMP as the transformation of values within the capitalist mode, his aim is to study CMP as the transformation of values on the world level.³⁹⁷

For Amin, the world capitalist system constitutes a unity which neither can be "analyzed as a mere juxtaposition of the countries or sectors governed by the capitalist mode of production with others governed by precapitalist modes of production (the dualist thesis),"³⁹⁸ nor can it be explained, even in abstraction, as the capitalist mode of production. "The social contradictions, characteristic of capitalism, are on ... on a world scale, that is, the contradiction is not between the bourgeoisie and proletariat at each country considered in isolation, but between the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat."³⁹⁹

In Amin's view, the search for the maximum rate of surplus value is an essential inner law of the capitalist mode of production. The essential increasing contradiction of this search is based on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

³⁹⁷ Samir Amin, *The Law of Value and Historical Materialism*, pp. 58-59.

³⁹⁸ Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*, (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 3.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

Amin believes that “there is only one way to counter it: increase the rate of surplus value. The nature of the formations in the periphery makes it possible to increase this rate much more than at the center,”⁴⁰⁰ because the cost of the reproduction of labor power and, therefore, labor itself in the periphery is much lower than the center.

But this does not mean that capitalism cannot survive internally. Amin believes that “the capitalist mode does not ‘need’ external markets, either for its products or for capital. Dynamic equilibrium is in fact always ‘possible,’ and there is no problem of its ‘accumulation’ as soon as one understands the active role of money and credit in accumulation. If the capitalist mode of production enters into relations with the periphery, this is because it tends to protect the internal dynamic of capitalist accumulation.”⁴⁰¹ But he does not explain why all capital does not flow into these areas, if the rate of surplus value in the periphery is higher than the center.

According to Amin, relations between the center and the periphery “are affected by transfers of value, and these constitute the essence of the problem of accumulation on a world scale. Whenever the capitalist mode of production enters into relations with precapitalist modes of production, and subjects these to itself, transfer of value takes place from the precapitalist formations, as a result of primitive accumulation.”⁴⁰² Amin argues that his theory of unequal exchange is not a matter

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 178.

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 3.

of circulation, as his opponents claim. But the root of his theory lies in the different conditions under which labor is exploited.⁴⁰³ He believes that in the imperialism labor is not exploited uniformly; the rate of surplus value is unequal.⁴⁰⁴

Unequal exploitation (and the unequal exchange which results from it) dictates inequality in the international division of labor ... reproduces the conditions of unequal development... It explains that the underdeveloped countries are as they are because they are super-exploited and not because they are backward (or, if they were indeed backward, that circumstance made it possible to super-exploit them).⁴⁰⁵

According to Amin, unequal exchange can occur whenever the difference in wage rates is greater than the difference in labor productivity between the periphery and the center.⁴⁰⁶

Thus, Amin believes that, in order to ensure a continued supply of cheap labor, capitalists strive to maintain the precapitalist relations of production in the periphery. Hence, while he agrees with Frank and many other dependency theoreticians that capitalism produced underdevelopment, he rejects Frank's and Wallerstein's ideas of homogenization in the world capitalist system, so, for Amin, the capitalist world system is made up of segments which are heterogeneous: groups of frankly capitalist firms producing commodities by means of efficient

403 Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 62.

404 Samir Amin, *The Law of Value and Historical Materialism*, p. 62.

405 Ibid., p. 63.

406 Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, p. 24.

techniques and employing wage labor of various rates of remuneration; and precapitalist areas where capitalist products are produced and marketed within peasant or non-capitalist modes. But Amin believes that production in the periphery has a dual character: backward and advanced production (both for export and for the domestic market) exist side by side (the dualist thesis of the mode in the periphery). Thus, in the last analysis, the world capitalist system is a single system of different capitalist formations: the mature dominant central capitalist formations, and the immature dependent peripheral capitalist formations. It is characterized by: “(1) the universal nature of commodities; ... (2) universal nature of capital, i.e., its international mobility; ... and (3) labor markets persistently confined within national boundaries — in other words, the very limited international mobility of the labor force.”⁴⁰⁷

Amin believes that one cannot understand the capitalist mode based on empirical observation of reality.

...but to understand the world capitalist system' one should go beyond empirical observation to class struggles which determine unequal exchange, and inequality in the international division of labor. There are no economic laws that are independent of class struggle ... There can be no economic theory of the world economy. The active search for markets is therefore a product of the class struggle, and it is in this way that the 'internal' national conditions of accumulation are interrelated with the conditions of the world system of pre-monopolist and then imperialist formations. Capital knows only one 'law': the search for maximum rate of surplus value, distinguished by its immediate form — the pursuit of a maximum rate of profit. In this search, it confronts only one obstacle: the resistance of the producers of this surplus value proletarians and immediate

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

producers formally subordinated to the exploitation of capital. ⁴⁰⁸

Amin makes a “distinction between; (a) the imperialist bourgeoisie which dominates the system as a whole; (b) the proletariat of the central countries, which enjoys increase in real wages; (c) the dependent bourgeoisie of the periphery, whose place is defined by international division of labor, and whose anti-imperialist activity modifies this division; (d) the proletariat of the periphery, subjected to super exploitation by virtue of the incomplete character of the capitalist structure, its historical subordination, and the disconnection derived between the price of labor power and the productivity of its labor — and which consequently, is the spearhead of the revolutionary forces on the world-scale; (e) the exploited peasantry of the periphery (the exploited classes of non-capitalist modes, organized in relation to the foregoing).” ⁴⁰⁹

Amin makes distinctions between expansionism, as the general character of capital, and imperialism, as the contemporary stage of capitalism. Expansionism is the immediate expression of the search for markets for commodities or capital. ⁴¹⁰ Since the end of the 19th century, the expansion of capitalism has been characterized by imperialism, the export of capital and commodities. Imperialism “in fact made possible, for the first time, the export of capital on a scale hitherto unthinkable. This gave a new momentum to the unequal international division of

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 105.

⁴⁰⁹ Samir Amin, *The Law of Value and Historical Materialism*, pp. 65-66.

⁴¹⁰ Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, p. 104.

labor and extended the exploitation by monopolies to all the producers of the system. But this exploitation was extended by dividing the producers, that is subjecting them to different rates of exploitation which aggravate unequal development.”⁴¹¹

In Amin’s view, in this period the center of gravity of the exploitation of labor by capital has been displaced from the center of the system to its periphery.⁴¹² Thus, for Amin, the phases of imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism, are not the same as the stages of the capitalist mode of production as a whole. To him, imperialism has undergone two expansionist phases: the first expansion is based on unequal exchange between agricultural and industrial countries, the international division of labor, imperialist class alliances, and political forms of imperialist domination. The second phase is characterized by a new rise of capitalism in the periphery. Industrialization by import substitution integrates the bourgeoisie of the periphery into the imperialist system, and this transforms the very nature of anti-imperialist strategy. In fact, in this phase, the peripheral bourgeoisie enters strategically into the capitalist camp.⁴¹³

However, as Howe (1980) observed, the essential tenets of dependency theory were not innovative. Dependency theory exhibited to certain economic doctrines

⁴¹¹ Ibid., p. 110.

⁴¹² Ibid., p. 10.

⁴¹³ Ibid., pp. 113-115.

current in 17th century Europe. The emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth through monopoly trade and the special role of industry in national well-being were both common elements of mercantilist thought.

All dependency interpretations, from those of Frank and Wallerstein to those of Arighi, Emmanuel, and Amin, are based on mercantilist – pre-Marxist – conceptions of the primacy of the realm of trade over that of mode of production. They confused capitalism with commercial relations or the trade between nations. They bring in the world capitalist market to explain the realization of surplus value; but they do not explain the nature of capitalism, and in turn, the world capitalist system. Here, capitalism is not characterized by the capitalist mode of production, its laws of existence and development, and its corresponding class relations, but rather by production of profit and exploitation of some areas by capitalist nations.

Accordingly, the class structures of different nations are merely the products of their places in the capitalist world system, rather than being the key determining factor in international relations.⁴¹⁴ Moreover, the locus of exploitation is located in the sphere of circulation rather than that of production and reproduction of life as a whole.

Although dependency theorists may have provided a descriptive analysis of the consequences of the international capitalist system, what is lacking is a theory of its nature. In other words, we may have been offered a useful analysis of the effects of the world capitalist system, but we have never been told why the capitalist

⁴¹⁴ Brewer, *Marxist Theory of Imperialism*, p. 17.

center needs to exploit the peripheral satellites. Perhaps the reason is the existence of cheap labor in the periphery; but why, then, does capital not flow into these areas?

In a certain sense, for dependency theory, the unit of analysis is neither the world capitalist system, nor social classes on a world scale, but rather the politico-economic structure of the periphery, that is, the consequences of the impact of CMP on peripheral politico-economic structure.

CHAPTER 11

Dialectical View of the Imperialism

A Juncture of Different But Dependent Social Systems

A scientific analysis of the world capitalist system is possible without reducing the unit of analysis to an abstract theory about an isolated capitalist mode of production, to a study of the politico-economic structure of peripheral satellites, or commercial relations among nations. This is possible without any need to reduce Marxism to economism, structuralism, or circulationism.

Capitalism may be characterized here by seven economic characteristics: A) it is the highest stage of commodity economy. B) it is based on the production of surplus value. C) it embodies the productive use of profit, that is, the reinvestment of the large part of profit in the process of production and reproduction. D) because of overproduction and underconsumption, capitalism cannot exist and develop internally; that is, the accumulation of capital or the realization of profits requires external markets. The external capitalist and non-capitalist space are the necessary condition of capitalist accumulation and the establishment of the world market (globalization), and then, the creation of the capitalist world system, imperialism. E) It requires a constantly growing profit. F) private ownership. G) it moves to dominate all economic activities.

Thus, the heart of the aggressive nature and the dynamics of the world capitalist system is the fact that:

1) Competition among corporations – capitalists.

2) Capitalism knows only one law: the search for maximum rate of profit.

2) Capitalism is unable to exist and develop by itself. The unlimited production and limited consumption require foreign markets; therefore, it compels capitalism to establish connections everywhere it can, seeks to nestle anywhere, and settles everywhere. These necessities know no rights; they violate all human rights, and the rights of all nations. It must destroy all traditional modes of life or subject them to its rule and needs. On the one hand, it compels all nations to become semicapitalist, on the other hand, as capitalism cannot be a universal mode, it tries to stop, block, or overthrow the growth of capitalism in the peripheral satellites.

This study holds the world capitalist system as a global articulation of distinct but dialectically interrelated modes of production and reproduction of life and their corresponding class relations. We treat it as a system of complex dependent economic, political, and ideological relations between and within the capitalist and dominated non-capitalist modes of life.

The Historical Development of the World Capitalist System

The origin of the historical relationship between the Western European countries and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America dates back to the creation in the 16th century of a world-embracing market. The basis of this world market is

the commodity economy, i.e., the separation of industry from agriculture and further division and specialization of labor within industry and agriculture in Europe. The social division of labor and the development of commerce and merchant capitals in Europe “give(s) rise everywhere to the tendency toward production of exchange-value, increase(s) its volume, multiplies it, make(s) it cosmopolitan, and develop(s) money into world-money. As soon as town industry as such separates from agriculture industry, its products are from the outset commodities and thus require the mediation of commerce for their sale.”⁴¹⁵

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the progressive gross of the social division of labor, the geographical discoveries, competition among European merchants to possess the goods of Asia and the treasures of America, sudden development of merchant capital in Europe, and geometric progression of circulating commodities on a world scale — all contributed to the creation of the market, characterized by capitalist circulation.

The distinction between the capitalist form of circulation and a simple form of circulation is based on the differences in their essence and form. In the simple form of circulation, commodities are exchanged either for one another directly, C - C, or

***THE UNLIMITED PRODUCTION AND LIMITED CONSUMPTION
COMPEL CAPITALISM EXPANDING INTO NEW MARKETS, TO
ESTABLISH CONNECTIONS EVERYWHERE IT CAN, SEEK TO NESTLE
ANYWHERE, AND SETTLE EVERYWHERE.***

⁴¹⁵ Marx, Capital, vol. III, pp. 331-332.

indirectly, that is through money or another commodity which acts as an intermediary, as a means of exchange, $C - M - C$. This is a common mode of circulation in societies with natural economies, such as feudalism or slavery. It begins with a sale and ends with a purchase for consumption, for satisfaction of needs. It starts with one commodity and ends with another qualitatively different commodity. Here, the money is just the means of exchange, and the leading motive of circulation is use—value.

But, in the world market, capitalist circulation is based on the transformation of money into commodities, including services, and the change of commodities back again into money, $M - C - M'$. Here, the circulation of commodities in the market is not performed by direct producers themselves, but a mediatory class of merchants. It begins with a purchase and ends with a sale. Here, money is not expended for consumption, or for satisfaction of wants, but it is advanced and accumulated. It is not used merely as a means of exchange, but its main function is to create more money (capital). The possessor of money is a capitalist whose function consists of promoting the exchange of commodities. His pocket is the point from which the capital starts, and to which it returns. The production of profit, and more and more reinvestment of capital, is the sole motive of this operation.

The first period of the historical development of the world capitalist system cannot be identified by CMP. The industrial workshops were still small. We had the market, the merchant capital, without having capitalist production and industrial capital. Thus, capital appeared just in the process of circulation. Therefore, it is capitalist circulation which turns products into commodities, and, in fact,

constitutes the basis of primitive accumulation of capital, not the process of production. **Merchant capital appropriates its profit not by direct exploitation of workers, but by the differences between prices of goods in various countries which still substantially have natural economies. Thus, the world market and merchant capital are older than capitalist production. In fact, they are the precondition for industrial capital and, with that, the whole capitalist mode of production and reproduction of life.**

At this stage, the world market does not constitute a system. There is no interdependency among nations. The relations among nations are not dialectical. There is no dialectical integration of diverse modes of production and reproduction. There is no dependent mode of production which can survive just by its relation to other modes. Here, we have the world capitalist market without having the world capitalist system.

It is worth noting that in studying the relationships among diverse tendencies (phenomena), it is essential to differentiate between following different but interchangeable relations: a) accidental or temporary; (b) unilateral; c) antagonistic; and d) dialectical relations. By an accidental or temporary relation, we mean that relation in which neither of its participants is dependent on the other; in other words, participants can survive without any qualitative change in their mode of life if they discontinue their relations with each other. By a unilateral relation, we mean that relation in which one of the parts is dependent on the other part(s); that is, it cannot survive without its relation to the other part, such as the relation of man to nature. An antagonistic relation is that relation in which the existence of one part (or all parts participating in that relation) is dependent on

the destruction of the other part(s). And by a dialectical relationship, we mean that relation in which none of the main participants can survive in isolation from other parts; each part is the precondition of other parts.

The second stage of the history of the relationship between the countries of Western Europe and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, dates from the creation in the 18th century of capitalist production in Europe. CMP in Western Europe arises, exists, and develops historically within the capitalist world market, within an environment of various non-capitalist modes of production.⁴¹⁶ Since its appearance, capitalist production has been dependent on non-capitalist formations, and this is a fact that has existed continuously since the advent of this system. “There never has been, nor does there exist at present, a country exclusively capitalist production.”⁴¹⁷

Capitalist production developed only in Europe, where progressive growth of the social division of labor, the great revolution in commerce, had already created the basis for capitalist production and its expansion.

*The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle-ages. Here, as in natural science is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his logic) that merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative changes.*⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁶ Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, pp. 61-62.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴¹⁸ Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 309.

In fact, by offering raw material and the instruments of production to producers, and by taking away from them their products, a merchant capitalist bites deeper and deeper into the whole process of production, makes it dependent on his capital, reduces the producers to the position of wage workers, and rules the industry, not any more as a merchant capitalist, but as an industrial capitalist. Thus, “it was not in the bosom of the old guilds that manufacture was born. It was the merchant that became the head of the workshop, and not the old guild-master.”⁴¹⁹

The capitalist production began in Europe when the capitalist commerce passed from the process of circulation to the process of production; “when each individual capitalist employs simultaneously a comparatively large number of laborers; when consequently the labor process is carried on an extensive scale and yields, relatively, large quantities of products.” It starts both historically and logically when there are “a great number of laborers working together, at the same time, in one place, in order to produce under the mastership of one capitalist.”⁴²⁰

Capitalism is the highest stage of the commodity economy. The system starts from the fact that the workman sells his labor-power as a commodity to industrial capital. Hence, M — L is regarded as characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, the constant production and reproduction of profit is the

*IMPERIALISM IS A JUNCTURE OF DIFFERENT BUT DIALECTICALLY
DEPENDENT OF DOMINANT & DOMINATED SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL LIFE.*

⁴¹⁹ Marx, quoted by Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism*, in p. 390.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 359-360.

basic law of capitalism.

The capitalist form of production is governed by the profit motive. Production only make sense to the capitalist if it fill his pockets with... profit...; but the basic law of capitalist production is not only profit in the sense of glittering bullion, but constantly growing profit. This is where it differs from any other economic system based on exploitation. For this purpose, the capitalist ... uses the fruit of exploitation not exclusively, and not even primarily, for personal luxury, but more and more to ... put back into capital and used to expand production. ⁴²¹

In this stage, despite the dependence of the capitalist mode of production on the periphery, the world market does not constitute a system. There is no mutual interdependency among the nations in the world market. Here, we observe only a unilateral dependency of the capitalist mode of production on the other modes. Non-capitalist modes of production still have their natural independent mode of life and can survive without any relationship with capitalist countries. In short, this period is characterized by a) the advent and development of the capitalist mode of production; b) the expansion of the world market; c) the progressive growth of state military power; and d) the survival of natural independent mode of production in the periphery.

The third stage of the historical development of the world capitalist system came into being from the industrial revolution, in the 19th century; that is the revolution in the instruments of labor, in sciences, in the advent of highly developed systems of machinery. The technical essence of the industrial revolution is the substitution

⁴²¹Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, p 49.

of machines for human labor, and conscious application of science in the process of capitalist production and reproduction of life. At this stage, it is not the laborer who employs the means of production, but, on the contrary, ***it is the machine which employs the worker. In fact, by means of machinery, capitalist production changes not only the technical basis of production, the function of labor, and the social division of labor, but it also changes the system of production of value and surplus value. Now, for the industrial capitalist, human labor is no longer the sole source of production of value and surplus value, but machinery constitutes another potential source for the production and reproduction of surplus value. This is what Marx could not realize. The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is not based on the increase in the rate of composition of capital, c/v , but on the competition among capitalists. In fact, the increase of the rate of composition of capital is one of the fundamental means of capitalists to fight with their competitors and the falling rate of profit.***

Thus, this stage may be characterized by the supremacy of capitalist production over capitalist commerce.

As soon as manufacture gains sufficient strength, and particularly large-scale industry, it creates in its turn a market for itself, by capturing it through its commodities. At this point commerce becomes the servant of industrial production, for which continued expansion of the market becomes a vital necessity. ⁴²²

Thus, although at first in the world market commerce revolutionized capitalist production, at this stage, the imminent necessity of capitalist production to produce on an over enlarged scale tends to extend and revolutionize the capitalist

⁴²² Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 336.

commerce in the world market.⁴²³ It creates an enormous market for its production. It multiplies the circulation of commodities and creates close ties with capitalist and non-capitalist countries.

In this period, the relationship between the capitalist center and the periphery is not just an economic relation in a so-called free market, but it involves various kinds of political and ideological struggles, manipulations, and interventions.

This gives rise to a new dominated ruling class in the periphery which facilitates the capitalist circulation of commodities and the realization of surplus value. Here, the relation between the capitalist center and the periphery is much like the relation between town and country (industry and agriculture).

In this period, by interrelations with the capitalist center, the peripheral areas do not become poorer; their development is not blocked by the capitalist center, but, on the contrary, the capitalist center, by selling commodities to the periphery, improves peripheral means of production and reproduction of life, and creates the condition for national advances in the periphery.

During this stage, despite all economic, political, and ideological changes, an independent economic system is still the dominant mode of life in the periphery. Therefore, the world market does not yet constitute a system. The world market is basically based on the unilateral dependency of the capitalist center on the periphery.

The fourth stage of the history of the capitalist metropolis/periphery relationship dates from the creation, in the 20th century, of the world capitalist system –

⁴²³ Ibid., p. 333.

Imperialism. The main dynamic of the capitalist mode of production in this stage is the constant growth and transformation of the industries, and firms, into large-scale entities, and the investment of capital on a world scale. In previous stages, the surplus value flowing from the periphery to the core was mainly through the sale of commodities produced at the core, but in the imperialist stage, this surplus value is realized, on the one hand, through the sale of commodities produced at the center, and on the other hand, through the direct investment in the periphery which corresponds to the new relation between core and periphery. Imperialism is the higher stage of capitalism. One of the characteristic features of this stage for the Western Capitalists is not the export of goods, but the export of capital, outsourcing/offshoring of businesses. This arises from the fact that the Western capitalists cannot find a profitable field for their investment at home. So, by exporting manufacturing, and information technology to overseas, to cheap labor countries (i.e. China, Malaysia, India) they change their destructive and oppressive strategy and replace it with a constructive means for the development of capitalism to those countries, to which their different types of investments are exported. This new strategy affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries and transforms them into quasi-superpower at the expense of their Western Main Street economies. Thus, at this stage, the core/periphery relation can no longer be characterized by trade relations, but also by the export of capital from the core to periphery, by the dissolution of the natural economy in the periphery and its transformation to an alienated dominated Capitalist mode of life – one which is neither capitalism nor statist, nor feudalism. It is called dominated capitalism because: a) the existence and the development of the economic,

political, and ideological relations in the periphery are dominated by the capitalist core; b) almost all of the major means of production are owned and controlled not by national or comprador bourgeoisie or feudal landlords, but by the state; c) the state in the periphery is a sub imperialist state; and in fact, the sub imperialist state forces in the periphery play fundamental roles in dissolution of the old independent mode of life in the periphery, and its transition to an alienated, dominated, and sub imperialist mode of life.

Imperialism needs protection.

Analysis of the actual course of modern imperialism has laid bare the combination of economic and political forces which fashion it. These forces are traced to their sources in the selfish interests of certain industrial, financial, and professional classes, seeking private advantages out of a policy of imperial expansion, and using this same policy to protect them in their economic, political, and social privileges against the pressure of democracy. ⁴²⁴

The core/periphery relation was established and has continued its existence by the direct support of the imperialist state. At the present time, imperialist state forces are exercised mostly by sub imperialist states of the peripheral satellites. In fact, in many countries, the sub imperialist states of peripheral satellites are basically selected, manipulated, maintained, supported, changed, equipped, and trained by imperialist forces.

Each step in the history of the core/periphery relation has been accompanied by development of the CMP in the center and a dominated mode of production in the periphery. As soon as capitalism stood on its legs, especially since the

424 Hobson, Imperialism (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 64.

establishment of modern industry, it has drawn all nations into the world market, and put an end to their independent natural economies. Capitalism subjects all countries to the rule of capitalism and makes them dependent on itself.⁴²⁵

Imperialism, as the highest stage of the core/periphery relation, as the world capitalist system, came into being when the constant growth of monopoly capital, large scale industry in the core, and the development of comprador bourgeoisie and sub imperialist states, dissolved and transformed the independent natural economy of the periphery into a dependent dominated commodity economy, structured and manipulated by the dominant force and role of the capitalist core.

Thus, the world capitalist system came into being, in a proper sense, when there was a dialectical integration and interdependence between the capitalist core and the periphery, that is, when capitalism completely dominated the periphery and undermined its traditional independent mode of life. The aggressive force of capitalism makes the periphery so dependent on itself that the latter cannot produce and reproduce itself in isolation from the former.

This new concept of imperialism rejects both the 'dualism' thesis (Rey, Amin) and the homogenization thesis (Marx, Lenin, Wallerstein, Frank), of imperialism. The world capitalist system is neither a mere juxtaposition of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes, nor can it be regarded as a homogenized capitalist mode of life, made up of advanced and less developed capitalist countries.

The impact of the world capitalist system on the periphery is not retrogressive, but, on the contrary, it is progressive. It is true that the plunderage of the periphery by

⁴²⁵ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*.

Western Europe and the export of wares into these peripheral satellites were initiated by force (for example, America was conquered and colonized by Europe; or India, China, and Japan were forced to trade with West), but this does not necessarily mean that the role of capitalism in the periphery was retrogressive. Empirical evidence shows that the impact of the core/periphery relation on the periphery is significantly progressive. In fact, the imperialist stage of the core/periphery relation can be characterized by a substantial upsurge of productive forces in the periphery. During this stage, the rate of growth per capita in some of the peripheral areas is even higher than in advanced countries. Hence, the term ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘dominated,’ does not mean backwardness or non-development. These terms just mean development proceeded mostly because of the relations with capitalism and at a certain stage of growth, it was blocked or destroyed by capitalist forces.⁴²⁶

Capitalism fulfills a double mission in the periphery: destructive and progressive; the dissolution of the traditional mode of production and the laying of the mental and material foundation for national advancement.⁴²⁷

The progressive effects of capitalism on the periphery have two basic characteristics: a) it is artificial and does not have national roots; and b) it is temporary, that is, it must be stopped, blocked, and overthrown, before it goes further, deeper, and becomes the relatively dominant mode of life, or garners national roots. In other words, it must be overthrown before the benefits can be

426 See Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism*, p. 321; see also Warren, *Imperialism*, pp. 192-193, 195-196, 229-234.

427 Marx, *Colonialism*, cited by Warren, pp. 41-42.

enjoyed. Capitalism, by selling its products to the periphery and by its direct and indirect investment in the periphery, creates the precondition of national advance in the periphery. It destroys the traditional modes of life, and unwillingly creates the precondition for CMP in the periphery. But capitalism cannot survive by itself. It is not an independent mode of production, but an aggressive dependent one; therefore, the homogenization of the world capitalist system is the grave of capitalism. Thus, as soon as the development of the periphery reaches a certain point, capitalism cannot tolerate that, so it tries inevitably, consciously, and through conspiracy to block, stop, or destroy what has been built in the periphery.

The Imperialist stage is also marked by a rapid splintering and emergence of new economic activities, where the splinter moves and tends to dominate all economic spheres including Service Industries. In fact, another important feature of the Imperial Stage is its evolution and expansion of economic activities to service industries. Thus, in the fourth stage a large portion of the economic activities devoted to service industry grew increasingly in the 20th century (in the United States service industry accounts for about 70% of GDP, in India today accounts for more than half of GDP or globally it accounts for of more than three-fifths of GDP).

**ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF CAPITALIST, DOMINATED CAPITALIST, AND STATIST COUNTRIES
1960-1970 TO 1970-1977**

	1960-70				1970-77	
	GDP	GDP/Capita	Industry	GDP	GDP/Capita	Industry
Less-developed economies	5.6	3.1	7.1	6.1	3.6	7.4
Africa	5.1	2.5	6.9	5.2	2.5	6.0
Nigeria	_ a	_ a	_ a	7.8	5.0	17.6
Latin America	5.5	2.8	6.8	6.2	3.4	6.8
Mexico	7.3	3.8	9.4	5.0	1.5	5.4
Brazil	8.0	5.1	10.0	9.8	6.8	10.2
Middle East	7.9	4.8	10.4	7.9	4.7	10.5
Egypt	4.9	2.3	5.1	_ a	_ a	_ a
Iran	10.4	7.3	12.1	10.2	7.4	17.2
Capitalist economies	5.1	4.0	6.0	3.2	2.3	3.1
European market economies	4.6	3.8	5.6	2.8	2.4	2.6
U.S.	4.3	3.0	5.3	2.8	1.9	2.4
Japan	10.5	9.4	_ a	5.3	3.9	5.7
Statist economies	6.7	5.6	8.5	6.0	5.0	7.6
USSR	7.2	5.9	9.5	5.7	4.8	7.6

a= Data not available

Source: United Nations 1987c, Tables 6A and 6B

The Dynamic of Imperialism

Marx and many of his followers maintain that imperialism is caused by the “law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.” This law is based on Marx’s idea that only human labor can produce value and surplus value, not machinery.

The value of labor power and the value that labor power creates in the labor process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values was what the capitalist had in view when he was purchasing the labor power. ⁴²⁸

For Marx the machinery as a passive component of capital “creates no new value.”⁴²⁹

In the labor process the means of production transfer their value to the product only so far as along with their use-value they also lose their exchange value ... The maximum loss of value that they can suffer in the process is plainly limited by the amount of original value with which they came into the process... Therefore, the means of production (including machinery) can never add more value to the product than they themselves possess in which they assist. ⁴³⁰

Thereby, Marx divides capital, C, into two parts: “one, the sum of money (c) laid out upon the means of production, and the other, the sum of money (v) expended upon labor power; “c” represents the portion that has become constant capital, and the “v” the portion that has become variable capital ($C=c+v$).”⁴³¹ Marx calls s/v

⁴²⁸ Marx, Capital, vol. I. P. 193.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p. 387.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., p. 205.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 212.

the rate of surplus value, and s/C or $s/c+v$ the rate of profit, c/v the composition of capital. Marx believed that the progressive role of CMP tends to increase the rate of composition of capital, c/v , that is, the constant growth of constant capital in relation to variable capital. As for Marx, variable capital can only produce surplus value, “The gradual growth of constant capital to variable capital must necessarily lead to a gradual fall of the general rate of profit, so long as the rate of surplus value, ...remains the same.”⁴³²

*For Marx, foreign trade cheapens, on the one hand, the element of constant capital, and on the other hand, the necessities of life for which variable capital is exchanged; therefore, it tends to raise the rate of profit by increasing the rate of surplus value, and by lowering the value of the constant capital.*⁴³³

*If capital is sent abroad, this is not done because it absolutely could not be applied at home, but because it can be employed at a higher rate of profit in a foreign country.*⁴³⁴

Social dialecticism rejects Marx’s ideas that human labor is the sole source of production of value and surplus value. A great majority of products today are produced by machines, with no intervention by human labor, and produce a high rate of profit for capitalist owners. Labor, from an economic point of view, is that relation which produces use-value, and surplus value. This includes all natural,

⁴³² Marx, Capital, vol. III, p. 212.

⁴³³ Ibid., p. 237.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 256.

mechanical, and human labor.

Thus, for this study, machinery not only produces value and surplus value, but is the most effective means of increasing the rate of profit. Machinery, not as a passive tool, but as a source of production of value and surplus value, becomes a capitalist means of creation of profit. Therefore, for capitalists, human labor and machine labor are two different modes of existence of variable capital. Both produce value and surplus value; both are the generators of more value; both produce equivalent value for their maintenance and surplus value for capitalists. Hence, machinery does not reduce the rate of surplus value, but on the contrary, it is another source for capital accumulation. Hence, the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is not based on the organic composition of capital, but on the law of competition among capitalists.

Consequently, imperialism is not a response to the increasingly falling rate of profit, or to the productivity of labor. Here, man is not the aim of production. Imperialism is not motivated by the production of use value, or exchange value. It is not concerned with national interest. Imperialism is motivated by constantly growing interests of the capitalists in making more profit. Hence, to understand the dynamic of imperialism is to understand, before anything else, the dynamic of capitalism. Capitalism is distinguished from the outset by three characteristic features:

First, it is based on a commodity economy. It produces its products as commodities and services.

Second, it is based on the production of surplus value. The production of surplus value constitutes the final aim and the determining motive of this mode of production.⁴³⁵ “Production only makes sense to a capitalist if it fills his pockets with ‘pure income,’ i.e., with profit that remains after all of his investment.”⁴³⁶

The third feature is the production and reproduction of the constantly growing profit. “This is where it differs from any other economic system based on exploitation. For this purpose, the capitalist ... uses the fruits of exploitation not exclusively, and not even primarily, for personal luxury, but more and more to increase exploitation itself. The largest part of the profits gained is put back into capital and used to expand production. The capital that mounts up or, as Marx calls it accumulates.”⁴³⁷ It is, in fact, this productive use of the profit that enabled capitalism to outstrip all prior economic systems.⁴³⁸ “Thus, the ancient conception, in which man always appears as the aim of production, seems very much more exalted than the modern world, in which production is the aim of man and wealth the aim of the production.”⁴³⁹

Capitalism begins from the fact that the profit is not consumed individually as

⁴³⁵ Marx, *Capital*, vol. III, pp. 879-880.

⁴³⁶ Rosa Luxemburg, *Accumulation of Capital*, p. 49.

⁴³⁷ Ibid. See also, Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, pp. 298, 509, 579, 618-619; *Capital*, vol. II, pp. 78, 153; and *Capital*, vol. III, p. 850.

⁴³⁸ Dudley Dillard, cited by Wilber & Jameson, “Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond,” in Wilbert, *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, (N.Y.: Random House, 1984), p. 15.

⁴³⁹ Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formation*, (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1980), p. 84.

revenue by the capitalist, but it contains a part destined for capitalization and accumulation. But where does this portion come from? How is capital accumulation possible? Might it have come from the workers' pockets? No, it could not have because workers have no means beyond the wages covering bare necessities which they receive from the capitalists. Could it come from capitalists themselves? No, it cannot because if they were to spend the total surplus value, there would be no accumulation. Could it come from those political and ideological fractions of ruling or ruled classes, which can be counted neither as capitalist nor as workers? No, it cannot because all the agents of these fractions are economically dependent on the pockets of capitalists and workers. Since there is no way that capital can be accumulated internally, there must be other capitalist and non-capitalist sources for capital accumulation, that is, *external capitalist and non-capitalist space is the necessary site of the realization of profit and the capitalist accumulation. Capitalism must seek foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home.*

Let us come straight to the heart of the dynamic of the capitalist world system or imperialism. Capitalism is unable to exist by itself. Or in Lenin's words:

*“Capitalism cannot exist and develop without constantly expanding the sphere of its domination, without colonizing new countries into the whirlpool of the world economy.”*⁴⁴⁰ The agents of the capitalist mode of production and reproduction do not constitute a sufficient market (source) for capital accumulation. The capitalist accumulation needs other markets in non-capitalist nations. Therefore, “capitalism arose and developed historically within non-capitalist societies.” And “since its

⁴⁴⁰ Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 600.

first appearance on the stage of history, capitalist production has demonstrated its enormous attraction toward non-capitalist countries.”⁴⁴¹ There is no capitalist nation without foreign trade.⁴⁴²

Thus, the specific task of bourgeois society is the establishment of a world market, and a mode of production based upon this world market. “The need for a constantly expanding market chases bourgeoisie over the surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connections everywhere.”⁴⁴³ The capitalist’s need to expand knows no laws or boundaries. The necessity for self-preservation violates the rights of all nations. Capitalism must fight a battle of annihilation against every non-capitalist mode of production to subject them to the rule of the capitalist mode of production.

Force is the means of capital accumulation. It, on the one hand, compels all nations to become capitalist, but, on the other hand, it cannot be a universal mode of life; therefore, it tries to block the development and the transition of the periphery to capitalism. Hence, because of the unlimited production and limited consumption, the greater eagerness of producers to sell than consumers to buy, more goods are produced than can be sold at profit, and the struggle for markets manifests the essence of the aggressive nature of capitalism, the dynamic and the ‘taproot’ of the world imperialism.⁴⁴⁴

441 Rosa Luxemburg, *Accumulation of Capital*, p. 64.

442 Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 66.

443 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 12.

444 Hobson, *Imperialism*, pp. 81, 88.

Another motive force of capital accumulation is the competition among capitalists. Competition subordinates the capitalist mode of production to the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. It “subordinates every individual capitalist to the immanent laws of capitalist production, as external and coercive laws. It compels him to keep extending his capital, to preserve it, and he can only extend it by the means of progressive accumulation.”⁴⁴⁵ *A capitalist must constantly compare his own price with the market-prices on a world scale. It compels a capitalist to adopt new methods to be able to reduce his cost price to the maximum possible extent.*

Thus, in CMP, there are always dialectical relations in the process of production of surplus value – capitalist accumulation, competition among capitalists, and the increase in the rate of the composition of capital – the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Each is the precondition of the others. They call forth each other into existence. Competition necessarily calls forth the constant improvement of labor to produce maximum profit. Capitalism, on the other hand, increases the organic composition of capital – the productivity of labor – to compete with other capitals and to create the maximum profit possible. And competition tends to reduce the rate of profit and forces capitalists to employ new methods of production and exploitation which would enable them to reduce costs, and produce more surplus value, before the average price level – market - price has been forced down by competitors.

⁴⁴⁵ Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 739.

World Capitalist Economic Crisis

The idea of open markets and free trades were sold to people for economic success, but that was not true or at least partially true. It has become an economic success for China and big corporations at the expense of the Western Main Street Economy or people's economy. This raises many questions including: How serious is the new Protectionist Movement? Can behemoth Multinational Corporations or their puppet governments contain Protectionist Movements? The fact is that globalization and outsourcing are great for most big corporations, but they are against the Main Street Economy, the job markets, and people's well-being on both sides of the Atlantic.

Recently, we have been witnessing the Brexit Movement, the America-First Movement, "Build-the-Wall" and Make-America-Great-Again against globalization. Capitalist international trades and free markets started after the Second World War, boosted, and had a golden period in the 1980s. But Globalization has lost its public support, especially in the West. In recent decades, protectionism has become a serious threat to World trade. The risk of trade wars recently became more visible by Brexit, Euroscepticism and during the Presidency of Donald Trump. Although the trade tensions have been defused currently in some fronts, the threat of further escalation of Trumpism still remains, and the world economic crisis and creeping protectionism are intensifying by a marked lack of governmental policies and strategies against the side effects of globalization.

For Dialecticism, protectionism and globalization are in a dialectical relation with each other--neither one can continue or survive without the other. But the only question remains is which one will be dominant?

Here, the domination will depend on the fight between ruling class and dominated classes, between people on one side and big corporations and their puppet governments (Establishment) on the other side. For Dialecticism, “Protectionism First” must be the main goal of any people’s political movement against establishments.

CONCLUSION

The main goal of this new school of thought, dialecticism, is to produce the most objective knowledge of the nature of the universe, consciousness/ knowledge, and social life, and at the same time, it is an attempt to review and criticize Marxism and reject some false classical theories.

I

Part One of this book (chapters 1 and 2) studies dialectical philosophy. The object of the study of this part is to understand the nature of the Universe. We may sum up the basic laws of the nature, creation, existence, changes, evolution, increase, destruction, movement, and development of the Universe in the following propositions:

1. Dialecticism does posit a philosophical argument. Dialectical philosophy is neither the art of conversation, nor the science of ideas or formal logic. It is not a superfluous science, nor can it be reduced to epistemology. ***Dialectical philosophy is not a descriptive, exploratory, or imaginative endeavor, but as an ontological science, tried to understand the nature or the essence of the Universe. Dialectical philosophy is the science of the universe.***
2. The object of dialectical philosophy is the Universe. It is the most comprehensive and affirmative recognition of the laws extracted from relations among diverse beings or existences which constitute the very essence of all phenomena. It is the science of laws and regularities occurring in the essence of all

natural, social, and mental phenomena. It is the science of changes, evolution, creation, existence, increment of the Universe. Or in short, it is the mental and ontological process of production and reproduction of the Universe.

According to this definition, then, dialectical philosophy, as the science of the Universe, does not negate the foundation of other sciences, or vice versa. But whereas special sciences are confined to the study of only a segment of reality, dialectical philosophy is concerned with the Universe or the whole existences.

3. The universe is alive, dynamic, and creative. Put Simply, the Universe, through the relationships between its constituent parts, is constantly growing, developing, evolving, and creating new beings. The universe is constantly changing quantitatively, quantitatively, incrementally, and increasingly becomes bigger. In other words, since life is nothing more than relationships between the various existences, so by creating more beings, relationships, and life, in fact, the universe is always getting bigger. ***So, the Universe is not only going from simple to complex, but it is also going from less to more.***

4. The universe is a system of complex interconnected practices or relations among diverse existents. Hence, the universe has a relational nature and, therefore, it changes constantly - ***no relation, no universe.*** Everything in the universe exists, transforms, develops, and evolves by relations, that is, by the interrelation among diverse tendencies or existences.

Hence, for dialectical philosophy, the interrelations among diverse existences constitute the hidden basis and the secret of existence and

development of all phenomena. They constitute the true soul of life and the key to the creation and self-movement of all phenomena. As the most essential element of reality, the relations among things are the mother of all happening.

The interrelations among diverse tendencies may be temporary, long lasting, accidental, unilateral, dialectical, antagonistic, organized, semi-organized, disorganized, direct, or indirect, but their presences among diverse things are universal and absolute.

5. Changes, creations, destructions, developments, transitions, evolutions are nothing more than the effects or products of relations among diverse phenomena. There are relations when phenomena change, and there are changes when there are relations. **There is no change without relationship, and there is no relations without change. As phenomena interrelate uninterruptedly, nothing stands still; nothing remains the same; everything changes.**

Historical development of the universe is basically marked by three kinds of changes: quantitative, qualitative, and incremental.

Changes are quantitative when we observe just a simple process of increase or decrease of something in phenomena, when the internal and external relations of phenomena do not change them qualitatively, that is, when their mode of life remains the same.

Changes are qualitative when phenomena are changed qualitatively, that is, when their inclinations, internal and external relations change their mode of life.

And changes are incremental when internal and external relations of phenomena create more tendencies, more relations, or more lives, beings, things in the Universe. As life is nothing more than the relations among diverse beings, therefore by the creation of more existences and relations, we create more life. In fact, historical development (evolution) of the universe is the historical creation of more and new modes of life, new relations among diverse tendencies; therefore, it is, at the same time, historical increment and expansion of life or the universe. Thus, the history of the universe is the succession of different stages, one arising necessarily from the one before it, passing from simple to complex, from the lesser beings to more beings, less practice to more practice, from less variety of life to more variety thereof, from less to more, from less life to more life. In short, THE UNIVERSE IS INCREMENTAL ENTITY.

6. For materialist philosophers, the universe is essentially composed of mass. The material world is the only reality and owes its origin to no other being. For idealist philosophers, on the other hand, the universe is created by ideas which are originally related to a higher being or some metaphysical spirit, which owes its origin to no other sources.

Classical physicists have pondered isolating the constituent parts of the universe or devised to pave the way for theorems such as the instant creation, a.k.a. the Big Bang.

For Dialecticism, the constituent parts of the universe are not divisible. The universe is a dynamic whole, and its components are interrelated; it is not composed of materials or isolated things. The universe may be thought of as a web of interrelationships in which no part can stand alone. Nothing is isolated the Universe. All phenomena are interrelated, interconnected and interdependent. That is why a reductionist approach to classical physics for understanding the universe has been a scientific failure. Matter was made from energy and energy can be extracted or released from matter. Matter cannot be removed from energies or vice versa; matter may not be considered as something from the metaphysical world or simply from the outside.

7. But, as we have seen, the universe is essentially practical; it is neither composed of mass, nor thought and ideas. Dialectical philosophy holds the superiority of relations over ideas and matter. Dialectical philosophy dematerializes and de-idealizes the essence of the universe.

8. For dialectical philosophy natural history is nothing but successions of separate stages, each of which has its own mode of life. The material mode of life is one of the stages of life. Matter is not the ultimate foundation of the universe, but it is nothing more than a particular mode of existence of

practice, of the interrelations among diverse tendencies, of life, at certain stages of its development.

Thus, the universe did not start with matter or ideas, but it had existed before matter or ideas. In fact, the latter came into existence as the products of the former. The root of matter cannot be found in matter as a thing, but in the interrelations among diverse tendencies which constitute the real heart of whole existence. Matter simply is a highly developed stage or mode of existence of these practices. As a special structure of life, matter is not the origin of life itself, nor is it the essence, but the form of life. **Life is not things, but relations among diverse things. Hence, relation is not the mode of existence of matter (as Engels claims), but, conversely, matter is the mode of existence of relation. *Hence, matter is not mortal and practice transitory (as Engels claims), but, conversely, matter is transitory, and practice immortal. Hence, matter cannot exist without practice, however practice can exist devoid of matter.***

BY REGARDING THE INTERRELATIONS AMONG DIVERSE BEINGS, EXISTENCES OR TENDENCIES AS THE CORNERSTONE OF EXISTENCE, AND BY REGARDING MATTER AND IDEAS AS PARTICULAR PRODUCTS OF THESE INTERRELATIONS AT A CERTAIN STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT, THIS STUDY REPLACES MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM WITH DIALECTICISM, OR WITH RELATIONALISM.

II

The basic propositions of dialectical epistemology (epistemic dialecticism) are the following:

1. Dialecticism does maintain an epistemology. Dialectical epistemology has as its object mental phenomena. Thus, contrary to Engels', Althusser's, Poulantzas', Benton's, and Politzer's ideas, dialectical epistemology is not philosophy. It does not study the Universe, but it is the science of the laws and principles that govern the origin, existence, production and reproduction, changes, and development of mental phenomena; it is an ontology of thought.

2. Dialectical epistemology starts from the fact that consciousness, knowledge (ideas), mental phenomena, theories, and scientific achievements, as objective realities, form an organic part of human social life. There are laws and regularities that can be discovered to understand the origin, emergence, changes, growth, and evolution of our consciousness.

3. The Universe constitutes the existential basis of knowledge; this means the primacy of being over thought. Human knowledge, then, does not have any metaphysical origin, but its existential basis is interwoven with the social condition of existence of man's real life, that is, with the real process of production and reproduction of man's social life and its corresponding class relations.

4. Science is not a free enterprise, but it is dialectically interwoven with the condition of existence of man's real life and its corresponding class relations.

5. Dialectical methodology is neither empiricism nor idealism. Unlike Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, or Mao Zedong, it does not reduce thought to the real concrete,

and unlike Althusser, Poulantzas, Bettelheim, Colletti, it does not reduce the real to thought or logic. As a subfield of the dialectical epistemology, the dialectical methodology is the science of scientific practices, that is, the science of those practices which tend to produce the most concrete knowledge of the nature of phenomena, to provide the most scientific guides for existing problems, that is, to modify human social life.

6. Dialectical methodology insists on the relative character of all sciences. Science is an endless process.

7. Dialectical methodology insists on the inter-dependency of sciences. There is no isolated science.

8. Dialectical methodology differentiates itself from other methodologies by its central tendency, object of investigation, labor, means, and its method.

Dialectical methodology as its central tendency the production of the most concrete knowledge of the nature of phenomena; therefore, it is not an exploratory, descriptive, or classificatory science, but an ontological one. ***Science is dialectical when it is looking for the nature of phenomena.***

9. Dialectical epistemology differentiates between the dialectical methodology and the dialectical method. In general, Dialectical methodology is the science of scientific practices, whereas, the dialectical method is the implementation of protocols, rules, procedures, principles, processes, and by using appropriate mental and

material tools required by the dialectical methodology for any scientific study or projects.

10. *As a revolutionary science, dialectical methodology applies and uses the scientific values (products) in practice, in real life; solves existing problems; modifies the condition of existence of human social life. Thus, the final aim of dialectical methodology is the real object, human life. It is, in the last instance, a humanist mode of production of scientific knowledge. This is exactly what we mean by the unity of theory and practice, i.e., the actual use or application of a scientific theory in practice. PRACTICE IS THE OBJECT OF THEORY, AND THEORY IS THE GUIDE OF PRACTICE.*

11. Dialectical methodology has as its object real objects. It works on real processes, and tries to produce the most concrete knowledge, directly or indirectly, from its real objects. The real object is not just the object of investigation (point of departure), but it is also the criterion of truth and the final goal of knowledge.

12. Dialectical methodology holds theory as those practices act with certain means on facts, to understand, explain, change, and modify the object. Thus, theoretical products not only express the forms and the conditions of existence and development of our object, but also provide scientific guides for its modification.

13. The theoretical practices consist of three distinct but dialectically interrelated practices: abstraction (the process of assimilation of the nature of phenomena),

reproduction (the presentation of our object via its essence), and revolutionary application (the application of scientific products in real life).

Dialectical methodology uses the abductive (inductive and deductive) method of analysis. It embraces its object from all sides.

III

The basic conclusions of social dialecticism (dialectical sociology) are as follows:

1. Social dialecticism is the science of human social life. Social dialecticism is the extension, application, and specification of the general laws of dialectical philosophy for the study of social life and its development. ²⁰⁸ It is the most comprehensive understanding of the laws of mutual relations between various things that regulate and manage the origin, existence and changes of social phenomena. For social dialecticism, social relations constitute the basic conditions for the existence and development of human social life. Social dialecticism is the enemy of all reductionism and dogmatism. It is not the science of invariable categories and assumptions for all periods, nor can it be reduced to the science of economics, politics, man, or ideological functions of social formations. It is the scientific recognition of regularities and laws found in social phenomena. It is the science of the origin, existence, change, development, transition, and variation of social phenomena. It is the science of those relations – disparate relations among diverse things or tendencies – under which humans produce and reproduce their social life, that is, their mental and material means,

208 Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, p. 1. Social dialecticism has as its object human social life

needs, interests, demands, developments, and make their own history.

2. SOCIAL DIALECTICISM PRESENTS ITSELF BY ITS ONTOLOGICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES. It is not looking for properties of social phenomena. It is neither a Hegelian process of differentiation and classification, nor a Weberian process of empirical differentiation, codification, and generalization of social phenomena, but it is the process of the production of the most concrete knowledge of the ‘essence’ of social life. It is an inquiry into the ‘nature’ of social phenomena.

The strength and the validity of social dialecticism is also based on its revolutionary tendency. We do not just explain the social phenomena, but we study human social life to change it – it is a science of relations among divers phenomena or tendencies, changes, and development. Thus, social dialecticism is the science of the conditions and forms under which various human societies have produced and reproduced themselves. At the same time, it is the science of revolutionary practices for changing and developing those conditions. Hence, *the basic theme and the general strategy of social dialecticism is to understand the nature of social life to provide the most scientific solutions to its problems, and to offer the most humanistic and effective guides for its development.*

3. Social dialecticism holds the impossibility of isolation of the infrastructure from the superstructure. It rejects the isolation of social relations from mental relations. It insists that ideas constitute an organic part of social life. It holds the impossibility of isolation of political, economic, and ideological relations from

each other and from class relations. It is a break with all those Marxist schools that seek to reduce the mode of production of life simply to the material mode of production. It is a break with all those Marxists who strive to understand social life through social institutions, politics, processes of material production, or human.

4. For social dialecticism, the production and reproduction of real life constitutes the ultimately determining element and the motive force of the history of human social life.

The process of production and reproduction of social life consists of four distinct but dialectically interrelated practices: a) the process of production and reproduction of the mental and material means of life; b) the production and reproduction of new demands or needs; c) the production and reproduction of species, i.e., to make and remake other humans; d) the production and reproduction of social relations and their corresponding class relations.

The social production and reproduction of life involves a triple dialectical relationship: a) men's relation to nature; b) men's relation to each other; and c) men's relations to their mental and material means of production and reproduction of life. In other words, through the process of production and reproduction of their life, men enter distinct but dialectically interrelated relations to nature, to each other, and to their means of life, which are not a matter of deliberate choice, but correspond to a definite stage of the development of their

productive forces. The sum of these relations constitutes the general condition of life, that is, the real foundation governing the existence and development of social life.

5. Here men, nature, mental and material means of life, and the interrelationships among them constitute productive forces. Social history is the history of the development of productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces, humans change their modes of life quantitatively, qualitatively, and incrementally.

6. Hence, social relations of production and reproduction of life are not something outside, alongside, under, or above social productive forces, but, social relations, as the main part of productive forces, are the consolidators, conductors, or coordinators of a productive force. This negates all those ideas which separate relations of production from productive forces and try to regard the former as a reflection of the latter, or vice versa.

7. Man produces and reproduces his life by certain historically created means. Here, by these means, we mean all those mental and material productive forces, such as machinery, roads, computers, religions, beliefs, expectations, dreams, norms, rules, laws, natural, plans, institutions, division of labor, customs, culture, traditions, and all other human made means, which have been produced, used, developed, and transmitted by humans in his real social life. These means serve as the necessary assets of man's social practices. They distinguish not only human modes of life from each other and from

animal modes of life, but they are also the most scientific criteria of the degree of development of societies.

8. *The division of labor, as a means of the process of production and reproduction, is the universal characteristic of social life and the necessary condition of its existence and development. Division of labor does not merely set up exclusive spheres of activities, but it also conditions existence and leads to the development of social classes and class divisions (class fractions and class strata). Social division of labor is not a neutral, or sui-generis division, but a social one, that is, it has been created, exists, changes, and develops through the process of production and reproduction of life and its corresponding class relations.*

9. Man is a natural-social-conscious being. He identifies and separates himself from other species by his higher consciousness and by his mode of production and reproduction of life. *Man differentiated himself from other animals as soon as he was able to develop and transmit his mental and material means of life, and as soon as he could develop his needs. The more man develops and modifies his mental and material means of life, the more he removes himself from an animal mode of life.*

10. *Man does not have a fixed unchanging nature, but, on the contrary, man's nature (interests, needs, wants, requirements, etc.) is quantitatively and qualitatively ever changing. His nature is neither a mere product of material forces (as materialists claim), nor is it a result of ideas or some metaphysical forces (as idealists claim), but it is dialectically interwoven with the process of*

production and reproduction of social life and its corresponding class relations; it is “the ensemble of the social relations.”

11. Another fundamental proposition of this part is the role of man in history. Unlike Marxist economists and structuralists, who deprive humans of any role, freedom, and maneuver, and turn them into passive objects, ***social dialecticism views humans as both subject and object of history; they are both the products and potential transformers of circumstances. They make their own history as much as history makes them.***

12. Social life is essentially relational and constantly changing. All aspects of man’s existence are the sites of distinct relations. As humans interact with each other, with nature and their material and mental means of production and reproduction of life, their life never stands still; it never repeats itself but is always in a state of quantitative and qualitative changes; it ever assumes new forms.

13. Social history, much like natural history, is the succession of separate stages, each of which has laws of its own. Hence, there is no social life in general. When we speak of human social life, we always have in mind the process of production and reproduction of men’s social life at certain stages of development, such as, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism.

14. ***Humans (humans’ labor, ideas, interests, needs, requirements, and dreams), nature, the mental and material means of life, and the interrelations among them, as productive forces, are the immanent factors of social life. For men to live, they must unite. The specific way***

this union is accomplished also specifies a social mode of production and reproduction of life, and in turn distinguishes different modes of life from each other. Hence, a mode of production of life is not a mode of material production, but it is 'a definite mode of life', a definite mode of production and reproduction of life.

15. As a result of the developments of human social life, social relations have also been divided into distinct but dialectically interrelated relations, such as economic, political, and ideological relations. These relations, as different moments of the process of production and reproduction of life, cannot exist and develop in isolation from each other. ***This proposition implies the following conclusions: a. the impossibility of reducing a mode of production to economic, political, or ideological relations. b. The impossibility of isolation of the superstructure from the infrastructure. c. The impossibility of isolation of economic, political, and ideological relations from each other, or from the process of production and reproduction of human social life, and its corresponding class relations.***

16. History is made up of many intersecting internal and external tendencies, relations, and forces. Hence, it does not follow a consistent pattern. There is no unilateral type of development and transition in social life.

17. Social classes are not gradational groups. They are determined neither by market relations (as Weberian claims), nor by authority relations (as conflict theoreticians believe). Classes are not located just in production relations (as all Marxists claim). They are determined not merely by their relations to the material means of productions as Marxist economists claim), not exclusively by class

consciousness (as Marxist historicists suggest), and not by ideological functions of social formations (as Marxist structuralists claim). *Each mode of production of life is not just the process of production and reproduction of use-values, but it is, simultaneously, the process of creation of contradictory life or social classes, which separate people's modes of life, their interests, requirements, needs, wills, and ideas from each other. From this definition the following conclusions flow:*

a. social classes are nothing more than the effect of a historically created mode of production and reproduction of life on its agents.

b. Arising from contradictory conditions in life, social classes are not located just in the economic infrastructure, they cannot be reduced to economic classes, but they are within social production and reproduction of life, within economic, political, and ideological relations. Hence, political, and ideological agents have as much class membership as economic agents.

c. There has been, and there will be no classless society, from those of primitive communities to those of the most advanced societies. The Marxist concept of a classless society is nothing more than utopian Marxism. It can be rejected as soon as we accept that men's life is social, because in social life, a commanding will be needed to

coordinate and unify the process of production and reproduction of life.

d. Class relations are power relations. d. Class relations are not homogenous but constitute a complex whole, full of internal and external contradictions.

e. Throughout its historical development, the social process of production and reproduction of life has undergone many divisions, so that in its advanced forms, it consists of distinct but dialectically interrelated economic, political, and ideological relations. In fact, social divisions of labor into economic, political, and ideological relations, create new contradictory conditions within social classes, and divide social classes into economic, political, and ideological fractions. Thus, class fractions and class strata are nothing more than the effects on class relations of the historically created economic, political, and ideological division of labor of the advanced modes of life.

f. The working class are all those people who, to survive, offer their labor in exchange for receiving money in the labor market, they do not have the material means of production and reproduction of social life, and their class affiliation and orientation depends on their expertise and income. Therefore, the lower class or the working class are not only those workers who work in the production lines or work in the infrastructure, but also include all employees who works for government, social, political, health institutions, service sectors, and

etc. Thus, people are called workers who, in the process of production and reproduction of social life, offer their labor in exchange of money (wages, salary) and are from low level of income.

g. And the middle class are all those people who own small businesses and those workers (employees) who have higher expertise and incomes in the production and reproduction of social life. Their class struggles depend on their historical determined class conditions and class interests, that is, sometimes their class interests are aligned with the ruling class and sometimes their class interests are aligned with the lower working class, and hence, they cooperate with working class in class struggles.

18. When men work together, they create a new phenomenon, a new organism, a new apparatus, a new means of production and reproduction of social life, that it has its own individuality, interests, needs, and power which are not identical with the interests, powers, and needs of its constituent individuals. This of course does not mean that the new organism constitutes an independent or sui-generis entity, but, on the contrary, the existence, changes, development, and transition of this organism are produced, regulated, and manipulated by its constituent parts and corresponding class relations.

For this study, social apparatuses are the sites of men's social production and reproduction of life and the corresponding class relations. They exist and continually evolve out of the life process of individuals, and their corresponding class relations; therefore, all relations within and between apparatuses are social relations and, simultaneously, class relations.

We reject all those Marxist notions that regard the state as a passive instrument in the hand of the ruling class, as a *sui-generis* structure with its own will, or as something external, above, or under class relations. Social dialecticism departs from all those Marxists who hold globalization (the world capitalist system) as the result of the trade among nations, or as a product of the articulation of structural levels of different social formations but as an extension of capitalism.

19. A scientific understanding of the nature of state apparatuses is possible, if historical development of social modes of production and reproduction of life and their historically created divisions of labor into economic, political, and ideological relations are taken into consideration.

The state, as an organic part of social life and its corresponding class relations, represents a commanding power to coordinate, secure, legitimize, organize, eorganize, disorganize, protect, and unify the process of production and reproduction of life and its corresponding class relations. The state has as its object the process of production and reproduction of the historically produced dominant mode of production of life, its articulations with other modes within and outside its social formations, and the corresponding class relations. As

a constituent part of the social production and reproduction of life, and its corresponding class relations, the state is not a neutral, sui-generis or independent, entity, but much like other relations and apparatuses, it is governed, manipulated, ruined, by class relations, dominated by ruling class interests.

The state may occasionally serve the interest of dominated classes or a common interest of all people but in the last instance, it is always a repressive force of ruling class against the dominated classes. Hence, state is always a ruling class state, but never a “people” state.

State powers correspond to social classes:

a) The state is immensely powerful and acts as the ruling class where there is no discernible civil society.

b) The state’s power is relative to that of the working classes where and when the latter are organized and well-represented, however, the ruling classes are still dominant.

c) The state is the string-puppet of the ruling class when the working class is not organized and weak. This would bring the dictatorship of the nongovernmental ruling class and big corporations. HERE, CORPORATOCRACY SUBSTITUTES DEMOCRACY.

20. A scientific analysis of the world capitalist system, imperialism, is possible without reducing the unit of analysis to an abstract theory of an isolated capitalist mode of production, without reducing our object of investigation to politico—economic structures of the peripheral satellites, or trade relations among nations. Marx and almost all his followers believe that imperialism is an answer to the increase in the rate of composition of capital, c/v . This proposition is based on Marxist ideas that only human labor can produce value and surplus value; machinery cannot.

Social dialecticism rejects Marxist idea that man's labor is the sole source of the production of value and surplus value and posits that machine labor can also produce value and surplus value. For capitalists, human labor and machine labor are two different modes of employment of variable capital. Both produce value and surplus value; both are the generators of more value; both produce equivalent value for their maintenance, and surplus value for capitalists.

In fact, by means of machinery, capitalist production changes not only the technical basis of production, the function of labor, and the social division of labor, but also the system of production of value and surplus value. Now, for capitalists, human labor is no longer the sole source of the production of value and surplus value, but machinery constitutes another potential source for the production and reproduction of value and surplus value. Hence, the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is not based on the increase of the rate of composition of capital, c/v , but on the competition among capitalists. Indeed, the increase of the rate composition of capital is one of the fundamental means for capitalists to fight with their competitors, and to combat the falling rate of profit.

21. This study holds the world capitalist system as a global articulation of distinct but dialectically interrelated modes of production and reproduction of life and their corresponding class relations.

Although the historical origin of the relationships between the core and peripheral countries dates from the creation, in the 16th century, of a world embracing market, but imperialism, as the highest stage of core/periphery relations, dates from the creation, in the 19th century, of the world capitalist system.

The main characteristics of this stage in the core are the constant transformation of small industry into large-scale industry, the concentration of production and capital (monopoly capital) and the investment of capital on a world scale.

Peripheral satellites, on the other hand, are characterized by the dominated economic, political, and ideological relations, by a substantial upsurge of productive forces, and by sub imperialist states, which own, operate, and control, almost all major mental and material means of life, and with that, the whole process of production and reproduction of life.

The imperialist stage is also accompanied by a rapid division of labor and the emergence of new economic activities, including service industries, which has grown increasingly in recent decades and has established another important feature of the Imperial Stage.

Thus, imperialism, as the world capitalist system, came into being when there existed dialectical or mutual interrelations and interdependence between the capitalist core and the non-capitalist peripheral satellites; when neither core nor periphery could produce and reproduce themselves in isolation from each other.

22. The impact of the core/ periphery relations on the periphery is not a retrogressive process, but, on the contrary, a progressive one. The capitalist core fulfills a triple mission in the periphery:

a) The replacement of the traditional mode of production with a new dominated alienated mode of production and reproduction of life.

b) The precondition of national advance and the growth of capitalism.

c) The overthrow of all progressive foundations and forces, before the benefits can be enjoyed.

Hence, the progressive effects of the world capitalist system on the periphery have two main characteristics:

a) They are artificial, that is, do not have national roots.

b) They are temporary, that is, they must be stopped, blocked, or overthrown at certain stages of development before they can go further, deeper; before they possess national roots; before the benefits can be enjoyed.

In recent decades, high wages, and operation costs in advanced countries, such as the U.S., Japan and Western Europe, have forced corporations to outsource or offshore millions of industrial, service, and IT jobs to cheap labor nations, at the expense of their main street economies.

23. To understand the dynamic of imperialism is to understand before anything else the dynamic of capitalism. Capitalism may be characterized here by four economic characteristics:

a) It is the highest stage of commodity economy.

b) It is based on the production of surplus value

c) It embodies the productive use of profit, that is, the reinvestment of the large part of profit in the process of production and reproduction.

d) It cannot exist and develop internally; that is, the accumulation of capital or the realization of profits requires external markets. The external non-capitalist space is the necessary condition of capitalist accumulation, the establishment of the world market, and then, the creation of the capitalist world system, imperialism; e) We have imperialism when the Western firms are exporting capital, outsourcing, and offshoring their businesses. So, by exporting manufacturing and information technology overseas, in fact, the West develops capitalism in all those countries, to which their different types of investments are exported.

Of course, this is happening to the benefit of big corporations economy or “Wall Street” economy, at the expense of their Western “Main Street” economies or People Economies.

The aggressive nature and the dynamics of the world capitalist system come from the fact that capitalism is unable to exist and develop by

itself. The unlimited production and limited consumption, and the need for foreign markets, compel capitalism to nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connections everywhere. Its necessity to expand knows no rights. Its necessity for self-preservation violates all human rights, and the rights of all nations. It must destroy all traditional modes of life, to subject them to its rules and needs. On the one hand, it compels all nations to become capitalist, on the other hand, as it cannot be a universal mode, it tries to stop, block, or overthrow the growth of capitalism in the peripheral satellites.

24. IMPERIALISM NEEDS PROTECTION. THE CORE/PERIPHERY RELATION WAS ESTABLISHED, CONTINUED TO EXIST, AND DEVELOPED BY THE DIRECT ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMPERIALIST STATES OF THE CORE, AND SUB IMPERIALIST STATES OF THE PERIPHERAL SATELLITES.

25. There are many different types of dependencies between and within phenomena, including relative dependency, mutual, absolute, or dialectical dependency in which neither side cannot survive without having relations with other side (s) except by changing qualitatively its system, its mode of life.

IV

Without a scientific knowledge of the nature of imperialism, various strategies may mislead revolutionary practices, or run the risk of severe defeat.

Dialecticism as a revolutionary science cannot stand still; it must be enriched by new scientific knowledge corresponding to new historical facts and tasks.

No remedy can be prescribed for the liberation of people from the aggressive interests and monopolistic/corrupting forces of capitalism except dominated classes by organizing themselves transform capitalism to a more humanistic mode of life in which people's will, needs, requirements, well beings, interests, and their continuous development are the chief aim of the process of production and reproduction of life.

IN SHORT, HUMAN WELFARE OUGHT TO BE THE MAIN GOAL OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL STRATEGY.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, T. W. *Negative Dialectics*. N.Y.: The Seebury Press, 1973.

Adibi, H. *jame-eh shenassy-e tabaghaaty-e ejtemaayee*. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1971.

Agger, B. *Western Marxism: An Introduction*. Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1979.

Alban, J. *The Politics of Iran*. Ohio: A Bell and Howel Co., 1972.

Althusser, L. *Essay in Self-Criticism*, trans. by G. Lock. London: NLB., 1976.

Althusser, L. *For Marx*. London: Verso, 1979.

Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. *Reading Capital*. London: Verso, 1979.

Amin, S. *Accumulation on a World Scale*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Amin, S. *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

Amin, S. *The Law of Value and Historical Materialism*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

Amin, S. *The Arab Nation - Nationalism and Class Struggles*. London: Zed Press, 1983.

Anderson, P. *Passage from Antiquity to Feudalism*. London: Verso, 1979.

226 Dialecticism

Anderson, P. *Considerations on Western Marxism*. London: Verso, 1979.

Anderson, P. *Arguments Within English Marxism*. London: Verso, 1980.

Applebaum, R. P. "Born-Again Functionalism? A Reconsideration of Althusser's Structuralism." *Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 1 (Summer, 1979). 18-33.

Arani, S. "Iran." *Dissent* (Winter, 1980): 9126 Aron, R. "Power and Status Relations," in *Class, Status, and Power*, 201-210, edited by R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1969.

Aron, R. *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*. Vol. I and II. N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968 and 1970.

Arrighi, G. and Saul, J. *Essay on Political Economy of Africa*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Arthur, C. J. "Dialectics of Labour," in *Issues in Marxist Philosophies*, 87-116, edited by J. Mephram and D-H. Rubben. N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979.

Ashraf, A. *Mavaane-i tareekhi-i roshd-i sarmayedary dar Iran*. Tehran: Zamineh, 1980.

Babbie, E. R. *The Practice of Social Research*. California: Walsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1979.

Banani, A. The Modernization of Iran. California: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Baran, P. The Political Economy of Growth. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1957.

Bibliography 227

Baran, P. and Sweezy, P.H. Monopoly Capital. N.Y.: Modern Reader Paperback, 1966.

Bendix, R. "Social Stratification and the Political Community," in Class, Status, and Power, 73-86, edited by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1966.

Bendix, R. and Lipset, S.M. Class, Status, and Power. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1966.

Benneth, J. Kant's Dialectics. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

Benton, T. Philosophical Foundation of Three Sociologies. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.

Berger, P.L. and Luckman, T. The Social Construction of Reality. N.Y.:
Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1976.

Bettelheim, C. The Transition of Socialist Economy. Great Britain: The Harvester
Press Limited, 1978.

Bill, J. A. The Politics of Iran. Ohio: Bell and Howell Co., 1972.

Blau, P.H. Exchange and Power in Social Life. N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1964.

Bloch, M. "Feudal Society," in *Structured Social Inequality*, 79-100, edited by C.S. Heller. London: McMillan Co., 1969.

Bottomore, T. "Classes in Modern Societies," in *Structured Social Inequality*, 524-531, edited by C.S. Heller. London: McMillan Co., 1969.

228 Dialecticism

Bottomore, T. *Karl Marx*. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973.

Braverman, H. *Labour and Monopoly Capital*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Brewer, A. *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

Bukharin, N. *Historical Materialism*. N.Y.: Russel & Russel, Inc., 1965.

Bukharin, N. *Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Burris, V. "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research." *Insurgent Sociologist* (Summer, 1979), 4-18.

Centers, R. *The Psychology of Social Class*. N.Y.: Russel & Russel, 1961.

Chomsky, N. *American Power and the New Mandarins*. N.Y.: Pentagon Books, 1969.

Cole, G.D.H. *Socialist Thought - Marxism and Anarchism*. N.Y.: International Publishers, 1968.

Colletti, Lucio, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, translated by J. White. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Colletti, Lucio, *Marxism and Hegel*, translated by L. Garner. London: NLB., 1973.

Colletti, Lucio, "Dialectic and Marxism." *New Left Review* (1975) 3-29.

Cornforth, M. *Historical Materialism*. N.Y.: International Publishers, 1977.

Bibliography 229

Cornforth, M. *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*. N.Y.: International Publishers, 1978.

Dahrendorf, R. "Social Structure, Group Interest, Conflict Groups," trans. by J. Lopreato, in *Social Stratification*, 55-63, edited by L.S. Lewis. A Reader, 1974.

David, K. and Moore, W.E. "Some Principle of Stratification," in *Structured Social Inequality*, 496-503, edited by C.S. Heller. London: McMillan Co., 1969.

Durkheim, E. *Suicide*. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1951.

Durkheim, E. *The Division of Labour in Society*. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1964.

Emmanuel, E. *Unequal Exchange*. London: NLB., 1972.

Emmanuel, E. "Myth of Development vs. Myth of Underdevelopment." *New Left Review* 85 (May/June).

Engels, F. *Anti-Dühring*. N.Y.: International Publishers, 1978.

Engels, F. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. N.Y.: I.P., 1978.

Engels, F. *Dialectics of Nature*. N.Y.: I.P., 1979.

Evan, J.D.G. Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic. London: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Fine, B. and Harris, L. Rereading Capital. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1979.

230 Dialecticism

Frank, A. G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1967.

Frank, A.G. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Frisk, H. "Dialectics and Ontology," in Issues in Marxist Philosophy, 117-143, edited by J. Mepham and D-H. Rubben. N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979.

Fromm, E. Marx's Concept of Man. N.Y.: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1976.

Gadamer, H.G. Hegel's Dialectic. London: Yale University Press, 1976.

Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. From Max Weber. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Gidden, A. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975.

Gidden, A. Capitalism and Modern Social theory. London: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Gidden, A. Sociology. N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1982.

Golden, M.P. The Research Experience. Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1976.

Gramsci, A. Prison Notebook. N.Y.: I.P., 1980.

Gregor, A. James, A Survey of Marxism. N.J.: Random House, 1955.

Bibliography 231

Groseclose, E. Introduction to Iran. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Gurvitch, G. Motale-eh dar bareh-eh Tabaghat-I Ejtemaii, trans, into Persian by B. Parham. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1973.

Haug, M.R. "Measurement in Social Stratification." Annual Review (1977): 51-77.

Heller, C.S. Structured Social Inequality. London: McMillan Co., 1969.

Hobson, J.A. Imperialism. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1965.

Howe, G.N. "Political Economy, The Internationalization of Capital, and the New World System: A Critique of Classical Dependency Theory." Paper Presented at L.A.S.A., Bloomington, Indiana, 1980.

Howe, G.N. "Introduction." Paper provided for the Introduction to Palloix' Travail et Production, Washington, D.C.

Huberman, L. and Sweezy, M. Introduction to Socialism. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, , Inc., 1973.

Inkeles, A. "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," in Social Stratification: A Reader, 510-522, ed. J. Lopreato and L.S. Lewis, 1974.

Jazani, Bijan, *Socio-Economic Analysis of a Dependent Capitalist State*.

London: The Iran Committee, 1973.

Jasani, Bijan, *Tarikh-i Sisaleh-I Iran*. Tehran, 1958.

232 Dialecticism

Jasani, Bijan, *Tarh-i Jameh-eh Shenassi va Mabani-i Strategy-i Jonbesh Enghelabi-I Iran*. Tehran: S.C.F.K.I., 1978.

Keddie, N.R. *Religion and Rebellion in Iran*. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966.

Keller, S. "Beyond the Ruling Class-Strategic Elites," in *Structured Social Inequality*, pp. 520-524, ed. by C.S. Heller, 1969.

Khosravi, K. *Jameh-eh Shenassi-e Roostaii-i Iran*. Tehran: Payam, 1979.

Khosravi, K. *Jameh-eh Dehghani dar Iran*. Tehran: Payam, 1979.

Khosravi, K. *Nezamhaye Bahrehbardary az Zamin dar Iran*. Tehran: Shabgir.

Kuhn, T.S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Lee, H.D.P. *Zeno of Elea*. London: Cambridge, 1963.

Lenin, V.I. *National Liberation, Socialism, and Imperialism*. N.Y.: I.P., 1968.

Lenin, V.I. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. N.Y.: I.P., 1972.

Lenin, V.I. *The State and Revolution*. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976.

Lenin, V.I. The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977.

Lenin, V.I. Left Wing Communism. N.Y.: I.P., 1978.

Lenin, V.I. What is to be Done? N.Y.: I.P., 1978.

Bibliography 233

Lenin, V.I. Imperialism – the Highest Stage of Capitalism. N.Y.: I.P., 1980.

Lenski, G.E. Power and Privilege. N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1966.

Lukacs, G. History of Class Consciousness. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971.

Lukacs, G. The Young Hegel, trans. by R. Livingston. London: The MIT Press, 1975.

Luxembourg, R. Accumulation of Capital. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1972.

McLennan, G. Marxism and the Methodologies of History. London: Verso, 1981.

Mandel, E. Late Capitalism, trans. by J.D. Bres. London: Verso, 1978.

Mao Zedong, Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong. Peking: F.L.P., 1971.

Mao Zedong, Quotations from the Chairman. Peking: F.L.P., 1976.

Marx, K. Class Struggles in France. N.Y.: I.P., 1976.

Marx, K. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. N.Y.: I.P. 1977.

Marx, K. *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formation*, ed. by E.J. Hobsbawm, trans. by J. Cohen. N.Y.: I.P., 1980.

234 Dialecticism

Marx, K. *Capital*, Vol. I, ed. by F. Engels, trans. by S. Moore and E. Aveling. N.Y.: I.P., 1979.

Marx, K. *Capital*, Vol. II, ed. by F. Engels, trans. by S. Moore and E. Aveling. N.Y.: I.P., 1977.

Marx, K. *Capital*. Vol. III, ed. by F. Engels, trans. by S. Moore and E. Aveling. N.Y.: I.P., 1977.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. *On Colonialism*. N.Y.: I.P., 1972.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. *The German Ideology*, ed. by C.J. Arthur. N.Y.: I.P., 1978.

Marx, K. and Engels, F. *The Communist Manifesto*. N.Y.: I.P., 1979.

McTaggart, J.M.E. *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*. N.Y.: Russel & Russel, 1964.

Meikle, S. "Dialectical Contradiction and Necessity," in *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*. 5-35, ed. by J. Mepham and D-H. Ruben, 1979.

Mepham, J. "From Grundrisse to Capital," in *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*. 145-171, ed. by J. Mepham and D-H. Ruben, 1979.

Mepham, J. and Ruben, D-H. Issues in Marxist Philosophy. N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979.

Merton, R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1968.

Bibliography 235

Merton, R.K. The Sociology of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Miliband, R. Marxism and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Mills, C.W. The Sociological Imagination. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Mills, C.W. "The Power Elite in the United States," in Social Stratification: A Reader. 362-369, ed. by J. Lopreato, 1974.

Nobari, A.R. Iran Erupts. Stanford: Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978.

Nomani, F. "The Origin and Development of Feudalism in Iran." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1972.

Olson, M. Power in Societies. London: McMillan Co., 1970
Ossowski, S. "Different Conceptions of Social Class," in Class, Status, and Power, 86-96, ed. By R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, 1966.

Owen, G.E.L. Aristotle on Dialectic. London: Oxford University Press.

Pahlavi, M.R. Answer to History. N.Y.: Stein and Day Publishers, 1980.

Pareto, V. "The Circulation of Elites," in *Power in Societies*, 114-122. ed. by M. Olson, 1970.

Parkin, F. *Class Inequality and Political Order*. N.Y.: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

236 Dialecticism

Parsons, T. "On the Concept of Political Power," in *Class, Status, and Power*, 240-265, ed. By R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, 1966.

Parsons, T. *The Evolution of Societies*. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1977.

Parsons, T. *Social System and the Evolution of Action Theory*. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1977.

Petras, J. *Politics and Social Structure in Latin America*. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1970.

Petrushevsky, I.P. *Keshavarzi va Monassebat-i Arzi dar Iran-i Ahd-I Moghul*, 2Vols. trans. into Persian by K. Keshavarz. Tehran: Nil, 1979.

Pietre, A. *Marx and Marxism*, trans. Into Persian by S. Zialian. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1973.

Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.A. *Regulating the Poor*. N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1972.

Politzer, G. *Elementary Principles of Philosophy*. N.Y.: I.P. 1978.

Polma, M.M. *Contemporary Sociological Theory*. N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1979.

Poulantzas, N. Political Power and Social Classes. London: Verso, 1978.

Poulantzas, N. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Verso, 1979.

Poulantzas, N. "The New Petty Bourgeoisie." *Insurgent Sociologists*, 1 (Summer, 1979): 56-60.

Bibliography 237

Poulantzas, N. State Power Socialism. London: Verso, 1980.

Ritzer, G. Contemporary Sociological Theory. N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.

Robinson, R. Plato's Earlier Dialectic. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Roosevelt, K. Countercoup. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1979.

Rossides, D.W. The History and the Nature of Sociological Theory.

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978.

Ruben D-H. "Marxism and Dialectics," in *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, 37-86, ed. by J. Mepham and D-H. Ruben, 1979.

Runciman, W.G. Weber - Selections in Translations. London: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Said, E.W. Orientalism. N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1978.

Saltzman Chafetz, J. A Primer on the Construction and Testing of Theories in Sociology. Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1983.

Sennett R. and Cobb, J. The Hidden Injuries of Class. N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1973.

Shajyli, Z. Vezarat and Veziran dar Iran. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1956.

Shaw, W.H. Marx's Theory of History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978.

Sherman, K. and Mood, J.L. Sociology – Traditional and Radical Perspectives. N.Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1979.

238 Dialecticism

Skotnes, A. "Structural Determination of the Proletariat and the Petty Bourgeoisie: A Critique of N. Poulantzas." *Insurgent Sociologists*, (Summer, 1979): 34-52.

Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations. N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1980.

Stalin, J. V. Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. Peking: F.L.P., 1972.

Stalin, J. V. Foundation of Leninism. N.Y.: I.P., 1977.

Stalin, J. V. Dialectical and Historical Materialism. Washington: Row Publication.

Stenzel, J. Plato's Method of Dialectic. N.Y.: Russel and Russel, 1964.

Szymanski, A. The Logic of Imperialism. N.Y.: Praegar, 1981.

Tommies, F. Community and Society. N.Y.: Harper and Row Publishers, 1957.

Trotsky, L. The Permanent Revolution. N.Y.: Pathfinder Press, 1978.

Tucker, R.C. The Marx-Engels Reader. N.Y.: W. W. Northon and Co. Inc., 1978.

Turner, J.H. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1978.

Wallace, W.L. Sociological Theory. N.Y.: Aldine Publishing Co. 1979.

Wallerstein, I. *The Modern World System*. N.Y.: Academic Press, 1976.

Warner, W.L. and Eells, K. "Status Inequality," in *Structured Social Inequality*, 175-183, ed. by C.S. Heller, 1969.

Warren, B. *Imperialism Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: Verso, 1980.

Bibliography 239

Weber, M. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976.

Wells, A. *Contemporary Sociological Theories*. Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co. Inc.

Wesolowski, W. "Some Notes on the Functional Theory of Stratification," in *Structured Social Inequality*. 503-513, ed. By C.S. Heller, 1969.

Wetter, G.A. *Soviet Ideology Today*, trans. by P. Health. N.Y.: Fredrick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966.

Wetter, G.A. *Dialectical Materialism*, trans. by P. Health. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973.

Wilber, C.K. *The Political Economy of Development and Under-development*. N.Y.: R.H., 1973.

Wright, E.O. *Class Structure and Income Determination*. N.Y.: Academic Press, Inc., 1979.

Wrong, O.H. "Social Inequality Without Social Stratification," in *Structured Social inequality*, 513-520, ed. by C.S. Heller, 1969.

Wrong, O.H. and Gracy, H.L. Reading in Introductory Sociology. N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1977.

Zeitlin, I.M. Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory. N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.

240 Dialecticism

Zeitlin, I.M. Rethinking Sociology. N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.

Zhackean, A. Mabani-i Elm- Eghtessad, trans. into Persian by M. Farhang. Tehran: Melli University Press, 1973.

Zonis M. The Political Elite of Iran. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.